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This dissertation traces the life aiu. career of James 
Sofasonke Mpanza , in particular since he became involved in 
local politics in Orlando in 1935.
His major political act was the organisation of a large 
squatter camp in 1944. On the basis of this he and the 
Sofasonke Party rose to power in Orlando. With the political 
climate resulting from the rise of national politics in the 
1950's, his party lost its support but returned in the wake of 
state repression. He was drawn into state structures , but 
retained a widespread good reputation in spite of this.
vThis work seeks to demonstrate through a highly detailed 
story of Mpanza's carreer that only political power built on 
the organisation of working class demands is durable , but also 
only if this is accompanied by an ideology consistent with 
working class interests. It is the former on which Mpanza's 
reputation is based and the lack of the latter which led to his 
downfall.
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The little green snake which is killed on sight,
the little greefTsnake which has long been entering different holes ,
Until it fell into a big one ,
From which, we are told, nothing returns,
But it returned, even today it is still here with us..
Once, in Durban, he was attacked by an Indian,
Who came to regret attacking those who shouldn’t be,
He had poked a hornet's nest and was consumed by flames 
Right up to his home-made shoes ,
And the crocodile swallowed up Sofasonke ,
Swallowed him right up to his head-ring.
And in the Crocodile's stomach he knelt and prayed,
Prayed to the living God , who heard him and answered ,
And the Crocodile swallowed him for fifteen days and then spat him out,
Who can dare do what you did Sofasonke?
Swim in a crocodile infested pool, where one ate him up, and even ate the 
foam from his body.
The great Mpanza flood, which swept away men, women and children,
And said, "Come out, follow me and I'll build you houses on Municipal 
land ,
And Magebhula cut up Municipal land, and that was that,
And built people houses out of sackcloth and filled a Municipal valley , 
Ndaba , in all your years , Have you ever seen a house of sackcloth?
There, then is Sofesonke building people houses out of sack-cloth,
We will follow greyhaired Father Mpanza to the death,
Buffalo whom they chained and threw into prison ,
He roared and the chains broke and prison gates opened,
Out he went, pranced about, and went right back to the sack city.
When he was at the Governor-General decreed that he be banished!
The police came for him and he headed for iXopo ,
But on the way, he sneezed, and turned back home, to the sack city,
Trie great judge shouted in the loud voice of the law and said he must be 
brought back'.
He turned at Standerton and retraced his steps.
The enemy gaped , but the family were jubilant ,
The women and children sang the song "Zulus, Sothos , Xhosas unite!"
Buffalo who exploited the law in sack-city until your will was done , 
Sofasonke,
You forsook your comfortable house and went to live in cold sack-city 
That's right, Ndaba! a general dies with his army!
Today we live in houses all through you, Sofasonke,
Famous One whose fame spread even to England ,
Those who lacked houses took your example and went out and built houses 
out of sack-cloth,
Buffalo who exploited the law in sack city,
Having previously done the same in Durban.
Refer them, son of Mpanza,
Refer them to the law books, since they made the laws 
Dove that feeds on pebbles like a crocodile
You great counter-puncher who makes them eat their own words,
They say I should praise you, but. how does one praise a person so well
(Vi)
You great saviour who saved the men and women of Orlando on May Day 
When Verwoerd raged till morning with his police at Orlando station,
And you hurried to the Commandant of the police in town,
And you said, "Sir, hurry go and stop your police 
You had sent them to-go and quell some trouble 
But now they are shooting indiscriminately"
Sofasonkel You slippery one 
Buffalo of many scars'.
He escaped at Mfesane when the crocodile had swallowed and then spitted him out, 
And escaped in Joburg when the Governor-General had banished him.
Prosecutor who prosecutes even his own mother-in-law 
We'll follow you , grey-haired Mpanza to the death 
Then the crooks will remain ruling our land.
BANTU KDELD, JULY 11 , 1953.
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PREFACE
The essential purpose of this dissertation is to deepen knowledge of 
Soweto, its peoples and the issues in their lives in an accessible form. 
It seeks to deepen that understanding both by showing the historical 
developments and by introducing analytic points related to these 
developments. The concern with accessibility is what determined the 
heavy emphasis on empirical detail and where possible the words of the * 
people concerned. It was also this which persuaded me to use the vehicle 
of the life story of Mpanza and his Sofasonke Party as the unifying 
thread in so many events of importance to Soweto people.
It is my belief that the role of the Intellectual should be defined 
primarily by broader social needs and more specifically that it is the 
duty of the intellectual to serve the working class. With this in view 
the use of excessive jargon and explicit discussion of abstract theory 
have been avoided . although interpretation of events has been informed by 
theory.
I wish to thank my supervisors, Doug Iiindson, for his support at 
difficult times, and Tom Lodge whose assistance, enthusiasm and 
encouragement found invisible expression on these pages. Thanks also to 
Colleen McCaul and Judy Mailer whose support made the more trying moments 
more durable and who shared the anxiety and excitement in producing 
this.. My appreciation must also go to Thea Jarvis who typed all of this 
and to many friends who contributed in many smaller ways. But
recognition must also go to the many people in Soweto including members 
of the Sofasonke Party, who offered help and proudly encouraged me to 
write this story so that everyone can know about the history of their 
great city and the great man who lived in it.
A small part of this dissertation has been published before. A short 
essay on the 1944 squatter camp was published in Africa Perspective No. 
21, in 1982 and a brief easy to read story of Mpanza's life In Learn and 
Teach Magazine No. 5, 1982.
(ix)
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1CHAPTER ONE : MPANZA’S EARLY LIFE AND THE ROAD TO ORLANDO, 1889 - 1934
"There is a lovely road that runs from Ixopo into the 
hills.' These hills are grass-covered and rolling , 
and they are lovely beyond any sihging of it."(l)
On one of these hills , no more than sixty kilometers to the north east ,
lived the daughter of chief Mlotshwa Sibisi of Pinetown, wife of Ventile
ka Mbihlana Mpanza of the Mtetwa clan. The Mtetwa clan were descended 
from Dingiswayo. He is said to have been the first man to introduce
horses to Zululand. Ventile too,in the tradition of his clan, had known 
horses.
But much had changed since Dingiswayo. While life remained much the
same at the Georgedale Mission Reserve where the Mpanzas lived, the 
Durban to Pietermaritzburg road nearby was stirred to life. v ' . They 
said that over the Drakensberg in the Boer republic gold had been
discovered and that a whole city of black and white was growing up around
.(4)the diggings. The whites called it Johannesburg , but to most
Zulu's it was known as Igoli - meaning "gold". They said there was
money to be made' and with taxes to pay many left to dig for the new 
bosses. The mines recruited skilled white labour from Europe, America,
Australia and Canada. With their skills, these whites were able to get 
the better emerging jobs.
The blacks were less keen on the work. Most only went to earn enough to 
pay their taxes then returned to their families on the land. Not only
did they do the less rewarding work but the whites had begun to exclude
them when they elected the Diggers Committee on the 8th November, 1886 
and formed the Sanitary Board in 1887. With their powers and funds 
limited by the Republican Government, this was the start of local 
government in Johannesburg and blacks were excluded. Besides , the
land yielded much to the traditional land-based blacks.
But with the advent of the gold mines new needs rapidly arose. 
Industries immediately related to mining , such as the manufacture of 
explosives, certain branches of engineering and the production of miners' 
boots, were soon established. It also stimulated coal-mining on the 
Rand.
2There also arose for the authorities, the problem of administration and 
control of the Mushrooming population.
Host blacks were temporary contract workers employed by the mines and 
housed in compounds. But with the growth of support industry they began 
to find alternative employment such as in the municipality and as 
domestic servants. Most blacks were thus left to find their own
accommodation and they looked for places near their work.
This freedom to choose where to live was not because the Government of 
the South African Republic preferred it that way or had no other ideas on 
the matter. Central to their policy of urban black control was the 
location which for example was compulsorily established in the 
Potchefstroora Municipal Constitution in 1884. But the haphazard 
eruption of Johannesburg left little scope for planning.
An attempt at planning was made when stands were sold for the village of
Johannesburg on the 1st June, 1887 and areas were set aside by the Mining
Commissioner for 'Coolies and Arabs’. This was some one and a half
miles to the ~west of the village and. later to be called 'Coolie
Location'. Within a year blacks had also built shacks there. The
Sanitary Board was then empowered to construct a 'Native Location' with
revenue to be raised by means of a poll tax on residents for whom it
provided housing. This was not followed through, but there was an
(7)attempt to contain squatting by banning the building of reed huts.
The ripples of all this development were felt far and wide.
"The most stagnant of colonial regions suddenly 
exploded into activity. Figures are hardly sufficient 
to describe the greatness of the changes that the 
smallest village and remotest kraal
experienced ...-"(8)
Millions of tons of food and mining equipment were needed. To answer 
this need thousands of South Africans of all races became 
transport-riders driving ox-wagons from the ports to the Transvaal.
3"This played a very important role in the 
transformation of farming because it drew the landless 
away from the land and indeed some landowners as well , 
for good money was to be made if one could gather 
together sufficient capital to purchase a wagon and a 
span of oxen." (9)
One of those who gathered the money together and bought a wagon was 
Ventile Mpanza. He avoided going to work and live in Johannesburg and 
while his family lived in their huts at Georgedale, Ventile went out to 
join the traffic on the Durban to Pietermaritzburg road and to carry 
goods to the Transvaal mines. He became a famous transport rider.
Then the Mpanza's lived well.
(10)
But this was not to last. With such a demand and profits to be made the 
railway lines were pushed on to the Witwatersrand as rapidly as 
possible. As they linked up to the mines from Cape Town, Port 
Elizabeth, East London and Durban, work for the transport riders began to 
fall off. (11)
Many 
left destitute.
who had invested in and become dependent on the wagon trade were
(12)
"The splendid stepping ox , the pride of every farmer 
who had a well-trained team, became a lumbering beast 
that impeded progress ..." (13)
This contributed to the problems of rural poverty and the migration to 
the towns. ^  ^
For Ventile the Durban road nearby began to quieten and poverty 
threatened. At this time was born their fourth child and second son.
"I , Sofasonke Mpanza , born May 15 , 1889 - only three 
weeks younger than Hitler - had many blows in my 
youthful days." (15)
He was baptized on June the 9th in the same year by the Rev. Gluckner of 
the Lutheran Clinch in New Germany near Durban. The Rev. Gluckner 
remarked on the beauty of his second name 'Sofasonke' , which means 'we 
shall all die together.'
4The many blows soon began to fall. Maybe the problems grew too much, 
but one day when James was only five his father went mad mysteriously and 
died a few months later in the Pietermaritzburg Mental Asylum.
As if this was not enough, his older brother died a year later. Without 
a husband to provide, Mpanza's mother was forced to seek work as a 
domestic worker in Pietermaritzburg. v '
Mpanza grew up in these rolling hills of Natal largely without the 
control and care of parents. With the other small boys he herded cattle 
and learnt to hunt birds and hares while his mother was away.
His first love was his dogs.
"Sofasonke would never eat his food provided by his 
parents if he was not sure his dogs had been fed. His 
best company was two , three or four dogs that were 
properly cared for. When he hunted rabbits he shared 
the spoil equally with his dogs," (19)
Without the protection of a father, Mpanza had to learn to fend for 
himself. It was thus very early in his life that he developed the 
characteristic of_a fighter. As a boy he was almost a bully. He 
delighted in beating up other boys. He would fight with determination 
to the bitter end and usually won. He showed the same determination in 
the games he played with the local boys.
Wien he grew older he moved to Pietermaritzburg to stay with his mother. 
Thera he befriended a man who worked with a trainer of race horses, 
Mpanza was fascinated by these animals. He was often helping at the 
stables and would be allowed to ride the horses. The thrill of those 
rides was to stay in his memory.
In Pietermaritzburg Mpanza's fortune changed for the better. Unlike
many young blacks at the time he attended an Indian school. They often
played with the white children from a neighbouring school. Mpanza
learnt to speak an Indian dialect and also English which was a great
(20)advantage.
5As he learned and played , Mpanza was oblivious to the clouds of war 
gathering in the Transvaal. Far away where people went to dig for gold, 
the British and Boers were fighting and the outcome of that fight would 
not leave his future untouched.
When the war was over the Transvaal was under British control. The 
mines* interrupted by the war, now resumed production and the people 
began to return to Johannesburg. Because of the lack of provision of 
African housing a shanty-town began to develop on the west side of 
town. There were approximately 5 000 people of all races living in this 
area which was called 'Coolie Town'. The Council regarded 'Coolie Town' 
as a health hazard but were prevented by the white electorate from 
clearing it by moving its inhabitants to surrounding areas.
In 1904 there occured in this area something even stronger than the 
opposition of the white electorate - an outbreak of bubonic plague. The 
officials of the Council acted that very night. All inhabitants were 
cleared, and the whole slum was burnt to the ground. The Council agreed 
that accommodation must be found for the refugees, even if only 
temporarily. For the blacks and Indians this was provided on municipal 
land adjoining the sewage disposal works at Klipsprult, fifteen 
kilometers to the south west of Johannesburg. Corrugated tin shelters 
were provided by the Council as temporary shelters, and these were to be
occupied for some thirty years. (21)
The following year (1905) the first municipally established township ,
Klipspruit, was developed here and blacks from overcrowded slum areas
(22)near -to the centre of town were compelled to move there. v For the
inhabitants this was expensive, far away and the housing was inadequate.
But there was little they could do. The Transvaal Municipalities
Election Ordinance of 1903 excluded blacks from voting and set the
(23)precedent for an all-white franchise.
The Transvaal councils had been given greater powers under the Crown 
Colony Government's Municipal Corporations Ordinance of 1903. This 
authorised them to lay out locations, and to regulate "the housing of
natives by their employers” and licensing of casual labour. (24)
6Blacks had thus no rights in the running of the Government or the city 
and came under increasing controls.
The majority avoided going to the location and sought accommodation 
nearer their work. Sofiatown was established in 1905 with freehold 
rights for whites and blacks. Many were attracted to this as owners or 
tenants.
Meanwhile, Mpanza returned from Pietermaritzburg for his fourth standard 
to the Georgedale Primary School. He was a bright pupil and did well in 
his studies particularly with the aid of his good English.
When a school inspector visited Georgedale he ordered the older children
-in standards 4, 5 and 6 to transfer to Edendale Secondary School, near
( Of * }Pietermaritzburg. ' 1
Instead Mpanza went to Indaleni to train as a teacher. He passed the
3rd Class Teacher's Certificate Examination and was fortunate to be able
to start standard 5 at Adam's Seminary near Amamzimtoti , with his
mother's support. This school was later known as the Amanzimtoti Zulu
Training College and was to be the school of many famous black leaders in 
(27)years to come. Mpanza was a good student there and in history
greatly admired Napoleon Bonaparte as one of his heroes.
Here Mpanza achieved recognition as a soccer player. He played for his 
school team, the Amamzimtoti "Shooting Stars" in first division soccer. 
They were a top team in the local league. He soon rose to fame as both 
the captain and a leading defender, occasionally playing centre 
forward. He played with characteristic determination and was soon 
popular with the crowds. Many called him "Man o' Men" ~ Zahlehta ziye 
'Matikulu. v ' It was also at this time that Mpanza developed a new 
interest.
"Women had begun to notice me when I was at primary 
school, but it was iwr until I was at college that I 
began to appreciate them. I was a top scorer for the 
school's soccer team. Shooting Stars. My fans, 
mostly girls, used to call me 'Coy Coy Man' and shout 
'Coy Coy' when I had the ball. Looking back now ... I 
fancy I was too sure of myself then, overflowing with 
exuberant self-confidence". (29)
7For Mpanza the good times were not to last. Though a good student, his 
humble beginnings still made themselves felt. "But examination time 
came in December next year and mother could not raise the examination 
fees." (30)
In 1907 , at the age of 18 he was compelled to leave school to support 
himself. His first job was for the Natal Railway and Harbours as a 
'mabhalane' - a clerk.
He worked there for one year then found a job in January 1908 as a clerk
with a Mr. H.S. Broadbent in a f-irm of attorneys. He worked in
(32)Camperdown and lived in neaby Georgedale. v '
This was Mpanza's first contact with law. He took to reading books of
law and became well versed in legal procedure and jurisprudence. He
made a special study of interpretations by Judges on cases affecting
blacks. To his employers, Mpanza was a trusted clerk and interpreter and
was at times allowed to give advice to some of the clients. This was a
special assignment he enjoyed most. It was an opportunity to show his
(33)knowledge to people who came to the office. K '
Mpanza's 'exuberant self confidence' and his school-time interests 
returned.
”My new job gave me plenty of time for the local
girls. I had prestige. I felt almost a chief, 
fearing neither man nor God. Not that the idea of a 
God ever occurred to me.” (34)
But this was not all. One day a letter arrived for Mpanza that was to 
greatly alter the course of his life and thereby the lives of many 
others. The letter read;
8"To all to whom these presents shall come, greetings:
whereat^ under the provisions of the law entitled 'For 
relieving certain persons from the operation of Native 
Law' , the Governer of Natal , by and with the advice of 
his executive Council is empowered to grant letters of 
exemption to any Native resident in the Colony; And 
whereas James Sofasonke Mpanza being at the present 
time dwelling at Georgedale, in the Division of 
Camperdown, has, in conformity with the provisions of 
the said law, I do hereby make known and declare that 
on and after the date of the publication of these 
presents in the Government Gazette the said James 
Sofasonke Mpanza shall be , and is hereby declared to 
he exempted from, and taken out of the operation of 
Native Law : and shall be, and is, thenceforth subject 
to the ordinary laws of the Colony.
Given by me, this ninth day of September, in the year 
of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eight at 
Government House Pietermaritzburg , Natal.
Matthew Nathan 
Governor
Registered this day, September 15th, 1908 : Herbert
Millar, registrar of Deeds." (35)
Mpanza had now become an honorary white. (36)
But the young Mpanza was soon in trouble.
"It all started this way, I had been going cut with 
a girl called Martha Bengu. One day in 1909 she
jilted me for an African cop in the district. Yes 
m e , James Sofasonke Mpanza, aged 20, and a 5-Pound- 
a-month attorney's dark and so, I fondly thought, 
shove the police.
I couldn't take the snub. I went after her, 
assaulted her and forced her to love me all over
again. But she worked for a clerk of the court. She 
reported me and in due course I was summoned to appear 
in court.
I confidently strutted into the dock, without even 
bothering to brief Counsel. The magistrate jailed me 
for a month without the option of a fine. I was 
furious , straight-way lodged an appeal and the Supreme 
Court reduced the sentence to a 1 Pound fine.
That was my first brush with the law. I was very
satisfied with myself. Dangerously satisfied." (37)
This was a precedent for Mpanza in more ways than one. It was not to be
the only time he went beyond the law and not to be the last that he
sought to conduct his own defence in Court.
9Absorbed by his good fortune and self-satisfaction Mpanza did not notice 
that around him disillusionment was creeping into black political 
thought. The- Vereeniging peace treaty signed by the British and the 
Boers in 1902 did not bring with it hoped for reforms. Having gained 
what they set out to achieve , control over the gold-fields , the British 
were in a conciliatory mood. Self-rule was granted to the Transvaal and 
the Orange River Colony. This was to entrench the racially
discriminatory policies of the Boer Republics. Many blacks had come to 
believe that the war was being fought to establish British non-racial 
justice throughout South Africa. v 1
The treaty had been signed between the two warring factors with no 
consultation with blacks at all. This was an ominous sign of the path 
ahead , a path that led to Union in 1910.
It had been expected that in the Vereeniging Treaty the Cape System of 
limited black,franchise would have been extended to the Boer Republics.
Disillusionment at. this gave rise immediately to a number of new
organisations among blacks. The African People's rganisation,
predominantly coloured, was formed in 1902. Amongst black communities,
local associations, usually with tribal homogeneity, established
themselves in urban and rural areas. Colony-based organisations were
C39')also formed such as the Natal Native Congress. v ' In the Transvaal
was the Transvaal Congress , a Bapedi Union and a Basuto
Association.
When the draft South Africa Act was released in 1907 as a proposed common
law for all colonies in a single union, it was clear that the direction
set by the Vereeniging Treaty was being followed. The black franchise
(41)was restricted to the Cape and only whites could sit in Parliament.
There was immediate response from the black organisations. Regional 
conferences were held in 1908 from which sixty delegates were elected for
a South African Native Convention which met in Bloemfontein in March the
, (A 2)following year.
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Still believing in the liberal paternalism of the British Government, a 
delegation was appointed from the Convention to go to England in 1909 to 
argue the case for* the extension of the Cape franchise system in time for 
the consolidation of the Union. v ' This failed and the British
government took the easier path of abiding with the wishes of the 
established white colonial governments. Thus in 1910 the Union of South 
Africa was established without consultation and depriving blacks of 
democratic rights. Thus the ruling class in South Africa adopted a 
strategy that was to set the tone for racial oppression and capitalist 
domination. The ball was now in the court of the oppressed.
The new Union government was dominated by racists who made further 
threats of control and restriction on the black masses. Black leaders 
were alarmed and sought to heal the division which had weakened them by 
calling for a meeting to establish a National Congress. On the
8th January 1912, close on 100 delegates met in Bloemfontein.
"Those who attended wTere the products of missionary 
education - ministers, teachers, clerks, interpreters, 
a few successful farmers, builders, small-scale
traders, compound managers, estate and labour
agents. They were not trade unionists, nor were they 
socially radical.” (^6)
In other words, they were mainly chiefs and professionals. The African
National Congress was primarily concerned with constitutional rights and
was conciliatory in attitude. The chiefs were given a prominent role in
an upper house. Nevertheless as a nation-wide organisation in the
context of a period of aggressive colonialism, it was a recognisable 
(47)achievement. v / In response to the unified offensive of the ruling
class, the oppressed had rallied behind their ox^ n national organisation 
to establish the most enduring and consistent voice of black resistance. 
Thus by 1912 the major political bodies for the history of the South 
African struggle had been established.
A significant step was taken in the ruling class offensive with the 
passing of the Natives Land Act in 1913. This was to create the basis 
of the necessary urbanisation of the black population and exacerbate 
contradictions in the state's urban control policies.
11
Johannesburg continued to grow at this time but the black population was 
still comparitively small as was the ratio of women to men. But the 
second decade saw the influx of families which began to alter the urban 
environment drastically. Slums began to mushroom around the city 
centre.
Meanwhile in Natal Mpanza, after his first taste of success in court , was 
finding himself in more trouble. He had left his previous job and was 
now working in Pinetown, near Durban. He began to abuse his 
trust. ^ 9^
"And so in the firm of D. St. John Stevens I began to 
embezzle money. I was found out, but Mr. Stevens was 
such a reasonable and understanding man that he asked 
me to stay. The matter was hushed up." (50)
Mpanza was allowed to receive fees from clients and issue the respective
receipts. When temptation overcame him, he prepared himself for trouble
in advance. He wrote out the receipts, but let his employer add his own
signature to every receipt and although the employer issued so many
(51)receipts, the cash that saw its way to the bank was neglibls.
"I had many women and I was swanky and proud. They 
and my attitude corroded my morals. I had left the 
firm a long time when my other frauds were discovered 
by Mrs. Stevens." (52)
Confronted with the facts, Mpanza denied having taken the money to such
(53)an extent that the police were called.
"I was duly charged and appeared before the then 
Native High Court, but, because I was exempted under 
Law 28, 1865, which placed me under the common law of 
the then Colony of Natal , I successfully took 
exception to the jurisdiction of this court. My trial 
was transferred to the Supreme Court. Then, as 
before, I defended myself." (54)
Using what little legal knowledge he had acquired, Mpanza fared well.
He cross-examined his employer on every little detail and the employer
found himself in trouble most of the time.
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The most amusing part came when Mpanza said that all the receipts had the 
employer's signature which proved that he had taken all the money and not 
Mpanza. The lawyer could not get himself out of this trouble and he was 
even rebuked by the Magistrate.
Mpanza was finally convicted, however, on the evidence of an old woman 
who stuck to her story saying repeatedly that Mpanza had taken money from 
her and issued her a receipt. Pointing a trembling finger at Mpanza in 
the dock, the old woman said, "this very young man took the money from 
me." v J He was found guilty and sentenced to twelve months with 
hard labour.  ^ ' The Magistrate remarked that Mpanza could better 
use his talents in the legal profession as he had the making of a good 
lawyer.
"The next nine months changed my whole life. I met 
for the first time hardened criminals.
I entered jail arrogant and saucy. No warder could 
push me around. I was rewarded with solitary 
confinements.” (57)
Mpanza found a new use for his active mind.
“In jail I met an old friend , Dick Cele. Together we 
discussed a master plan. It was sweetly simple , and 
utterly ghoulish. We would simply eliminate Indian 
shopkeepers and take their money." (58)
They planned to destroy all evidence of their crime by burning the shop.
The plot was discussed at length with other more seasoned prisoners.
Mpanza also planned to rob the office of the lawyer who had sent him to
(59)jail. Ee said he knew where the money was kept. v '
When World War One broke out Mpanza was given three months remission on 
his sentence and was now free to carry out his plans. He returned home 
to his mother's grass hut. His two sisters wept to see him again. His 
mother's hugging and kissing turned to anger as she threw him to the 
floor. He was dead drunk.
Mpanza invited his close friend Abna Sokhulu to join him in robbing his 
former employer. Sokhulu declined as he reasoned that there may have 
been changes in the lawyer's office in tha previous nine months. Mpanza
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walked out on him calling him a coward and went to Durban to recruit Cele 
for .the job. Cele had been waiting for Mpanza's release.
They went to the lawyer's office one night but things had in fact changed 
and they failed to get the money. It was time for the second 
plan. <60>
On the evening of Friday, 1st August 1914, eleven days after his release, 
Mpanza and Cele claimed their first chosen victim, the Indian storekeeper 
in Georgedale.
Walking with the shorter Cele, he went to the shop. They bought bread 
and a tin of corned beef , a piece of rope and a tin of paraffin. They 
were sitting eating their bread and beef when the Indian shopkeeper 
approached them. He asked what they were going to do with the rope.
"I have just come out of jail. I am going to buy a 
goat to cleanse myself replied Mpanza.
An employee of the Indian was watching the proceedings from the corner of 
the shop.
He was sent on an errand but returned in time to see Mpanza and Cele 
leaving the burning shop. He asked the two men to help him in putting 
out the fire , but Mpanza threw the empty tin of paraffin at him and told 
him to "get ....".
This man gave principle evidence when they were charged for the murder of 
the Indian shopkeeper.
But at first the police were faced with a problem. It was clear that 
Mpanza and Cele had robbed the store but there was no sign of the 
storekeeper. Only a pile of ashes remained of his wood and iron store 
and attached dwelling.
"I was sure Mpanza and his friend had murdered the 
Indian. But it is difficult to prove a murder without
a corpse
14
tells the ex-police officer who was responsible for the investigation of 
Mpanza's crime.
Determinedly, the policemen called in a small army of constables.
"I gave them the tea strainers and sieves - that sort 
of thing. We spent weeks on the job - sifting the 
entire building bit by bit."
Out of the ashes came a wedding ring, bits of a shoe. And then came 
their reward - and Mpanza's death sentence.
Surviving the blaze which had destroyed the entire building was a single 
finger.
"That finger was enough to prove that the storekeeper 
. was dead. Mpanza and the other man were arrested for 
murder. I laid out all the bits we had found with 
the finger right in the middle for the Judge to see ,”
said the ex-policeman.
This was not all the evidence available to the court.
"But the most damaging was given by my former mates.
Some described how we had discussed with them the plan 
to rob and murder Indian traders generally and destroy 
all evidence with arson,"
recalls Mpanza.
"But two described how we planned to commit the crime 
on one Indian. It was this evidence that influenced 
the verdict. They sentenced us to death. I waited 
for the hangman to do his bit." (64)
At the trial, Mpanza denied any knowledge of Dick Gele. He also refused 
to be tried with him because Cele was a Native and he was an 'honorary 
white '.
He failed to convince the court that he did not know Cele, due to the 
evidence of the shopkeeper's assistant. But in his second bid he was
successful so that they were both found, guilty in different courts , 
Mpanza in the Supreme Court; and Cele in the Natal Native High Court. It
was 1915 when they were imprisoned pending execution in
Pietermaritzburg. (65)
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Mpanza refused to see the prison chaplain who visited him in jail. He
complained when paraded outside his cell for photographs and told the
warders to 'go to hell. '
"I prepared myself for death like a martyr. I had
conquered my conscience , suppressing my’ guilt under a 
legal guiltlessness. My argument: I had not actually 
been seen at the scene of the crime. I fought from 
court to court , cocksure of my righteousness. If the
full Natal bench failed to acquit me at least the
Appellate Division would , I thought
he remembered. But the appeal was not upheld.
Not defeated, Mpanza decided to write to the King of England of his 
fate. Abner Sokhulu recalls that as Mpanza put it,
"he wanted to say farewell to his King and to tell him 
why he thinks his guilt had not been proved. He 
insisted that there had been no eyewitness evidence.
And this was after the sentence of death had been 
confirmed by the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein."
Mpanza's life was in the balance for the six months he spent in the 
condemned cells.
"They brought the news to me at breakfast one day.
Dick was reprieved. A few weeks later my sentence 
was also commuted to life imprisonment."
But at the thought Mpanza protested.
"You and your Governor-General can go to hell. I want 
to be executed now - now and be finished with it. 
This is not justice.”
He continued ,
"for the first time I was afraid of the torture of 
eternal imprisonment , torture for a crime for which I 
knew I would suffer for the rest of my life. I was a 
coward seeking escape through death.
They had to force me out of the death cell and 
immediately I started a hunger strike. By the. eighth 
day I was too weak to resist forced feeding. I -was 
bound hands behind back and had my mouth forced ope 
with forceps. A tube was thrust down my throat and 
food driven into my famished stomach."
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Two months later Mpanza was moved to Durban Central jail where he was 
kept apart from all other prisoners. After a month he was transferred 
to Point Jail , near the quay in Durban where again he was returned to a 
common cell. Within a week the fighting Mpanza was in trouble again. 
He was caught by a white supervisor, smoking his first cigarette since 
his arrest the year before. Mpanza tells the story;
"he pounced , holding me by the scruff of the neck. I 
turned quickly, caught him, lifted him onto a stone 
crusher platform, and tried to push his head into the 
teeth of the crusher itself. I failed, lifted him 
back, threw him to the ground and pressed his eyes 
hard with both thumbs.
Three prison warders dragged me away, It had almost 
been my second murder. I was isolated, manacled , then 
three weeks later given ten strokes of the cane, and 
aching from the lashes, put in shackles for a month 
like a mad dog." (68)
From there Mpanza was moved to Toitspan Prison, Kimberley and back into 
more trouble.
"A rather bossy supervisor decided I was a slow-coach 
and began pushing me around. Frenzied , I pulled out a 
sprag from the mine truck I was loading and landed it 
on his head with a nice crack. The result was ten 
strokes and more shackles.” (69)
Mpanza was then moved to De Beers Prison and from there to Cinderella 
Prison in Boksburg where he was isolated for six months.
"They never told me why. After this I joined other 
hard core prisoners and was put under the special care 
of a certain man, a specialist in toughness. My 
pocket ticket was marked black, indicating a trouble 
maker.” (70)
This is how Mpanza found himself in 1918 when he was about to have an 
experience one night that would transform his entire life and influence 
him to the end.
"First there had been some soul-searching sermons from 
the prison chaplains, I had found myself thinking - 
hard. Then that night I had a sudden attack of
’flu. As I lay in my cell I saw a vision on the
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wall. It was of a chaplain called Baker. The 
vision told me to re-baptise myself in repentance and 
cleanse myself of my sins. I do not know what caused 
this vTsion, but I feel certain it was a spiritual 
demonstration that the Gospel had reached into the 
depths of my soul." (71)
Mpanza began reading the Bible with interest and a new understanding. He 
began to think of his mother and sisters for the first time and of the 
sorrow and pain he had given them. He was filled with a fear that he 
was heading for hell. The thought of burning in hell brought him more 
fear.
"He sincerely believed that his life was saved for a 
purpose approved by God and he at once decided to live 
for his people. And he believed also that to pursue 
his aim successfully, he had to read , follow and 
understand the lives of great leaders and 
personalities mentioned in the Bible. He had special 
admiration for Hoses who led the children of Israel 
from Egypt to Canaan , land of peace and happiness and 
freedom." (72)
Mpanza continues,
"I began to pray, begging forgiveness, with another 
long-term prisoner , Simon. I began preaching to 
other prisoners , telling them to repent. They
responded." (73)
Mpanza persuaded others to his new found faith.
"In our cell we prayed in relays of 30 minutes a man 
right through the night. We began with the lights-out 
bell , then as the bell rang each half-hour and the 
jail police called 'all's well' , the man praying 
stopped and woke the next - and so until the 
morning. We did this for three years. Our cell 
became a veritable abode of the angels." (74)
Three years after his vision he was rebaptized by Missionary Baker. He 
had become convinced that infant baptism was against the scriptures.
This year was a turning point in Mpanza's life. It also witnessed a 
change in the lives of Johannesburg blacks. In the slums around the 
city an influenza epidemic broke out and the high number of deaths 
finally stirred the City Council to establish Western Native Township. 
Between 1918 and 1921 , 207 houses were built.
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It was also during this year that the Urban Areas Bill was passed. It 
allowed the Governor-General to compel blacks to live in locations. It 
also introduced several new ideas which would eventually become part of 
the South African location system such as the separate native revenue 
account. More importantly it initiated representative local government 
policy for locations in the form of advisory boards , but made no attempt 
to define them. Powers were also granted to local authorities to 
exclude the unemployed from towns and to register service contracts.
"These restrictions , and the comments of the 
Department of Native Affairs on them, reflect the 
beginning of real concern over the growth of African 
urbanization. (76)
Far away from all this, things were not going well for Mpanza. Mpanza's 
conscience was beginning to torture him.
"It was as if someone alive was talking to m e , 
reminding me: 'You, James Sofasonke Mpanza are a
murderer.'" (77)
Mpanza fasted secretly for seven days, praying to God to assure him he 
had been forgiven by sending an angel as in the olden days. On the 
seventh day of his fast a prison cook tapped urgently on his cell window 
saying a boiler attendent was crying to see him.
"I found the man weeping. His name was Sam. I had
never seen him before. He held me with a shaking hand
and said: 'God commands me to tell you that your sins
have been forgiven.'
I was afraid and looked in panic at the sky but it was 
clear, blue, peaceful. We knelt and prayed
together. An hour later Sam quietly collapsed and 
died. I wept for the first time in my life." (73)
Mpanza's faith was now strong. He vowed never again to tempt God. He
was given permission to preach to the prisoners and to teach a class
about the. ’spirit of the New Birth'. He converted many
prisoners s baptising them in a big bath previously used by the Reverend 
Ba ker«
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At this time a new political body was set up with very different beliefs 
and aims, and which was to play an important role in much of Mpanza's 
political life. In July, 1921 the Communist Party of South Africa was 
established. The party's first manifesto appealed mainly to the white 
working class which was seen as the vanguard of the revolution as . the 
industrialised proletariat. However, the determination was also 
expressed to break racial barriers.
At first the Communist Party failed to attract many followers. With 
plenty of theory, they still failed to penetrate the black population in 
any significant way. The A.N.C. on the other hand, with no theory of 
social change had a considerably larger following. The Communist Party 
tended to accuse the A.N.C. of opportunistically blinding the Africans to
/ Ol \
their working class status and of thus preventing real liberation.  ^ 1
Thus while the A.N.C. continued to organise around reformist issues in 
the early 20's, the Communist Party underestimated the power of African 
nationalism and remained largely white and few in number.
While these new struggles and new traditions were being laid Mpanza was 
fighting his own battles in prison.
His chief warder was transferred to another prison. Mpanza was suddenly 
called into the reception office, handcuffed and sent off to Pretoria 
Prison for no apparent reason. While he was there he heard that a priest 
had complained to the new chief warder that Mpanza was creating 
dissension and disaffection among his flock and had urged his removal.
He was again placed in solitary confinement for six months. While thus 
confined, a feeling of depression came upon him and a conviction that he
/ Q  O  \
should make his message known to the world.  ^ '
"As I meditated, the urge welled up within me to 
bursting point to continue my Gospel campaign. I 
felt, as I read my Bible, that if I could not preach 
to other prisoners, I must write." (83)
Mpanza. asked the prison Governor for writing materials and prayed ,
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”0 God, if I am given permission to write this book I 
will understand that I am sent by you. Be with me 
Lord." (84)
Mpanza was given a pen and paper and got down to writing his only book , 
'The Battles of the Christian Pathway" , in. 1924.
"In ’writing the manuscript I was inspired throughout.. . . -
I would read my Bible for about an hour, suddenly 
feeling the inspiration well up within me , pray and 
write." (85)
He handed the manuscript to the chief warder to publish only if he died 
in jail which he believed he would at that time.
More moves were afoot in the world outside which were to have 
consequences for Mpanza. In the wake of the government's earlier 
response to the rapid black urbanisation, in the Urban Areas Bill of 
1918, the Transvaal Local Government Commission (the Stallard Commission) 
was appointed. The findings of this Commission laid the basic 
foundation of state urban black policy against which Mpanza would find 
himself fighting in later years. This policy was encapsulated in the 
following sentence from the report in 1922:
"The Native should only be allowed to enter into the 
urban areas, which are essentially the white man's 
creation, when he is willing to enter and to 
administer to the needs of the white man, and should 
depart therefrom when he ceases to so minister." (86)
This principle of impermanence was to have far-reaching implications and 
was to be crystallised in the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923.
This act also defined the first legislative framework covering many areas 
of urban black life. It provided powers for racial segregation in the 
Urban areas thus entrenching their requirement on local authorities to 
establish locations as residential areas for blacks. The responsibility 
for housing of blacks was placed on local Councils. A separate Native 
Revenue Account was required into which revenues contributed by local 
residents from rents, fines, levies and beer hall profits were to be 
paid. (^ ''^  Provision was made for the establishment of Advisory 
Boards to represent blacks' opinions. The law stated that for every 
location there was to be a board consisting of
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"not less than three natives resident within the area 
of jurisdiction of the urban local authority in 
addition to a chairman who may be a European."
The law stated further that ,
"the mode of election or selection of members of such 
boards, the procedure, the period and conditions of 
office and their duties and functions shall be defined 
by regulations made by the urban local authority under 
this act."
The local authority was required to consult with the advisory board
/ OO \
before making or withdrawing regulations concerning the location. v '
This act also introduced legislation for the first time entrusting to the 
local authorities the right to grant trading licences in the locations. 
This was both a concession and a control. Although being granted at 
all , trading rights for blacks were only allowed within the terms of the 
state's segregationist policy.
The act also made the sale of liquor and traditional beer the monopoly of 
the local authority.
This act was to lay significant predocnditions to Mpanza's activities and 
the events in which he became involved. In particular the advisory 
board legislation created the state's local organ through which most of 
his activities were focussed. Mpanza himself recognised the importance 
of this act and was later to know it well.
"Sofasonke is popularly referred to by his associates 
as a man who can quote the Urban Areas Act of 1923 , 
chapter and verse, with ease." (91)
The South African Native National Congress was opposed to the act as they
had not been consulted in drawing it up. They objected most strongly to
(92)the clause denying property rights to Africans in the urban areas.
A further significant step was to arise out of the victory of the Fact 
Government and the concessions which it granted to the white working 
class in the wake of the Rand Revolt. White workers were to have their
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jobs protected against black competition. This was to have serious 
consequences for the Communist Party policy and to undermine their 
conception of the white working class as the revolutionary
vanguard. (^3)
In December 1924 the Johannesburg City Council opted to support the
segregation policies of the government and had the whole of Johannesburg
declared a proclaimed area under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923.
This removed residential rights from blacks in the Johannesburg area and
(94)compelled them to live in the locations. v J
Attempts at slum clearance and the removal of blacks to the locations
followed. Due to the shortage of accommodation in the locations and the
(95)extra cost, this policy was not very successful.
Back in prison, a rumour reached Mpanza's cell one day of a move in 
religious circles to secure his early discharge from prison on parole. 
Then the Reverend Webb of the Methodist Church allowed Mpanza to conduct 
a service. He chose the Commandment, 'Honour thy father and mother' for 
his sermon. All the prisoners appeared to be gripped in a strange 
trance. Some fell on the floor and cried freely even before he had 
finished his sermon. Later they asked for bibles.
Mpaaza was released from isolation and was made the prison hospital 
orderly.
“I prayed for the sick prisoners night and day. It 
was observed by the prison doctors that fewer patients 
died when I was an orderly. Once we had a serious 
meningitis case the doctors said had no hope. With 
confidence in my faith I prayed for him, and he was 
healed. (96)
Negotiations for his discharge continued , with the Swiss Missionary 
Society in the fore. Then the arrival of the Prince of Wales in South 
Africa in 1925 brought an amnesty, and his sentence was commuted to 15 
years.
1925 was also the year that the first advisory boards were introduced by
the Johannesburg City Council. Certain representative bodies had
existed in areas like Kiipspruit, as early as 1908 and Western Native
(97)Township but this was the first official body.
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The structure chosen by the Johannesburg City Council was two appointed 
and four elected members with the township superintendent as 
chairperson. Only those in whose name a house was vented could vote for 
the elected candidates and of these only those who could produce a 
receipt showing that they had fully paid their rents up to the month 
preceding that during which the election took place.
In 1926 the Johannesburg City Council encountered a further obstacle to 
its ’slum clearance’ programme.
"The courts of law then decided that the proclamation 
of December 1924, under which, the whole slum 
clearance campaign of the council had been conducted 
ever since, was invalid. Clearly, the court held, the 
municipality had not yet provided adequate
accommodation for Natives in its own locations and 
hostels; and until it had done so, no proclamation 
applying segregation provisions of the 1923 Act to the 
whole municipal area (as the 1924 proclamation 
purported to do) could legally be made; for the
legislature could hardly have intended to compel
Natives to leave their, existing place of residence for 
alternative municipal accommodation which did not
exist. (98)
The effect of the slum clearance without creating housing alternatives
(99)would only be to intensify another slum. v 1
The Council could only partially implement its segregation policies but 
it had indicated its intention to do so and the terms which would allow 
it to do so had been set.
Finally, in 1927 Mpanza was discharged on a two-year parole. But he was 
suddenly filled with fear of the outside world. He had nothing with 
which to start a new life.
But for him the miracles were not over.
"Cod again provided in a miraculous way. I found 
myself suddenly leaving prison in a gentlemanly 
fashion, equipped with everything from bed linen to 
suits. A certain indeterminate sentence prisoner had 
told the authorities to present me with his entire 
kit." (100)
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On his release Mpanza went to see his mother and sisters in 
Pietermaritzburg-'and Durban. His old mother shed tears in disbelief and 
pleasure to see him again. His sister Evelyn urged him to get married 
but since his conversion Mpanza had vowed not to marry, a vow he was not 
to keep.
This year also saw the Johannesburg City Council working toward 
fulfilling its requirements for the Urban Areas Act. Extensions had 
been made to Klipspruit arid Western Native Township and Eastern Native 
Township had been developed. One thousand houses had been added to 
Western and four hundred built at Eastern. Work was concentrated on the 
townships away from the city centre. These developments enabled the 
Council to compel more blacks to move to the locations. This was not 
without resistance. Apart from the shortage of houses in the locations, 
blacks also resisted moving to the locations for another sound reason.
"It is true that all things considered , location 
house's are much better than the accommodation provided 
by the slum areas which are extortion in regard to 
rents. But for a room that yields a monthly rental of 
1 Pound 10 Shillings in slum areas, the occupants are 
saved much expense by those residing in locations. A 
native living in town at a monthly rental of 1 Pound 
10 Shillings is better off by more than 1 Pound 15 
Shillings than a native in the locations considering 
he has to pay only the rent while the other man has to 
pay 15/- a month travelling expenses, 15/- lunch in 
town and extra medical charges together with 
travelling expenses for wife and school 
children. (101)
Clearly there had been a large growth in the black population in
Johannesburg. There were now7 22 814 women out of a total of 136 695
blacks. This was a drop in the ratio of men to women from 23 to one in
1910, to 5 to one in 1927. There was thus a growing pressure for family 
f 100)accommodation v
The City Council responded to its growing obligations by establishing the 
Non-European Affairs Department with Graham Eallenden as its first 
manager. Its responsibility was the ’control, housing and welfare’ of 
the City's black population.
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In 1928 Ballenden persuaded the Council to appoint the first Non-European 
Affairs Committee. At this time in the central government the
Native Affairs Department took over from the Locations Department. (105)
The growth of urbanisation and the state's responses were to have other 
repercussions. In response to an increasing urban black proletariat and 
the compromise of the white worker, the 1927 annual conference of the 
Communist Party resolved
"to train 'cadres of class conscious native workers' 
and to form branches in the African areas."
To reflect this change in policy it was agreed to draw blacks into the 
administration and three blacks were elected to the central 
committee. (1®^
The following year the A.N.C. after a brief flirtation opposed further 
association with the Communist Party under the influence of the 
chiefs. (10^) - The Communist Party meanwhile was taking a further step 
toward blacks in adopting its 'Native Republic' policy. This sought to 
mobilize black workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie into a national 
struggle for a 'Native Republic' as a stage in the struggle for socialism.
This new slogan, while losing white worker support, trough people like 
Edwin Mofutsanyana , J.B. Marks and Moses Kotane into the party.
At this time in 1928 the Locations Advisory Board Congress was 
established with the object of
"uniting all urban advisory boards and securing an 
improvement in conditions in municipal locations 
promoting co-operation and understanding between 
municipal authorities and the urban residents; and of 
making representations to Government and local 
administrative authorities."
The Congress was to be given official recognition and the delegates to
the annual meetings were usually to have their expenses paid from the
(109)Native Revenue Accounts. v
After his release from jail, Mpanza lived for a while with a Tswana woman
as his common law wife oh a farm near Pretoria. It was allocated to him
by the Government. Feeling wary of vengeful Indians , he feared to
( 110)
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When lie did return, he taught at a school in Pietermaritzburg and did 
missionary work.
After a few years he wanted to return to Pretoria. He was helped by his 
brother-in-law who organised a very’successful party for him which raised 
R24.
In Pretoria he was placed with a Swiss Mission.
"I served for three years as an Evangelist in that 
congregation under a devoted white missionary, a great 
believer, the Rev. P. Dourquin. I had a happy life 
there. I preached with success at the Mental Hospital 
and many other places, such as the Railway Location,
Pretoria, Lady Selbourne , etc." 0-12)
"During the week I ran a one-teacher school of sixty 
pupils at the Railways Location and shared my RIO a 
month with poor mothers. At weekends I preached again 
to full houses."(113)
In Johannesburg the communist newspaper , the South African Worker was 
revived with more than half the articles in black languages. The Party 
also ran a night school in Johannesburg. Thewe two organs spread the 
communist influence. Headway was also being made in the locations. In 
Vereeniging , near Johannesburg a meeting outside the location attended by 
2 OOO people managed to recruit several hundred to the party. At
Potclief stroom the party recruited virtually the entire location. A 
meeting there was interrupted by the police in spite of resistance from 
the 1 000 strong audience , a black speaker was arrested and charged. The 
Conmtxnist lawyer, Bunting, defended him and won the case which was 
attended by hundreds of blacks. A further meeting was held immediately 
after the court case during which white bystanders attacked the white 
Com2mnist speakers. The blacks intervened on behalf of the Communists. 
As a result of this the Communist Party won almost total support from the 
location. ^  ^ ^
The successes were to have other benefits for the Communist Party in 
future struggles on the Rand.
27
In about 1930 Mpanza moved to Bertrams in Johannesburg. Bertrams had 
the advantage of_being close to work and an established community.
There be worked for a while as a commercial photographer and as some 
remember him, a furniture salesman who had 'the gift of the gab.'
"I worked for a year as a canvasser for a furniture 
firm." (H7)
Here he parted with the Tswana woman with whome he had had some 
children. It is said that he grew tired of her and ordered her to be 
sent back to Pretoria 'because she was not educated'. Says
Mpanza
“I had a lover since 1930 but because we did not see 
eye to eye I did not want to marry her. We had four 
children together." (H9)
The greater part of Mpanza's life in Johannesburg was spent teaching in 
Bertrams at the African Gaza School. (1^®)
"I came to Bertrams and taught in Mr. Light's private 
school. I remained here until the place was 
demolished." (121)
Mpanza was very fond of music and traditional culture. His school 
competed in the first Transvaal Eisteddford organised by a Mr. Mark 
Radete, and won the Ballendon Shield for choral music. The following 
year at a Pretoria competition, the school took the first prize in 
traditional music and was highly commended by the adjudicators for the 
remarkable talent shown in this prodcution. (1^^^
1930 marked the year of a more aggressive attitude on the part of the 
state. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act was amended.
"empowering a local authority to require , in 
accordance with regulations, every Native, with 
certain exceptions, who resides, but is not employed, 
in the urban area, to remove therefrom." (123)
The argument for segregation for blacks in Johannesburg is explained thus:
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"To herd them in locations , as remote as may be from
the residence of white men, is no doubt the simplest
way to -prevent a nuisance arising, from the point of 
view of either public health or of social contact; and 
such locations as the council provides should be as 
light • a burden as possible on municipal funds.
Finally , as regards the life lived- by the Native
within the locations, the most important aim of the 
council must be to maintain discipline." (124)
The Council was now in a position to overcome the obstacle to its 
segregationist policies imposed by the court decision of 1926 linking 
availability of accommodation to the removals. The Council's power to 
remove was now based on unemployment. In addition the Council took steps 
to make removals practically possible. They bought 1 300 morgan of land 
on the farm Klipspruit No. 8 some 15 kilometers to the south-west of 
Johannesburg and a competition was started for the lay-out of the 
township. (1^-^
"It was to be designed to accommodate 80 000 people 
with administration offices, a public hall, a cottage 
hospital with dispensory and clinic , a central police 
station, a central post office and three district 
offices, a fire station, ten sites for schools, ten . 
sites for religious purposes, shopping centre , a 
market and a community store. The township was to be 
called Orlando, after the then serving Chairman of the 
Native Affairs Committee , Councillor Edwin Orlando 
Leake." (126)
At least eight trains a day each day were to be provided for Orlando at 
sixpence per single ride.
It was to be a 'model township1 which from the Council's point of view
n  op.)
meant easy to control. v ‘
Building started in 1931. ( ^ ^  Presenting Orlando as a 'model Native 
township' the people were told that 'it will be the biggest and finest in 
the Union.' But it was not welcomed with unreserved enthusiasm by all.
"It is to be hoped that the City Council will avoid 
the mistakes made in the planning of the Western and 
Eastern Native townships. The smallness and the 
similarity of the cottages in these townships make 
them look ugly and slummy. The new Bantu have a sense 
of beauty and proportion. Like other peoples they 
appreciate variety." (130)
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But with the country in the grip of the 'worst drought in living memory' 
and reports of starvation and sickness from most of the rural areas , 
people were flooding to the cities in search of work and sustenance and 
as the situation grew worse so did the pressure for housing in 
Johannesburg.
There were also those, however, who were strongly impressed by the 
Council's plans.
"This will undoubtedly be somewhat a paradise and to a 
greater extent enhance the status of the Bantu within 
the ambit of progress and civilization. It manifests 
the growing co-operation between the two dominant 
races domiciled in this Southern part of the African 
continent and shows clearly that some of our rulers 
I have now realised that closer co-operation and
brotherhood are the keys of harmony and peace.” (132)
In October, 1932 the first 80 houses were completed and handed over to 
the Native Affairs Department. By the middle of the month over 35 
families had taken up residence there and many more had made application 
for houses..
Some, were pleased with the new houses.
"Those who are now living there expressed themselves 
very satisfied - not only at the situation of the 
township - but the height and roominess and appearance 
of the houses.
There seems to be no doubt that this township will be 
the most popular in the country. The houses, are 
varied in design and colour, well-spaced , with a 
generous piece of land for each one." (133)
In order to promote interest in the new township , the City Council 
encouraged people to see it.
"The City fathers are so anxious to make Orlando known 
to the Bantu people that they have arranged for a 
special train with the Railway Authorities for the 
purpose of making it possible for all those who wish 
to see Orlando to do so on Sunday, October
30th." (134)
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But the ’City fathers’ were not so anxious as to want just anyone to move 
to Orlando.
"It is considered desirable that the advantages and 
conditions of residence should be made known to the 
better class natives," they said (135)
"Only those who were legally married, not 'vat en sit'
(living in sin) couples" were allowed. (136)
On October 30th , 1932 the inauguration ceremony of Orlando was performed 
by the Mayor of Johannesburg , Mr. D.F. Corlett. Three hundred houses 
had been built and seventy were occupied. Transported by two free 
trains and private cars, the ceremony was attended by 3 000 blacks. The 
day was spent displaying the township and picnicking in the area.
Mr. G. Ballenden, the Manager of the N.E.A.D. explained in his speech, the 
conditions of residence in Orlando.
"The rent for the two roomed houss he said was 25/- a 
month r for three roomed houses 30/-. Any approved 
person could buy one of the houses from the 
Municipality by deposing a quarter of the value and 
then paying L2.10/- a month. And one could build his 
own house, the Municipality being prepared to advance 
him a loan up to L250 , the owner deposing a quarter of 
the amount." (137)
The initial response to Orlando was poor. The Rev. O.S.D. Mooki recalls,
“The first houses were built in 1932. These two and 
three-roomed houses were unpopular among the people.
They did not come here out of their own free will ... 
in 1932 most houses were still empty.” (138)
The Council at first tried to persuade people to move. With further 
plans in mind, the authorities appeared benignly co-operative. 
W.B. Ngakane , another early inhabitant, recalls:
"The houses were few, the City Council of Johannesburg 
was keen to get the people out of the backyards in 
town and they were actually inviting people to come to 
Orlando. They'd show pictures of a family sitting 
outside, happy, in contrast to the conditions in the 
backyards. They were saying , ’Come along , here are 
houses.’ And people, some people would decided to come 
along, and when they got there, went to the
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superintendent, said, 'I want a house.' He says, 
'Alright, you go in and select a house.' They were 
all lying empty. Person went and selected a house , 
and two weeks afterwards he would come back again and 
say 'No, I've seen a better house, and I want to 
change my house.' And all that was O.K." (139)
To the inhabitants of the already established vibrant communities near 
the city centre 'Orlando represented loneliness, lack of amenities, 
something akin to exile."
"You know, going to Orlando meant you were binding 
yourself to town life and lots of people hoped to 
return to the country one day.
Rent was 17s.6p for a two roomed house in Orlando.
Morabi parties could not take place in Orlando , 
because that community spirit was lost. The Orlando
people were isolated from each other. In Boornfontein 
we lived closely together ... we helped each other in 
everything.
People in Orlando became independent. People didn't 
want to go at first because of the distance - it was 
too far to walk to work. They had to take trams to 
town. They spent 2s. 6p on transport and only earned 
21s a month. They felt the pinch.
Quite a lot preferred Boornfontein because selling 
beer there was a profitable business. In Orlando 
there were no customers - it was known as a place of 
hunger." (1^1)
Regardless, the Council pushed ahead with its plans. The next step was 
local representation.
By 1932 , after seven years of existence in Johannesburg , there was
already criticism of the advisory boards. This criticism was not
directed at the advisory board system itself , but was rather seen as a
problem of the behaviour of their members.
"These Boards, properly and wisely used, can be of 
great help in the administration of the affairs of the 
locations.
Unfortunately the manner in which their members are 
elected has brought in politics in that the section 
that is elected by the residents regard those 
appointed by the local authorities as 'good boys' who
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cannot serve the people because they represent the 
views of the local authorities in the meetings of the 
Boards. In some locations there is an open warfare 
between tKe two sections, and the result is that the 
Boards fail to function as they should." (142)
The members were also criticised for their elitism.
"Advisory boards should co-operate with the residents 
- my visits to the townships have impressed me with 
the fact that Bantu intellectuals are a class of their 
own. They never get on smoothly together. The
Advisory Boards which are composed of intellectuals 
who are supposed to know a thing or two better than 
the people they represent, seem to be completely out 
of touch with the people.
From what little experience I know of these bodies 
they do not even get the opinion of the people as to 
what pressing matter they would like the Boards to 
tackle at once. No. They have no time to do this 
when their own opinions are so lofty and embrace all 
the needs of the people. That is why these townships 
are becoming well-ordered slums, that is; slums which 
exist where it was thought slums could not
exist." (143)
This was moderate criticism which also argued for more co-operation from 
those members who opposed any proposal coming - from the local 
authorities. As their side of the bargain, advisor}' board members should 
also perform their duty to maintain law and order in the locations. 
However, the Council's disregard for the boards was clearly noted.
"But the faxilt is not one sided only. Most of the 
local authorities do not make proper use of members of 
the Advisory Boards; they regard them as mere pawns to 
be exploited not for the good of the location 
residents but for their suppression. It is on record 
that most of the members have complained 'that they 
serve no useful purpose and that no notice is taken of 
their representations.' This is a grievous charge 
against the authorities which cannot be 
overlooked." (144)
The Advisory Boards Congress, now in its fourth year, took up the issue. 
It passed a resolution:
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"that in view of the fact that local authorities do 
not act in accordance with the decisions of Advisory 
Boards, the Congress should request local authorities 
to consult Advisory Boards before imposing any
regulations or restrictions on natives in urban 
locations."
and further
"that the superintendents of locations should not be 
ipso facto chairmen of Advisory Boards." (1^5)
The result of the dissatisfaction was disillusionment with the advisory 
boards and wider-spread low-percentage polls in elections.
As a result it had become the practice of the residents to establish
fully elected bodies called vigilance committees. Anybody could vote for
these, unlike the advisory boards w’hich were restricted to registered 
tenants only. These would become an independent forum for the residents' 
demands and would then meet with the advisory boards to discuss 
grievances. They would also sometimes agree upon who should be voted
into the boards and were very influential in carrying this out.
Against this background , the Council established the first advisory board 
in Orlando. .
"In the last week of Sunday 26th February 1933 ,
Ballenden the Manager of the Native Affairs Department 
introduced the first members of the new board at a 
public meeting. The elected members were R.W.
Msimang , John Sebobone , G. Kuluse and J. Hliso. The 
Council's nominees were T. Manqina and P. Chimeloane.
Advisory boards are the only recognised body by the 
City Council and the Government. If there were any 
matter of grievance the township residents wanted to 
be rectified, the Council or the Government would only 
recognise the Advisory Board ," said Ballendon.
Encouraging the residents to set up their own educational institutions 
Mr. Ballenden continued ,
"The mother does not keep the baby hugged to her breat 
forever but at the appropriate time gives it a chartc.e 
to try its limbs. The same applies to the Africa, 
though like a child he will sometimes fall in the 
attempt."
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He further introduced Mr. Oliver, formerly the Superintendent of 
Klipspruit, as Orlando's first Superintendent.
Ballertdon concluded by criticising the 'foolish practice' of having a 
vigilance committee in addition to an advisory board. He said that the
vigilance committees were composed of those who failed to be elected to 
the advisory boards. ^  ^
At this time the A.N.C. was badly disorganised being loose and 
decentralised. It was thus not in a position, apart from
ideological considerations , to take much of an interest in advisory 
boards.
The Communist Party on the other hand had steadily been building support 
in the locations and was looking for platforms to propogate its policies.
By 1933 complaints against conditions in Orlando were emerging. At a
Johannesburg Joint Council Meeting several black speakers complained that
while they are' forced to live in Orlando , no schools are provided and
f1 4 9 )transport to Johannesburg is expensive. '
While some still held that Orlando was ’destined to be a great Bantu 
City, greater than Zimbabwe of old' the discriminatory police raids and 
harsh regulations of the locations were questioned.
The difference between the image of a wholesome and pleasant community 
projected by the Council and the harsh reality was becoming more obvious.
"The township consisted of two or three-roomed 
identical houses, packed close together, and arranged 
in blocks alongside broad and red-earthed streets , 
which were quagmires in the rainy weather, and the 
home of dust-devils in the dry seasons. The houses 
were built cheaply and had neither floor nor ceiling, 
no water tap, and no separate cooking facilities. The 
backyard contained a water closet , and water was
obtained at the street corner tap. In fact the area
was little different from those elsewhere in the
country, except perhaps, that they were more sturdily 
built. There was schooling for only a small minority 
of the children , and there were no parks , and no
sports grounds."
While the average earning capacity of Orlando was LI per week, between 
16/- and 40/- was being spent on the rent and transport alone.
This was disproportionately high.
The population of Orlando toward the end of 1933 was about 3 000. This 
compares with Western Native Township at 12 000, Eastern Native Township 
at 4 000 and Klipspruit at 9 000. There were probably about 1 500 
houses at Orlando at this time which means that at least half the houses 
were still empty.
This assessment is strengthened by the election figures on the last day 
of 1933 for the 1934 Orlando Advisory Board. The poll was 'more than 
700* , which is the number of registered tenants. Of this only 250 votes 
were cast. Those elected were Arthur Madhlala (66 votes), John Mofokeng 
(64 votes) , Edgar Mpati (58 votes) and Andrew Bokaba (34 votes). In 
addition the Council appointed Eliskim Tshabalala and Wise Poka to the. 
board. It appears that for the previous year the Council had appointed 
the entire board to initiate it. By the second term of office then and 
in tiie first elections, the entire board was replaced. This signifies a
substantial difference between the attitudes of the Council and the h
-electorate from the start. The new board stated its intention to deal 
with the following issues.
"(a) Government school at Orlando,
(b) Hawking by non-residents to the detriment of 
local storekeepers , and
(c) Rents.” (153)
By 1934 the residents of Orlando were sufficiently settled in and 
committed to Orlando to initiate organised opposition to the local state 
control.
“An enthusiastic meeting took place on August 5th at 
Orlando Township the object being to form a vigilance 
committee and appoint office bearers.”
The already established Western Native Township Vigilance Committee was 
invited to attend and assist in establishing the Orlando committee. The
chairman said the large attendance indicated the desire of residents for 
1 the right kind of progress.'
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The decision was made to form an Orlando Township Vigilance Committee 
which was then elected.
Early in 1933 the local authorities revealed their hidden hand. The 
chairman of the Non-European Affairs Committee revealed at a Council 
meeting that shortly after work began at Orlando, the Council had applied 
to the Minister to proclaim the whole of Johannesburg a white area under 
the Urban Areas Act. The provision of housing at Orlando was felt to 
have overcome the obstacle in the way of the 1926 ruling. The 
proclamation was opposed by a deputation of landowners from Martindale, 
Newclare and Sophia town. After negotiations the Minister agreed to the 
proclamation excluding these three townships. This made over
43 OGQ blacks illegally resident in Johannesburg. It also tested
and proved the Council's formula for further removals. For the three 
townships still excluded it would only be a matter of time and housing.
The first targets for removal were Bertrams and Lorentzville. After 
agitation from the white Bertrams and Lorentzville Vigilance Association, 
the Mon-European Affairs Committee gave the assurance that it had
"decided to cancel all location licenses in Bertrams , 
Lorentzville and neighbouring districts, and the 
natives must quit by June 30."
Another Councillor added that
"the City Council was doing all it possibly could to 
encourage the native to move to Orlando Township on 
his own, but if he did not go on his own, they would 
make sure that he was put there." (157)
With so many houses standing empty, it is clear that coercion was 
necessary.
By the end of 1934 the Public Health Committee was finishing the clearing 
of Bertrams and Lorentzville and about to move on to Doornfontein. (-^^
And so Mpanza came to Orlando.
"I taught in Pretoria and Johannesburg schools until 
1934, when Africans were ordered out of their backyard 
homes to seek houses at Orlando, the City's first big 
t ownship." (159)
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In Orlando he moved into one of the first houses built in Soweto, No. 957 
Pheele Street , where he lived for the rest of his life.
It is said that once there, 'Sofasonke did all in his power to encourage 
backyard residents to occupy Orlando East houses. ' In Orlando
he was said to have been a hawker.
At the age of 45 then, Mpanza - fighter, lover of race horses , fluent in 
English, educated, keen on soccer, popular with women, holder of a 
certificate of exemption, astute and experienced with law, a criminal 
record, a persuasive preacher, a teacher, and a jack of many other trades 
who had lived among the working people for most of his life , - found a 
home in the new location of Orlando. With the removal of the people to 
Orlando went the Communist Party and the A.N.C. to work among this 
growing constituency. While the A.N.C. was weak, elitist and in 
disarray, the Communist Party was gaining a foothold among the masses and 
soon made moves towards the Orlando Advisory Board as a platform for its 
policy. The democratic Vigilance Committee had been established among 
the residents to protect their interests and there appears to have been 
some overlap between the Communist Party and the Vigilance Committee. 
The Location Advisory Boards' Congress had been formed, with official 
recognition as a national forum for Advisory Boards.
The Council on the other hand saw the township as the key to its 
segregationist policies in Johannesburg. In particular, this was a 
means to reduce the cost of and maintain control over black labour. With
costs as their major concern, rather than the interests of the people,/ -| £ *) \
most of the amenities promised had been postponed. '
With these differing interests and the advisory boards as the contact 
point between the masses and the local state the basis of Orlando 
Township's struggles and the social components of that struggle, had been 
laid by 1934.
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CHAPTKa TWO MPANZA FOUNDS THE SOFASONKE PARTY, SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND
POLITICS IN ORLANDO. 1935 - 1943.
The South African economy experienced an economic upsurge in the
thirties, particularly in the five years after 1933. There was a 70% 
increase in the G.N.P. There was also relatively little increase in the 
cost of living during this period. It was also a time, however, when 
the rural reserves showed a rapid deterioration in agriculture, as
revealed by the Native Economic Commission of 1932. The overall result 
of these factors was the intensification of urbanisation and the start of 
a trend toward whole families moving to the cities.
The black population of Johannesburg increased between 1926/27 and
( 2 )1935/36 by at least 40%. v ' This was to have its consequences for
Orlando.
Mpanza was soon noticed by the Orlando Vigilance Committee as a talented 
politician and was asked to join them. He learned quickly and soon left 
the Vigilance Committee to start his own party. The reasons behind this 
move were probably his dislike for the Communists who appear to have been 
influential in the Vigilance Committee , and probably also because he felt 
he could do better with his own party and style of politics which was 
more personality oriented.
He saw his party very much as aimed at the advisory board.
“When advisory boards began, in 1935, I formed the 
Sofasonke Party." (3)
In tiie face of growing population pressure , housing was an early issue 
which his party focussed upon.
"When he formed the Sofasonke Party he realised that 
he should have a programme and project around which he 
would be able to have a following. His project was 
'Housing and Shelter for All.' This project which 
was an organising slogan appealed to his followers.
He said the. two-roomed houses in Orlando did not offer 
adequate accommodation for families and insisted that 
the two—roomed houses were matchboxes and inadequate 
for housing families. As a result larger houses were
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provided in Orlando West. Wien commenting on the 
four-roomed houses in Orlando West, he said these 
houses were better rat hovels as compared to the 
previous structure and went on to say that there was 
still room for improvement." (^)
This contrasts with the more optimistic view of Orlando expressed in the 
press closer to the time of Orlando's establishment.
"The natives so liberally provided for, cannot help 
taking a real pride in their new homes and
surroundings , and so long as the Johannesburg Council 
carry out their duty of providing the amenities of a 
civilized life to make this scheme attractive ... 
Altogether Orlando is a model township well worth 
emulating by other local authorities eager to pride 
themselves in having in their environs a happy, 
peaceful and progressive native community."
With the Orlando Advisory Board only two years old, it was rapidly 
becoming the focal point of many differing interests. The Orlando Board 
was by now a member of the Location Advisory Boards' Association, a 
combined forum for the Witwatersrand advisory boards. Near the 
beginning of the year the Municpal conference of the Reef Mayors and 
Superintendents, obviously threatened by the tremendous influx of people, 
including families , put forward proposals' to maintain and extend their 
control of the townships. They proposed;
"1. Enclosing the entire location with a man-proof 
fence.
2. Stationing additional police in the location.
3. Limiting the number of women residents. (It was 
accepted that in every Reef location the women 
outnumbered the men and that many of them were 
engaged in illicit liquor traffic).
4. Prohibiting the practice of taking in lodgers.
5. Permitting only municipal-owned and erected 
houses."
In opposition to this the Witwatersrand Location Advisory Boards' 
Association in a meeting on the 23ra January , 1934 resolved:
"1. that this meeting views with alarm and entire 
disappointment the decision of the Reef 
Conference of Mayors and Superintendents in the 
proposition of a raan-proof fence for all
Locations along the Reef, in that it does not 
stop illicit liquor traffic and other evils, but
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does affect the circulation of money to the 
genuine trader and visits of respectable persons , 
and hence is tantamount to imprisonment and a 
disgrace to civilization.
2. That the purpose of good order and administration 
of law within the Location, a block system, such 
as that of Bloemfontein, should _ be introduced 
here and that the duties and functions of the 
members of the advisory board should be 
defined. [This was an important issue that was 
to reoccur. The Natives , (Urban Areas) Act of 
1923 requires the City Council to define the 
duties of the Advisory Board - K.F.]
3. That this Reef Conference of Location Advisory 
Boards disagrees with the principle of limiting 
the number of women residents or of Native 
residents in urban areas , but alternately prays 
that the Municipalities should petition the 
Government to improve the conditions of life and 
service in rural areas , as that would stem the 
influ:: into urban areas.
4. The practice of taking in lodgers is compatible 
with native custom, therefore should not be
- interfered with.
5. The native community is bent on making urban 
areas their permanent home. This conference 
therefore urges the local authorities to set 
aside land for freehold occupation.” (5)
At this time the Orlando Board was under Communist control. Communists 
also exerted some influence on other Boards as well. While working
through the boards the Communist Party recognised their limitations. 
They criticised the boards for only representing the enfranchised 
minority in the locations, for having no executive power, for being 
subject to the unelected local superintendent and for not having their 
own. budget even though their electors paid taxes, rent, lodgers fees, 
etc. into the Native Revenue Account.
However, while recognising that advisory boards were part of segregated 
townships , the Communist Party advocated the transformation of advisory 
boards into real organs of self-government. This would require the 
extension of the vote to all location residents from 18 years of age , the 
residents to conduct the election themselves , the advisory board to have 
full executive powers for the location, all members to be elected 
including the chairperson, the board to have its own budget or all
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revenue from the location, and to have full control over an all-black 
police force.
They called for discussion of these points and for "a mighty struggle for 
self-government in the locations" if the government failed to comply with 
the residents' wishes.
The Council ignored the Board's opposition and continued to implement
their controls, such as the "man-proof" fence.
In spite of the fairly constant cost of living , in June 1935 it was
proposed by the Council that the Orlando rents be reduced from 1 Pound
10 Shillings to 1 Pound 5 Shillings. Showing rare compassion, it was 
argued that as black wages were only 3 Pounds to 4 Pounds per month, the 
cost of clothes and transport would make this rent too much. It was also 
argued, and perhaps more to the point, that lower rents would make the 
township more attractive. Clearly this was a move to reduce
resistance to _the Council's removal programme. The proposal was later 
approved.
But the concession, such as it was, was also traded simultaneously for
further Council control. News of the rent reduction was greeted with
cheers at a meeting of residents organised by the Orlando Advisory
Board. But the Board was also obliged to tell the gathering of the
Council's intention to introduce a 'permit system' for entry to Orlando.
(9)This met with protest from the Board members and residents.
Clearly the state's interest in the locations, following on from the 
Stalla.rd principle, was in a cheap, manageable site for the reproduction 
of labour power. This was the motivation behind the Council's permit- 
system and the Government's appointment of the Natives Urban Areas 
Commission in July 1935 to investigate the position of urban blacks and to
"recommend the form which legislation should take.
Cl) To enforce the principle of limiting the number of Natives in 
urban areas to the labour requirements of such urban areas;
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(2) To provide for controlling the entry of natives into urban areas;
(3) To provide for the withdrawal of superfluous Natives from urban
.. (10)areas. v '
Responding to the Commission, the Reef and Pretoria Municipalities met in 
October to pass resolutions supporting the aims of the Commission arid 
requesting that the influx of families be limited.
"We consider that sufficient provision has been made 
by the local authorities of the Reef and Pretoria for 
Natives living under conditions of married life , and 
therefore that further Native families should be 
prohibited from coming ' to the Reef and 
Pretoria.” (H)
As a further step the Johannesburg City Council successfully applied to 
have the limit of the proclaimed area around the municipal boundary 
extended from 3 to 5 miles. This was because new communities were 
springing up just outside the 3 mile limit.
Ballendon, the manager of the Non-European Affairs Department claimed i~ri 
his annual report that the recent proclamation of the whole of 
Johannesburg under the Urban Areas Act, and the removal of families from 
the proclaimed areas was being successful in greatly checking the influx 
of families to Johannesburg. He warned, however, that a clear policy
/  -» o  \
would have to be adopted to prevent a further influx of families. '
Kith Doornfontein and Bertrams behind them, the Council still had, with 
the aid of the Slums Act of 1934, Sophiatown, Pimviile, Martindale, 
Nexjclare and Prospect Township to clear. Again Orlando was to provide 
the solution. There were then 2 811 houses in Orlando , of which 591 
were still unoccupied. The Council x-7as , however, proposing the building 
of a further 1 000 houses for the black families to be moved from these 
areas. <13>
The population of Orlando x?as 12 000 in 1936 , but Johannesburg was
about to see an unprecidented increase in its black population of 69% in 
the next decade.
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With the tightening up of state strategy for urban control had also come 
an attempt to revive black politics with the formation of the All-African 
Convention (A.A.C.) in 1935. It was intended as an umbrella body to 
which many organisations, including the A.N.C. , would affiliate to oppose 
the Hertzog Land and Representation Bills .of 1936. As the A.N.C.
was still badly disorganized, the A.A.C. looked like a possible successor 
to it as the leading black political body. The A.A.C. attracted a broad 
range of black leaders at its outset. In a rare case of involving 
himself in national politics Mpanza was elected to the Council Committee 
of the A.A.C. in December, 1935.
Returning to its removal programme, the Council's first target was to be 
12 000 people at Pimville. Confident of its new regulations, the
Non-European Affairs Department could claim by June 1936, that
"The Department now exercises some form of control 
over all housing of natives within the Municipal area , 
and is gradually tightening up this control and' 
compelling the improvement of housing conditions 
wherever found necessary." There were now 3 000 
houses at Orlando. (19)
As leader of the Sofasonke Party Mpanza was elected in December 1935 to 
the Orlando Advisory Board for 1936, his first term of office. He won 
one seat for his party from the Communist Party.
”My opponents were assisted by white lady comrades 
with transport, loudspeakers and expensive pamphlets, 
promising every imaginable unobtainable , but I 
steadily built up my reputation as their thorn in the 
flesh." (20)
Mpanza's party at a very early stage adopted specific issues around which 
to base their struggle. His avowed aim In joining the Advisory Board 
was to press the City Council to provide accommodation for the numerous
/  O  1  \
sub-tenants in Orlando. ' A'
In July 1936, the manager of the Non-European Affairs Department reported
that 18 000 blacks were living in Orlando and that another 4 000 would be
( 22)added when the 1 000 bouses now under construction were completed.
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With the rapid growth of Orlando, the residents began to complain of the
inadequate train-.service. The line ran from town through to Pimville and
back, and trains were often full by the time they reached Orlando in the
(23)morning , making Orlando residents late for work. The railways
had meanwhile opened a station at Orlando known as "Mlamlankunzi" - the
separator of bulls - in honour of Graham Ballenden who as manager of the
Non-European Affairs Department was seen to mediate between the people 
and the Council.
There was still resistance to moving to Orlando. Although anxious to
move people out of the city, the Council still subjected them to an
'endless cross-examination' to see if- they were suitable. The fact that
the houses were without plaster or flooring and that two months' rent in
(25)advance had to be raised were a cause of further resentment.
Ballenden was still showing concern about the influx of families to 
Johannesburg. He made public warnings against further migration. The
Council had increased the number of planned houses from 1 000 to 2 000 
but these were earmarked for families from within Johannesburg. New
families he warned, would be returned at their own expense 'to the place
f  o r \
from whence they had come.' ' . ■ . ‘
With housing in Orlando already coming under pressure , the Council had
(27)begun condemming properties at Prospect Township.
But eagerness to move people was motivating the Council to build more 
unfinished houses as rapidly as possible rather than improving the 
quality of life in the township as it stood. Orlando was falling far 
short of being the 'black Park town' it was once thought to be. By late 
1936 there were still no electric lights, (only 4 gas lamps in the whole 
township), the roads were not tarred, and the train service, as the only 
public transport, was still inadequate. v '
With Advisory Board elections drawing near, election propaganda was being 
publicised.
"The Communist Party of South Africa calls upon all 
Native residents of locations to realise the 
importance of the coming elections for members of the
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Advisory Boards. ... The members of the Advisory 
Boards should be our leaders in the struggle for:
Better housing, lower rents, abolition of the lodger's 
fees, cheaper sanitary and water rates, better 
sanitary service, better water supplies, cleaner 
locations, freedom of movement for yourselves, your 
families and your visitors (abolition of the curfew), 
free education for your children, a cheap milk supply 
for your children, maternity homes for the mothers, 
hospital and medical services for the sick, cheap and 
efficient transport , the right to brew beer for 
personal comsumption, better social services and 
better social conditions for all." (29)
It can be seen that the issues seen by the Communist Party as appropriate 
for the boards to take up were very broad ranging although specific to 
the townships. Given the limitations of the boards as a power base the 
strategy of the Communist Party, although pursued through the boards, is 
not confined to the board's constitutional limitations.
"The Advisory Board members have the ears of the 
Superintendent, the Municipality and the Native 
Affairs Department.
If the Municipality and the Government does not listen 
to the Advisory members when they put forward your 
just demands , the Advisory members must call meetings 
of residents , lead deputations and demonstrations and 
compel the rulers to fulfill these demands. The 
Advisory Board members must be REAL LEADEB.S AND 
FIGHTERS FOR YOUR DEMANDS.
Elect the best men; men who have proved themselves; 
men you can trust. Don't elect "Good Boys" of the 
Government and the Superintendents. Don't elect 
leaders and men who advise you to remain quiet under 
real grievances." (30)
The Communist Party strategy, even when involved in institutional 
struggles , relied on a base outside of these institutions, more 
specifically on mass activity. Their interest in Advisory Boards was 
greatly increased with the establishment of the Native Representative 
Council elections for which were based on block votes from the Advisory 
Boards. Outlining the joint demands of the Communist Party and the 
A.AJC, , which were both national and working class demands , they
continue
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"tfe can only achieve the demands by organisation (and) 
active struggle in the reserves , locations , factories, 
mines and places of employment. The members of the 
Native-Representative Council must lay them before the 
government and resist all detrimental
legislation." (31)
The Communist Party's line on participation in state structures was 
clearly stated by Basner addressing the Reef Advisory Boards about the 
Native Representative Council when he
"pointed out that inside the Senate very little could 
be achieved without the mass organisation and backing 
of the Native people." (32)
Again
"The Political Bureau of the Communist Party of South 
.Africa, ... has come to the conclusion that in order 
to make use of and struggle against this law, which 
has been forced upon us ... leaders should be elected 
who will wage a relentless struggle both from within 
and without these Councils on behalf of the exploited 
and oppressed Africans." (33)
It can be seen from this that the Communist Party , while being prepared 
to work through state institutions never saw these as their only avenue, 
or as an alternative to mass organisation. It was rather one means 
toward the goal of mass organisation. This differs from Mpanza's 
objectives at this time which appear to be focussed almost exclusively on 
the boards.
The Orlando Advisory Board elections for 1937 took place on the 13th 
December. Pushing ahead with his populist politics using any available 
drawcards, Mpanza succeeded in winning the highest number of individual 
votes in what was his second Advisory Board election. The results were 
Mpanza 161 votes, John Mofokeng 103, J.B.D. November 96, and Samuel 
Letsatsi 86. (~w ) The other three were Communist candidates giving 
the Communist Party the majority again. Although successful , they 
complained that
"On the whole the electors ware too much occupied by 
personalities and not enough by political 
considerations." v-^ 5)
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By now the Council had greatly increased its building programme for 
Orlando. 3 500 houses were planned for and under construction, and 955
additional acres^,were being considered for purchase as a site for more
i, (36)houses. v
The Council had resolved to expropriate Prospect Township but although 
building 300 houses a month at Orlando, there were as yet not enough 
houses to begin removals. Approval for the removal was received from the 
Minister of Public Health by July 1937.
By mid-year resistance to the removals was largely broken and most 
'slum-dwellers' were prepared to move to Orlando. v The township
was ready to receive Prospect residents by August. During the first 
week-end of the month 467 families were moved in about 60 trucks with a 
further 248 families scheduled for the end of the month. This was about 
2 000 people. By this time Orlande had 3 663 houses occupied , and
/ O Q \another 3 000 either under construction or planned. v J
With elections’ again approaching , the Vigilance Committees under the 
African Vigilance Federation, combining representatives from Orlando", 
Vfestern Native Township, Eastern Native Township and Germiston, decided 
to field candidates in Western Native Township and Orlando.
The Communist Party again complaining that the Boards were neglected , 
called for a more determined approach towards elections.
"The municipal authorities were quick to take 
advantage of the backwardness of the existing 
political organisations, and to label these boards as 
'non-political' and to pack them with docile and 
reliable natives , for the most part teachers , 
ministers of European denominational churches , court 
interpreters and shopkeepers: men dependent on a good 
report from the Superintendent for their livelihood 
and unable for economic reasons to take a firm stand 
against the vested interests.
If radical militant elements stand for election and 
are elected to the boards they can express the 
grievances of the people and organise the location 
residents for deputations, demonstrations and strikes 
against the terrible hardships of the urban Native 
masses. They can lead the people In the struggle 
agaiixst the Pass Laws, poll-tax and beer raids, and
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affiliated to the Convention (A.A.C.) establish a 
direct connection between every urban centre and the 
Convention. They can do more than that. They can 
teach and organise the peasants and country people who 
look to the locations for a lead.
Every election for the advisory boards must become a 
political struggle for the elimination of the 'good 
boys' and the reformists and for the election of 
revolutionary elements." (41)
In the elections on the 12th December, 1937 the Vigilance Committee 
candidate succeeded in comfortably taking three out of the four seats 
leaving only Mpanza from the previous year. The percentage poll was 
approximately 33%.
The Communist Party appealed for unity and encouraged the formation of 
Vigilance Committees in other areas.
"The people want unity, they want to be organised, and 
the advisory boards are the bodies for doing it.
Unity .of the advisory boards, together with the 
vigilance committees , will make the Councils sit 
up". («)
Before 1938, the Council's screening and extra costs involved in living 
at Orlando tended to result in better off blacks moving there. From 1938 
on as each black suburb near the city centre was destroyed , the 
inhabitants had to go to Orlando. The initial period enabled a higher 
proportion of the petit-bourgeoisie to become more established in 
Orlando. With trading territory free from white competition and market 
places provided by the Council , the fairly established petit-bourgeoisie 
was able to consolidate itself. A lot of those who followed after 1938 
would have been both poorer and without housing and would have mainly 
been subtenants.
To implement its policy of restricting the urban population to labour 
requirements, the Ministry of Native Affairs decided in July to conduct a 
census of the locations. They argued that the results of the census 
would be of great benefit to the black population and therefore appealed 
for co-operation. ^
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Nevertheless, the influx of families continued. These tended to settle 
on the fringes of the city in places like Kliptown where it was estimated 
.that 800 - 900 famlies were living as tenants in houses owned by the 
residents. Many families were also illegally occupying land. Ballenden 
argued at the time that if families were restricted from entering the 
area the cost of housing the equivalent number of single men would be 
only about one quarter. This shows the real interest of the
Council in cheap labour rather than the more liberal and humanitarian 
image it has often projected.
More politicised people at the time were able to see the implications of
the census for greater control. Not only would it reduce the Council's
housing costs but it would also increase the stranglehold of the
employers over the workers. The workers would then face the double
threat of losing both their jobs and their homes in the urban areas if
they did not behave as dictated by their boss. There was some attempt to
organise opposition to the census and it appears that the Vigilance
Committees were, party to this. They advocated a refusal to answer the
questionnaire. This resulted in 14 people being charged , although the
charges were dropped against all except Gaur Radebe who was Secretary of
the Western Native Township Advisory Board■and a member of the Vigilance
Committee. This was an act of victimisation as Radebe was also a member
(47)of the Communist Party and a rising figure in the A.N.C.
The results of the census, however, were not quite what the Council 
expected. The census found,
"(a) That there are no bodies of idle Africans in the 
towns whose services should be put at the 
disposal of the farmers, and 
(b) it has thrown some light on the extent of the 
housing shortage." (48)
By now Orlando had 6 000 houses with 3 000 more and four hostels planned , 
and had introduced street lighting. Money had been voted for floors to 
be provided. The population was approximately 35 000, which was policed 
by six white policemen and about twelve black constables.
"Orlando has an excellent name with the police. The 
Police Commission of Inquiry in 1936 reported that it 
was one of the few Native townships under proper 
control.” (49)
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From the Council' s_.poi.nt of view this was indeed a 'model township'.
By this stage the Council had moved people to Orlando from the following 
areas which it had successfully cleared of black residents;
"Bertrams, Doornfontein, Spes Bona, Wolhuter , Central, 
Marshalltown, Ferreirastown, City and Suburban, parts 
of Fordsburg , Newtown, Vrededorp and Prospect 
Township." (50)
But the controls did not stop the drift into Johannesburg.
"The influx of Natives to Johannesburg , particularly 
women and children is increasing and as no further 
accommodation is available at the moment in the 
Council's Native townships and hostels, these natives 
drift into residential areas, finding temporary 
accommodation with friends and relatives." (51)
There was now already a tremendous pressure on Orlando housing and in 
spite of city clearance and influx, the number of houses remained almost 
static from 1938 through to 1940.
"Mien the people ware forced out of towns like 
Prospect Township which was one of the worst slums and 
they came to Orlando, soon there was no room. All the 
houses were occupied. But the City Council was 
forcing the people out of the back yards." (53)
The registered waiting list for housing was to climb from 143 in 1939 to 
4 500 at the end of 1941.
Even though housing had more than doubled since 1936 , it had not kept
pace with the increase in population but only served to lull the
^55)authorities into thinking the situation was under control. v '
Mpanza who was quick to see the importance of the housing issue , claims 
to have been alone in fighting for this cause.
"But at the time the idea had not come to our party to 
put up more candidates than myself and thus I was at 
one time the only non-Communist boardsman among the 
four. So 1 got no backing when, long before the war,
I urged the City Council not to proceed with their
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move to make backyard dwellings illegal when they had 
not built enough houses in the location to accommodate 
the peopLe.” (56)
It was not strictly true that the Communist Party did not take up the 
housing issue. What is probably more the case, judging from earlier
statements, is that housing was one of a number of broarder demands 
supported by them, rather than the central demand as it was for Mpanza. 
This would have stemmed not only from ideological differences but also 
from the short-term, rather immediate, and localised and personal nature 
of Mpanza's politics. Also his ability to exploit popular sentiments.
"At public meetings , with his hat cocked at a jaunty 
angle, Mpanza was able to sway his audience. He spoke 
their language , the language of those who hungered for 
houses.
Soon he was acknowledged as the leader of the people 
in Orlando. Whenever Mpanza arrived sitting proudly 
astride one of his horses there would be spontaneous 
applause. He was looked upon with reverence as the 
man who fought for and spoke on behalf of the 
underdog." (57)
The Communist Party meanwhile, had not remained static. It was having 
growing influence in the Transvaal A.N.C. The election of the president 
of the Transvaal A.N.C. took place in Orlando with a ’Moscow flag' on 
display. Gaur Radebe was an example of the overlap of membership
that was tending to occur, although he was shortly thereafter expelled 
from the Communist Party for petit-bourgeois tendencies.
But in spite of the Communist Party's influence, the A.N.C. before the 
war was still elitist in character and primarily concerned with 'peaceful 
propaganda'. As a nationalist movement, this was largely due to its
limited social base as proletarianisation was not very advanced. w  J 
Of cours the A.N.C.'s political development was not linear, and this was 
also a period of a retreat to more conservative policies under the 
leadership of P.I. Sene.
A number of studies into the cost of living of black families in 
Johannesburg in 1939 showed a deficiency in wages of 2 Pounds to 4 Pounds 
per month. ^60^ xhis was only the start. From 1939 to 1945 the South 
African economy, affected by the war, began to go through changes which
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had widespread ramifications throughout the country. The value of 
manufacturing output increased by 116% creating an insatiable demand for 
labour. At the same time the inflation rate soared by about 32% while 
wages did not keep up. The attraction of possible employment, and 
the coercion of the continuing decline of the reserves and the increasing 
cost of living , resulted in a rapid intensification in the wave of black 
urbanisation.
There was also the problem of unemployment in some sectors of industry. 
Laid off workers were compelled to look for other jobs but usually at a
lower wage. (62)
At Orlando train fares were becoming an increasing burden against 
relatively declining incomes , houses still had no ceilings , no floors and 
no electricity. Compared to other townships the rents were high (1 Pound 
for 2-roomed houses as compared to 14 shillings for the same in Port 
Elizabeth) , about a quarter to one third of income instead of the 
Government's stated maximum of one fifth. There were less than half the
necessary number of schools. (63)
A letter to the House of Assembly at the time states:
‘There is bitter discontent amongst the older Natives.
If this is a model township , and the sixth largest town in the Union, 
then God preserve the Natives from the repitition of such a 
monstrosity ... I am driven to the conclusion that a collosal crime 
has been perpetrated by the white races against the Natives ... 
Johannesburg will reap what it has sown. (64)
To make matters worse the Council's grant for housing for 1940 was not 
forthcoming and building came to a stop.
Noting the growing poverty the Council reduced rents in Orlando from 
1 Pound per month for twc-roomed houses and 1 Pound 5 shillings for 
three-roomed houses, to 4/- and 5/- per week respectively.
The poverty was not entirely uniform as Orlando was able to sustain a 
growing number of businessmen. The most numerous were coalsellers , and
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fruit and vegetable hawkers. There were 188 businesses in private 
houses.
The Vigilance Committees were gaining influence at this time. They were 
generally more influential over the residents than the advisory boards 
and were regarded as more representative by the majority of residents. 
Nevertheless, they were still compelled to work through the boards which 
were the only officially recognised organ. The federation of vigilance 
committees was trying to extend its affiliates to include the whole of 
the Band. It was hoped that this would put them in a stronger position 
to attain official recognition.
Buring the year the Orlando Residents Association was formed with backing 
from the Communist Party and with a Communist member. The party
had only had two members in the Board for 1940. They fielded three 
candidates and one supporter of their programme for 1941.
“They .pledged themselves to work for:- lower rents, 
more power to the Advisory Boards , votes for African 
women, better houses - with floors and ceilings - and 
more houses too! And to build up and strengthen the 
Orlando Residents' Association, and to give regular 
reports from the Board to the people.” The Communist 
Party candidates were E.T. Mofutsonyana, J. Masupha , 
and S. Moema.
Supporting their programme as an Independent Progressive was
£. Maviffibela. The three Communist Party candidates were elected
along with H. Mdingi an independent. Mpanza is said to have been on the 
hoard every year except one before 1955 and since he entered the advisory 
board politics. This year he was excluded on a technical point. He was 
known for his training race horses in 1940. The results were J. Masupha 
137, E.T. Mofutsonyana 130, S. Moema 129, and H.B.M. Mdingi 47. This was 
an about 1 0% poll.
The success of the Communist Party in Orlando Advisory Board politics 
should be seen as a reflection of their relative efficiency and good 
organisation. Voters were frequently more impressed with personalities 
rather than ideologies but it is not likely that personality was a strong 
point in their favour in this case. Neither Moema nor Masupha ever 
attracted a very strong following on their own, and Mofutsonyana who was
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the key Communist personality in Orlando and also to some extent 
Johannesburg , was not a good public speaker. His contribution was more 
intellectual than that of a popular rank and file or charismatic leader.
The Communist Party continued to further their alliance with the A.N.C.
At the annual conference of the Johannesburg District Communist Party 
held in February
"Great importance was attached by the Johannesburg 
Communists to helping the African National Congress to 
lead the African people in their struggle." They also 
pledged to fight for 'lower rents and better housing 
in the townships:-" (72)
Unconcerned about long term goals or national party programmes , Mpanza 
was less constrained in the means he was prepared to use to achieve his 
ends. W.B. Ngakane, a member of the A.N.C. since 1936 and an appointee 
to the Orlando Advisory Board since 1937 , was unfortunate enough to make 
an enemy of Mpanza at about this time.
"One day he tried to have me murdered because I 
opposed his methods of dealing with people. When I
 ^ confronted Mpanza with some of the things he did - for 
instance after he was elected , if somebody went to him 
to go and represent him at the superintendent's 
office, he'd say, 'All right you have to pay a Rand or 
two Rands for a taxi to take me to the
superintendent's place.' And then I said, 'You can't 
do this , it is not right. You asked them to vote for 
you.' I fell out of favour with him."
This eventually led to Mpanza arranging to have him killed. At a meeting 
in the Orlando Communal Hall Mpanza was insulted by Ngakane not 
immediately acknowledging Mpanza as chairman. This was customary as 
Mpanza had won the highest number of individual votes , but was not an 
official rule. Mpanza invoked strong feelings in the crowd against 
Ngakane who would have been assaulted if he had not remained calm and had. 
backing from supporters.
"The following Monday ... we attended the meeting and 
this was where he had ordered a murderer especially 
from Carletonville , from the mines there , a Pondo 
chap. I went to the meeting, not knowing there was 
trouble."
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Ngakane was in the boardroom with three others , waiting for Mpanza. 
Someone came bn to warn them thre was trouble brewing. Another came 
in and said to Ngakane "We're going to fix you tonight.” He then 
left and a huge Hondo came in with Mpanza behind him. Mpanza said to 
the Pondo ,
"You act quickly because I want to go home." Ngakane was trapped in 
the boardroom as there was only one door out. He told them he would 
fight back. As he kept them talking supporters of his armed with 
sticks arrived and he left with them. v '
Although Mpanza and Ngakane were later to become close friends, it was 
actions like these which discredited Mpanza among the A.N.C. and the 
Communists and gave him a reputation of not being shy of using violence 
to achieve his ends. This was to lead to disunity in Orlando poliics at 
a later stage and to make Mpanza more vulnerable to the local authorities 
when he least needed to be.
It had become the practice by 1940 to keep 'unauthorised persons' out of 
locations through joint raids by the South African Police and municipal 
police. The raids were usually after 9- p.m. and caused considerable 
resentment and complaint. The advisory boards of all the locations in 
Johannesburg repeatedly demanded the suspension of the raids and after 
numerous discussions with the boards it was decided during 1940 to 
introduce another method. During the war, with a drain on the manpower 
and resources the state was wary of arousing dissension among blacks at 
home.
In June 1941 the Council proposed new legislation whereby the occupier of
a dwelling could be called to establish their right to the dwelling or be
removed. This was challenged in Court and while the appeal was being
contested the Magistrate's Court declined to grant ejectment orders under
the section. During this period, from 1941 to 1943, there was a heavy
( 74}influx into the City, with many families included. v
With the pressure on housing the Council had no option but to relax the 
location regulations and turn a blind eye to lodgers and 
sub--letting. Officially the population was 40 000 but there were
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oiiany more among the sub-tenants. The Council attempted to build another 
750 houses to deal with the overcrowding.  ^ ' But the Central Housing
Board only granted a portion (300 000 Pounds) of the amount applied for 
(1.800 000). Most of the money applied for was to have been spent on 
housing for Orlando Mast. The Council predicted, optimistically, that 
its plans would be delayed for at least a year.
The Communist Party was quick to respond.
"There are not nearly enough houses for the people in 
Orlando. People have nowhere to sleep. The houses 
are crowded , and three or more people have to be in 
one room. In addition, some have to spend the night 
on the verandahs. Over 3 000 have registered for 
homes - and only 750 homes are being builtl
This shocking position is due in the first place to the neglect of 
the Municipality."
At a public meeting on August 18th, 1941 Mr. Venables, the Assistant 
Manager of Locations in the Johannesburg Municipality, said that, they 
could not build houses because the Government needed the taoney for the Y*
war. •
But this is really a feeble excuse. Rich men are making millions of 
Pounds in profits out of the war. Let the Government take this money and 
use it to build homes for the people. If it was not for the African
industrial workers in Johannesburg, the war could not continue at the 
front. It is also a part of the war to see that the workers here are 
properly cared for."
They also endorsed a mass meeting called by the Orlando Residents' 
Association to protest against the housing shortage and the behaviour of 
Mr. Venables in attacking the representativity of the Orlando Advisory 
Board. (/8)
The Orlando Residents' Association in turn gave support to the previous 
Communis t dominated board in the December elections. The three 
Communists were returned for 1942 but the independent was replaced by 
Mpanza
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Concerned to maintain stability in the urban areas and increasinlyg
desparate for finance, the Council during May, 1942 took a significant
step away from its policy of making the Native Revenue Account balance.
They decided to meet deficits for improvements to Orlando from general 
(80)revenue. v '
It was of course not only the Johannesburg Municipality that was facing 
the housing crisis. Five hundred families are said to have built a 
shanty town next to Sharpeville Location outside Vereeniging in 1942. 
They were promised that housing would be built for them as soon as 
housing materials became available. Meanwhile they remained where they 
were. <81>
The Communist Party again fielded their Advisory Board candidates of the 
last two years in the Orlando elections. They were S.M. Moema, E.T. 
Mofutsonyana and J. Masupha (as an independent). To these they added A. 
Msitshana, the leader of the Orlando Branch of the Communist Party. They 
stood for
"Better housing and lower rents; decent streets, 
street-lights and sanitary arrangements; more powers 
for the Advisory Boards and African representation on 
City Councils; the end of the permit system, lodger's 
fees and other undemocratic location
regulations.” (82)
In what had become an established pattern, Mpanza and three Communists 
were elected. (*^)
The Second World War was a major concern of the South African ruling 
class in the early forties. Their attempts to pass the cost of the war 
onto the working class were mediated by their concern to ensure economic 
stability and black political loyalty to the war effort. The irony of a 
war for ’democracy’ in an undemocratic South Africa also did not escape 
black political leaders.
This situation led to a more concessionary attitude in some respects. 
Workers in some sectors of the economy and more so skilled workers were 
able to take advantage of the situation, and despite of war legislation 
to the contrary, won higher wages through increased strike action. The
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state responded with minimum wages in almost all the large industrial 
areas, hut this-in turn led to growing unemployment as capital sought to 
reduce overall labour costs. It was also true that some industrial 
sectors for example building, suffered badly under the war economy and 
this threw more workers onto the labour market. The overall affect was 
to widen the discrepancy between skilled and unskilled workers.
On top of this the consumer price index was to increase by over 30% 
reducing the value of wage increases , and food shortages intensified the 
impoverishment of unskilled and unemployed workers. This was due to 
drought and an over-optimistic forecast of maize production for 1942. 
This led to an over-commitment on the part of the state to maize exports 
which could only be met by exporting local reserves. The drought in turn 
threw greater pressure on the urban areas.
The overall effect was growing desperation among the increasingly 
urbanised black masses at a time when the state was attempting to appease 
opposition. - The result was growing militancy among the black 
masses.
Responding to this in 1943 the A.N.C. drew up a new constitution which 
showed a move toward mass organization. It eliminated the Upper House of 
the Chiefs, provided for the democratic election of the posts of 
treasurer and secretary, and established a working committee which could 
act for the national executive and which would be within a fifty mile 
distance of national headquarters. This made it possible to have a 
standing year round organisation for the first time. These changes were 
to have positive consequences for Congress which was to regroup and take 
significant steps toward further growth. ' 1
In Orlando the number of houses had increased by less than 200 in 1942 , 
then remained static until 1944.
Without response, Mpanza sought to bring the plight of the Orlando 
homeless to the attention of the authorities through the Orlando Advisory 
Board and through writing to the Minister of Native Affairs. He then 
looked for publicity by writing to the press.
"Natives in Orlando - Sir, - In 1932 the Johannesburg 
City Council passed a motion compelling all Africans 
to leave the central areas of the city and to reside 
in various established townships outside the city 
boundary. The Council moreover undertook to supply 
adequate housing facilities for the Natives affected. 
In consequence of this , houses in Prospect Township 
and Vrededorp were demolished in 1935 and Africans 
were sent to various established areas.
The municipality has failed in the attempt to house 
the Africans affected during the last decade, and, up 
to date there are 3 000 families desperately 
attempting to find houses who are unable to do so.
In view of the above unsatisfactory state of affairs 
and of the unhygienic and unhappy conditions arising 
therefrom, I suggest that under Sections 2 and 3 of 
the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923 the Administor of 
the Transvaal be called upon to ask for the
intervention of the Minister in order to 
satisfactorily settle the pressing situation in
Orlando.
J. Sofasonke Mpanza.
Member of the Advisory Board ,
Orlando." (®7)_
And again,
"Housing in Orlando. - At the outset I wish to say 
that it is appreciated that there is a war on, and
that the war effort is of paramount importance and
dwarfs all other considerations. Building materials 
and labour are at a premium, and everything available 
is rightly directed towards winning the war. Orlando 
Location is already over-crowded to an almost 
overwhelming degree, x^ hile in the city accommodation 
is also not available , because those Europeans who 
dare to harbour Natives in their yards are , together 
with the Natives in question, prosecuted for so 
doing. It would therefore not be out of place to 
discuss this lack of housing facilities , and to place 
before the authorities the facts, so that some 
temporary measure may be adopted to alleviate the 
distress which has been created.
J. Sofasonke Mpanza.” (88)
While aware of the seriousness of the situation,
"The non-European housing problem in Johannesburg is 
assuming serious proportions , for many natives have 
recently brought their families into the town owing to 
conditions in the native reserves," (89)
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and still awaiting the release of building materials by the Goverment, 
the Council responded with repression as soon as the results of the test 
case of the new regulations were heard.
In April 1943 the South African Police , assisted by the Civic Guards 
began a series of relentless raids on blacks in Johannesburg. With the 
raids still continuing the last published figures showed that nearly 
11 000 people had been arrested in thirteen nights of raiding. Of these 
more than half were charged , the vast majority of whom were for ’a 
technical offence.'
The Pimville , Western Native Township, Orlando and Eastern Native
Township Advisory Boards were meanwhile holding joint meetings with the
Non-European Affairs Committee of the Council , to discuss their
('91')grievances. v
Showing restraint Mpanza continued to write to the newspapers.
’’Accommodation in Orlando. It is hard for a native to ~
-1 understand the attitude of the Johannesburg local 
authority with regard to accommodation in Orlando or 
in any of the other townships owned by the City
Council. The latter has rigourously enforced every 
provision of the Urban Areas Act favourable to itself , 
such as sub-sections 3 and 5 of Section 5 , which 
empower the local authority to prosecute any European 
who harbours a native in his premises. The Native
Advisory Boards will be failing in their duties if
they do not take steps to approach the Minister of 
Native Affairs, under Section 2 Sub-Section 1 of the 
Act, to exercise powers vested in him by the said 
Section of Act 21 of 1923 , as amended - Member of
Advisory Board, Orland." (92)
With still no response, the Sofasonke Party now decided on a more
militant course. Said Mpanza,
"By 1943 my party decided it was time to act. The 
plan was to advise our followers to put up squatters 
shacks on municipal land. We were prepared to take
the risks involved.” (93)
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Behind the scenes the Sofasonke Party began preparing its followers for 
action.
Black militancy vras now finding expression in other developments. August 
1943 saw the start of the Alexandra bus boycott.
A small group emerged out of the bus boycott who had worked closely 
together on this campaign and earlier in a struggle around education. 
These were Baloyi , Koza and Mampuru. They had become increasingly 
critical of the A.N.C. for showing little response to popular struggles 
of the time. Xuma was said to have remained aloof from the Alexandra bus 
boycott, for instance. AT the same time Basner, now ex-S.A.C.P., was 
feeling that there was a need for a militant mass organization to oppose 
such actions as the police raids of April 1943.
These people were drawn together to form the African Democratic Party 
(A.D.P.) on the 26th September when they published a manifesto under the 
names of Paul Mosaka, Self Mampuru, S.J.J. Lesolang and G.E, Kuzwayo with 
Basner and two other whites as members.
The content of their aims did not differ essentially from those of the 
A.N.C. , the main difference being their stated interest in militant 
particiipation in mass resistance. In their aims then they were as out 
of step with the masses as was the A.N.C. at that time. They also stated 
their concern at the internal rivalries and splits within the A.N.C.
Unfortunately their organization was fraught with problems right from the 
start. Differences of opinion and political style emerged beteween Koza 
and most of the rest who were not capable of actually taking the steps 
they had boldly advocated.
Within the first two months of their existence they showTed they were 
already intimidated against holding a planned mass demonstration simply 
by state scrutiny.
"Militancy had proved an empty boast." (94)
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Koza was eventually expelled.
The A.B.P. Included In its policies an intention to work through state 
structures such as the Native Representative Council and stressed the 
importance of white participation in the organisation.
The A.B.P. was never able to function on a national level and was mainly 
involved in and supported around the Johannesburg area.
Even so, they gained no seats in the 1943 Orlando Advisory Board election
(95)and the Board again consisted of three Communists and Mpanza. v '
At this time the A.A.C. was also revived.
Yet another grouping was beginning to take shape involving some young men 
named. Mbata , Nkomo , Roboroka , Tambo and others. They had had talks with 
Mampuru but -were not happy vTith participation in the Native 
Representative Council elections or the involvement of whites.
The A.D.P.'s inability to initiate significant campaigns only enabled 
them to call for a day of prayer on the 8th January 1944 to be known as 
’Atlantic Charter Day.' They called on blacks to solemnly turn to God. 
They concluded,
“This is our New Year message to the African peox->le.
Salvation lies in your hands. Heaven helps those who 
help themselves. Observe the African Day of Prayer 
and fight for freedom.” (96)
In Orlando meanwhile, the situation was deteriorating. Firstly, in 
February the white bricklayers at Orlando West downed tools after a 
demand from the contractor that they increase their output. They were 
antagonised further when they were fined for stopping work. In the face 
of the post-war skills shortage they were not in the mood for
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arguing. v Secondly, heavy rains caused 85 houses to collapse at
Pimville. The City Council took no steps to help the destitute who took 
shelter with friends. The Native Affairs Department had stated its
intention to put up temporary block houses but no steps had been taken to 
build. (98)
The loss of the houses placed greater strain on an already impossible 
situation and with building grinding to a complete halt, breaking point 
had been reached. The official waiting list was 16 000.
"Now in Orlando there were people coming in thousands 
like in all cities. People were shifting perhaps
because the wages were better in the towns than
anywhere else. There were so many people that people 
were now sleeping on the verandahs of other people.
We kept on appealing to the municipality of
Johannesburg to give accommodation or build houses for 
these people because they were employed in town. But 
they wouldn't do anything," recalls
Mofutsonyana. (100)
Mpanza wrote once more, in desperation, to the Minister of Native 
Affairs, pointing out that the Council did not allow blacks to live in 
the city, or elsewhere in prohibited areas, though it was unable to 
accommodate them. He therefore urged the Minister to intervene and 
exercise the powers vested in him by ibe Act by taking over the
administration of Orlando Township if he was satisfied, after inquiry, 
that the Council was not fulfilling its obligation to the native 
residents. In so doing, Mpanza showed an astute ability to exploit the 
divisions between central and local government. Secondary industry , 
wanting to take advantage of a more mobile labour force , exercised 
considerable influence on the central government. This influence was 
shown in the central government's easier attitude toward influx control 
regulations and a reluctance to remove the squatters who were a labour 
supply to urban based secondary industry.
What happened next was to become one of the most important acts of urban 
resistance and was to change the face of Orlando and the south western 
townships completely. It was also to place Mpanza and the Sotasonke 
Party in an unassailable petition above their opponents in Orlando for 
many 3/ears and to give them a permanent place in the history of Soweto.
( 9 7 )
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CHAPTER 3 : SHANTY TOWN AND THE RISE OF THE SOFASONKE PARTY
1944 - 1945
"The segregation provisions of the Urban Areas Act 
prevent the Natives from acquiring land and from 
buying , building or hiring houses except in the 
locations, where, in the case of Johannesburg , no land 
or houses are made available for us except houses 
built and owned by the Municipality. By applying the 
segregation provisions and not setting aside any land 
on which we may build ourselves , the Municipality has 
taken on itself the duty of providing us with houses.
But it has not carried out that duty; there are no 
houses for us. Very well, then, we shall go and sit 
down on municipal land and wait for the Municipality 
to come and put a roof over our heads."
This was Mpanza's argument for squatting. As we have seen the decision 
to squat was preceded by attempts on the part of the Communist Party , the 
African Democratic Party and in particular Mpanza to bring the housing 
crisis in Orlando to the attention of the Council and the Department of 
Native Affairs, but with no result. The squat was then not a Spontaneous 
or sudden step as is incorrectly portrayed in the following.
"But in South Africa , for the time being the 
conditions created by the war set off a series of 
' revolts with a pattern of mass action led, not by the 
A.N.C. or its Youth League who were functioning on a 
different level altogether, but by elemental 
indiginous leaders thrown up by the situation.
The greatests of such revolts began in 1944 when tens 
of thousands of Africans who had for so long been 
jammed into the dreadful slums around Johannesburg , 
followed a demogcgic township eccentric , James Mpanza , 
in a spontaneous trek from Orlando to vacant municipal 
land nearby." (2 )
Apart from the fact that the Youth League had not yet been formed at the 
time of the squat, that 'tens of thousands' is an exaggeration, that 
there was more to Mpanza than a 'demagogic township eccentric' , as we 
have seen the decision to squat had already been made in 1943.
Far from spontaneous it was a well “measured and calculated step 
spearheaded by a leader with a very shrewd understanding of his 
constituency, of the significance of the issue at hand and a confident 
assessment of his following. Indeed, uplifted by the enormity of the
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action planned , Mpanza for once appeared to trascend narrow party 
interests and invited the Communist Party and the A.D.P. to join his 
planning committee.
tJot without reason, but badly misreading the situation the Communist 
Party rejected his approach.
The Communist Party was obviously suspicious of Mpanza in the light of 
their experience with him in the Advisory Board politics and his 
reputation for gangster-like methods in achieving his ends. They saw 
their local advisory board members as ’infinitely more advanced 
politically’ and Mpanza's plans as 'election propaganda'.
The result of discussion in Johannesburg Communist groups was that ,
"It was generally agreed that the party could not have 
been so irresponsible as to send thousands of people 
to set up hessian shanties at the beginning of winter, 
with all the resultant dangers , particularly to the 
children."
They did not believe that the camps could succeed in forcing the Council 
to provide housing and furthermore underestimated the extent of the 
crisis.
"We knew there were many people would did not have 
houses but not to such an extent." said
Mafutsanyana (5)
The party were 'actively discouraging' the camps, and held that the 
correct line was to campaign against the landlords, and for higher wages 
to let workers obtain their own houses. They disassociated themselves 
frasa the squatter movement.
The A.N.C. was still restructuring around its new constitution and the 
Youth League was in the process of formation. Among the founders of the 
Youth Leaque were Lembede , Ngubane , Mandela, Nkomo , Mbata and Sisulu.
"Night after night the young men met, and young women 
too; one of them, Albertina, a serious nurse with a 
noble brow, became Walter Sisulu's wife during 1.944.
They would all meet appropriately enough, since they
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were planning a new policy for Congress, in the office 
of its founder, Seme, where Lembede worked, or, in 
some ramshackle building in the buisiness area of 
Johannesburg , they met in the A.N.C. office , or 
perhaps in one or another's houses in Orlando , the 
expanding township crammed with innumerable little 
houses that looked like match boxes. Sometimes they 
talked all through the night. As their ideas caught 
on, new members were continually joining." (7)
The league was to be formed on Easter Sunday, 1944, a week after the
(O \
squat was due to start. ' '
The A.N.C. therefore did not take part in the squatter movement.
The A.D.P. on the other hand, troubled by internal dissention, short on 
credibility and lacking the impetous to initiate its own campaigns, 
welcomed Mpanza's invitation. It was an opportunity to act out the 
militant politics for which they claimed to stand. They had been
defeated in the previous advisory board elections and this was an 
opportunity to recoup their losses in alliance with the minority party in 
the board against the Communisty Party.
So it was that the ad-hoc committee of 8 , which was formed, to organise 
the squat, consisted of Sofasonke Party and A.D.P. members only.
"The Committee called several- meetings in the township 
to win support for its plans, and Senator Basener was 
invited to join the speakers.” (9)
Undeterred by the lack of Communist Party support , Mpanza deliberately 
made known his intentions to the authorities.
"Mpanza approached the chairman of the Non-European 
Affairs Committee (NEAC) and told him: 'Since there
is no material to build houses , and meatime the 
Council has land , I am taking possession of the land 
and building shacks for the people who have no houses 
to live in until such time at the Council shall have 
material to build houses.'" (1 0 )
Much of Mpanza's confidence in taking this stand was due to his legal 
understanding. The 1926 Court ruling against the Council argued exactly 
that the law could not have mean to allow' for people to be removed under 
an Urban Areas proclamation if they had nowhere to move to. Mpanza's
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argument was that , seeing that Johannesburg had been proclaimed under 
the Urban Areas Act, the Council was then obliged to provide the 
housing. This was never tested by Mpanza in Court.
On Saturday, the 25th March, 1944 the squat was started. Mpanza gathered 
hundreds of houseless people , mainly sub-tenants in Orlando but also 
'those who were living with their wives in the backyards of White homes 
and were being arrested daily for living there illegally."
"Those with no houses were advised to collect as many 
sacks and poles, so to erect shacks to live in what 
could be called vacant land." (1 2 )
To join the squat one had first to belong to the Sofasonke Party at a fee 
of 6 shillings and then pay 2/6 for admission to a site. Thereafter 
there was a fee of 2/6 per week for the running and policing of the 
village.
"He was dressed as usual in regalia, which was partly 
suggestive of a tribal chief , and partly of a silver 
braided commissionaire. Mpanza addressed the 
gathering with exhortations, and announced that they 
were about to cross the River Jordan, and with that 
they crossed the veld to the chosen site." (1 2 )
"On my horse, I led a group of people to a vacant lot 
in Orlando West and started a squatters camp ," Mpanza 
recalls. (14)
With his wife walking beside him, 500 families, among them many women 
with babies on their backs, followed Mpanza 'like the children of Israel 
followed Moses, as they led them out of bondage in Egypt to Canaan'.
“Sofasonke nengwevu baba - we shall die together with 
our father," they sang as they walked. (1 2 )
They started to prepare the sight for the camp and continued into the 
night by the light of a huge bonfire.
By the next day about 250 shacks had been completed and occupied. With 
an 'air of feverish excitement' they continued to work, with those 
already in occupation making themselves more comfortable and the new 
arrivals choosing stands and preparing the site for construction with 
picks and shovels.
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"It was on a fine Sunday that Mr. James Sofasonke 
Mpanza ran up and down the streets on horseback, 
holding'"'the reins with one hand and two sacks and 
poles on his shoulders, shouting at the top of his 
voice till sunset, saying: ’all those without houses 
must collect their sacks and poles and go straight to 
the other side of the river.’" (18)
Most of the shanties were made of wooden poles with roofs and walls of 
hessian while some were just mielie stalks covered with leaves. A few 
were able to get corrugated iron sheets for theirs.
The shanties were all very small , there was very little room to move 
about inside and too low to stand in. . Some were shared by two families. 
They cooked on brazziers in front of their home , fetching water from 
Orlando. Hessian, poles, firewood and coal had been bought by the 
committee to help develop the camp.
A protest meeting was held that day addressed by Mpanza and Paul Mosaka
as a member of the Native Representative Council.
#
The squatters published a manifesto explaining the reasons for squatting 
saying that they had been living under, intolerable conditions being 
’crowded like grapes’ , that they had approached the authorities and were 
given promises which were not kept. They had finally communicated with 
the Minister of Native Affairs and asked him to use his powers to compel 
the City Council to provide houses but were unsuccessful. 'As a result 
of the Sofasonke Party finally decided, out of necessity, to lead this 
first exodus it said.
The squatters said that they would rather live out in the open in their 
shanties than continue in the overcrowded Orlando houses as sub-tenants 
where they were liable to ejection at any time , being illegal and forced 
to live with two or three families in one house.
The squatter leaders claimed that about seven thousand new houses were 
needed for workers employed in Johannesburg. They were determined to 
stay where they were even though they disliked the primitive conditions,
(IQ)until something was done about housing. •
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"The next day, Monday, a very big shanty town was 
unbelievably stretching far and wide. Flying machines 
roared in the sky to see wonders. The shacks 
increased by the hour." (20)
In spite of Mpanza's repeated appeals and warnings, the Council was
shocked , and hesitant in its response.. Their first impulse was to
prosecute the squatters , but the government would not support this unless
f 21)alternative housing could be offered. v y
A special meeting of the Council's Non-European Affairs Committee was 
called on the Monday to discuss the growing squatter camp. The Council 
had clearly been aware of the acute housing shortage but, apart from the 
shortage of materials, it had not seen the situation as an emergency. 
This was partly because the Council held the view that most of the 
squatters had no right to be living in Orlando as they had been illegal 
sub-tenants. They also had never dreamed of the possibility of an 
organised movement.
But because the housing shortage in Orlando was so obvious , there was 
considerable sympathy for the organisers of the movement at the start.
The Council was also in a difficult position or in a 'cleft stick' as one
(2 2 )of them put it. v It could not compel the squatters to return to
the Orlando houses as sub-tenancy was illegal and was the object of the 
mass police raids of the year before. At the same time the Council 
feared that unless something was done, the movement might spread to other 
townships. Commented one councillor. "Whatever the Council does now, it 
will probably be criticised." Feeling helpless, the Council blamed the 
Government for not responding to its appeals for help with its housing 
problem.
"We have been chasing the Government for years , trying 
to convince them of the seriousness of the position 
and the inability of the Council to remedy it without 
financial aid , but the results have been entirely 
negative. A recent deputation to Cape Town returned 
empty-handed." (23)
They decided that no action would be taken against the squatters until
(24)advise had been received from the government. But the Committee
was not satisfied with the response. Says Mampuru of the A.D.P. ,
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"For three days we waited to see the reaction of the 
City Council of Johannesburg. When we realised that 
the Council was not taking this seriously, we decided 
to invite more sub-tenants, not only from Orlando, but 
from all other townships under the municipality of 
Johannesburg." (25)
The exodus was still continuing on Tuesday, the fourth day of the camp. 
A neat hessian and wood shack bore a sign "Boots and Shoes Repaired". 
Many shanties were still being built.
Meanwhile the Committee was continuing to supply the camp. 100 bags of 
coal were bought communally and were rationed among the inhabitants. 
People also queued for a half-pint ration of milk until it was finished. 
There was clearly broader identification with the squatters' struggle. 
It was widely seen as an act of black resistant. Two local shopkeepers 
donated 10 bags of mealie meal which was distributed that afternoon. 
3 lack visitors had so far donated 2 Pounds 5 Shillings to keep the 
community going.
Mpanza was predicting that the camp would grow to 10 times its present 
size- He argued that only 2 000 of the 7 000 houses in Orlando did not 
have two or more families in them and that some houses had as many as 12  
people living in them, sleeping in the bedroom, the kitchen and the
dining room. Said Mpanza ,
"The overcrowding of houses in 1944 is not new. It 
started in 1937 when Prospect Township closed 
down." (26)
In M s  search for a solution Ballenden had hurried discussions with the 
Chief Native Commissioner, the local Native Commissioner, the Chief
Magistrate of Johannesburg , the acting Deputy-Commissioner of Police and
the joint Native Advisory Boards.
Meanwhile, still on Tuesday afternoon (the 27th) a number of sub-tenants 
fro® Orlando Rest had begun to move across. Rule men, women and
children participated in the building , it was mainly done by women while 
their men were away at work during the week. As children returned from 
school , they eagerly joined in the work. Some of the houses were
achieving greater sophistication with divisions in their shacks between 
living and sleeping quarters.
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The camps administration under the committee was maintaining the 
strictest discipline. They stated that they were not out to make 
.trouble, but simply wanted a 'fair deal' from the authorities. They
continued to distribute coal, firewood and milk bought with the funds, 
collected by the Sofasonke Party. Brewing of 'kaffir beer' was 
discouraged.
The City Council meeting of that night was dominated by four hours of 
debate on Orlando squatters.
"The Council eventually agreed to instruct the 
responsible Committee to consider proceeding 
immediately with all housing requirements on land 
available for the purpose , with such Government monies 
as are available and with its own financial resources; 
and that simultaneously the Government should be urged 
to make provision, by emergency regulations or 
otherwise, to place labour and material at the 
disposal of the Council.”
Urged on by the - squatters, the Councillors were in a more militant mood. 
Said one ,
"The time has come when we must stop asking for 
houses , we must demand them. We must stop passing 
resolutions; we must act.”
Joyce Waring questioned the excuse of the shortage of material. She said 
houses were being built for private ownership in the city's better class 
suburbs and that she knew of a house where repairs costing 1 500 Pounds 
had been done.
The next day, the Secretary for Native Affairs, D.L. Smit, announced that 
his Department was taking the Orlando exodus very seriouslxx but could 
only say that they had begun an investigation.
The Camp continued to grow with people streaming in from Orlando West and
elsewhere. The rate of influx v?as beginning to outstrip the supply of
hessian, wooden poles and other building materials which were becoming
(29)scarce •
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With hasty consultations and conferences between the Council , the Orlando 
Advisory Board , which of course included Mpanza and Paul Mosaka , and with 
Government representations being made , another meeting was held on the 
29th March, at which the Director of Native Labour was present.
The NEAC of the Council resolved that no prosecutions of the squatters 
would be institutions, provided that,
"a. there was no further influx into 'Shantytown'.
b. the squatters who were already there , excluding
any who should be found not to be employed in 
Johannesburg , would be allowed to remain pending 
provision by the Council of other temporary
accommodation; and ,
c. the Council would provide water and sanitary 
services both at Shantytown and in the proposed 
temporary camp." (31)
The Council also agreed to make an immediate start on the erection of 
permanent houses with the material available.
The decision to erect 
Councillor, who was a 
breeze blocks. These 
Engineers Department.'
could be 'dry packed'
, (33)stones.
temporary shelters followed the suggestion of a 
builder, that they could be made cheaply with 
would be made in moulds provided by the City 
They would be ready within two to three days and 
with an iron roof simply weighed down with
It was decided that the Chairman of NEA.C and Ballenden , Manager of NEA.D, 
would inform the squatter leaders of the conditions later in the week.
That evening at about 7 o'clock, rain threatened ever Orlando and the 
whole squatter community assembled to pray that it would not come. No 
rain fell in the area that night.
By the next day, with the camp now nearly six days old , there were 1 500 
families registered by the Sofasonke Party as resident in Shantytown. 
Every adult wishing to join the community was required to register in a 
little hessian covered hut before starting to build. On this morning 
there was a queue of about fifty ’women lined up outside this enrolment 
shack which became know, as 'The Office'.
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The organisers were providing simple sanitary facilities and the camp was 
untidy but clean. The search for building materials continued and scores 
of women were trudging the surrounding roads and paths bringing stakes 
and sacking with which to build.
Mpanza's expenditure on milk had now trebled from 2 Pounds on the fourth 
day to 6 Pounds on the 6th. The daily distribution of coal and wood was 
continuing and contributions from well-wishes supporting the 
establishment of the camp was still coming in.
Mpanza was finding it increasingly difficult to obtain hessian and 
sacking s but the building continued with increasing reliance on mealie 
stems.
"Stakes are planted in the cleared ground. Cross bars 
are nailed into place and the women twine mealie stems 
- in between the bars , just as their grandmothers did in 
the kraals."
The organisers and squatters were maintaining the strictest discipline. 
There had been no fights and brewing of beer was actively discouraged.
"We are not here to break the law. We are here to 
obtain for ourselves our rights," said Mpanza. (34)
More support was coming in for the squatters. The Executive Committee of 
the Transvaal Interdenominational African Ministers Association 
(Johannesburg Branch) decided to appoint a Committee to organise a 
National Sunday Service to be held at 'Mpanza's Kraal' on the 30th 
April. They decided to advertise this and request all religious bodies 
in the Johannesburg townships to attend with
"The main objective being to raise funds in order to 
help our brothers and sisters in their distress, with 
a view to providing for them shelter, food and fuel by 
enlisting public sympathy and assistance in the
struggle for moral justice." (35)
By Friday the 31st, Shantytown already had a population of well over 
6 000 with not all the squatters registered. What Mampuru estimated at 
3 500 families. Mpanza estimated this would increase to 5 000 families 
or iaore than 20 000 people if all the sub-tenants moved out oi the 
Orlando houses. v '
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Negotiations began on Friday between Ballenden and what the Committee of 
8 now called itself , the Sofasonke Village Management Committee.
Almost from the start it was clear who was in control of the movement. 
The A.D.P. of course were formerly represented on the Management 
Committee and worked closely with Mpanza from the start. For instance, 
Basner was used by the Committee to conduct some of the negotiations with 
the City Council on behalf of the squatters. They were also directly 
represented in the Shantytown Administration. One of their paid
oganisers , Nchee , was named Deputy Leader of the camp. But in practice 
they had very little say in what took place.
This was partly a failure in the quality of the leadership which was 
incapable of giving the lead once it came to action. But it was also due 
to the characteristic of Mpanza as a determined fighter.
"He was not inclined to accept a secondary position in- 
any organisation, nor to accept political tutelage 
from any organisation. He knew how to use methods', 
ranging from bluff and deception to violence to 
silence those who opposed his plans , and the A.D.P. 
members would have needed to be more astute to use the 
alliance in order to win the squatter to their point 
of view.” (37)
In fact, by the time it came to negotiations, Mpanza was already in 
nearly every sense in control. This he had carefully organised.
From the start every adult wishing to join the squat had been compelled
to join the Sofasonke Party and had paid a joining fee. Mpanza also
collected all revenue from dues and trading rights. Thus all the camp
guards were in his employ. The camp guards were there to give protection
(3o)
to property and person while the men were away at work. ' They no 
doubt also provided strong-arm support for Mpanza in internal struggles. 
The camp was administered from the shack called The Office. From here 
Mpanza applied camp regulations and dealt with problems brought to him by 
the inhabitants. In spite of Nchee's presence, this put him in direct 
day-to-day control of all action in the camp. All statements and
arguments presented by the squatter leaders, such as the 'Manifesto' bore
his mark and in the final event the camp and the Committee of which he 
was chairman bore his name.
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Outside the camp's politics, it was Mpanza alone out of the A.D.P. and 
the Sofasonke Party, who was on the Orlando Advisory Board and had 
already been party to the Council's consultations.
So it was that when it came to negotiating with the squatters, the 
negotiations were with him.
"I was soon called by the manager of the Non-European 
Affairs Department. My Committee and supporters 
followed on foot, by car and all sorts of transport.
The Council compromised , authorising me to supervise 
the shacks. They had seen the mood of the 
people. (39)
On the second day of negotiations, April 1st, agreement was reached. 
Mpanza and his Committee accepted the terms of the agreement and were 
given official recognition as the leaders of the squatters , and the 
official channel through which the Council would deal with the 
squatters. The Committee agreed to co-operate with the municipal police 
in preventing further influx into the camp.-
Most importantly , it was also agreed that no prosecutions would be
instituted against the leaders or any members of the community with
f4l)regards to the migration. v
The Council still held back from actually accepting responsibility from
(42)administering the camp as the A.D.P. would have wanted.
It was decided at the negotiations that the registered compiled by the 
camp organisers would be used by the Council as a guide for removals to 
temporary accommodation. There would also be a small charge for water 
and sanitation services for the temporary houses,
The exodxis was still continuing while negotiations took place. People 
were moving across from Orlando to squat on the hillside. Two lorrj/ 
loads of poles arrived and all kinds of transport were being used to 
carry loads of saaalie stalks, sacks, corrugated iron and other materials 
for buildixig.
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Committee imembers and administrative staff hurried off to carry out their 
side of the agreement. v 1
This was the first big gain for the Committee of 8, but more so for 
Mpanza and the Sofasonke Party. With this, the prestige of the Sofasonke 
Party was greatly enhanced. The squatters were also given a chance to 
consolidate.
The following morning , Sunday , a meeting was held at which Ballenden told 
the people of Shantytown of the agreement with the Municipality. He was 
then accompanied by the chairman, Gray, and some members of the NEAC on a 
tour of inspection of the village. Their attention was drawn to a crowd 
of people who had been stopped from entering Shantytown, in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement. This group was addressed by both gray 
and Ballenden who told them that no further families would be allowed 
in. The group was not satisfied and threatened to start another, bigger 
camp. The Councillors had left by noon.
That afternoon, building continued and Mosaka said the Committee was 
having difficulty in stopping further movement into the camp.
"ife have no authority to stop them, and if we attempt 
to do so there will be trouble.”
Another meeting was held in the afternoon attended by 5 000 people , 
mostly residents but also visitors. Mosaka addressed the gathering 
reporting on the meetings the Committe and he had had with the Council 
and the Manager of NEAD. He explained the terms of the agreement, and 
praised the conduct of the people which had made the Committee's work 
considerably easier than was expected. He assured them that they would 
be kept informed of the progress of further negotiations and urged them 
to continue in the orderly manner for which he had so much praise.
He read a resolution which had been drawn up, authorising the committee 
to start a relief fund and further authorising the Chairman and Secretary 
to deposit all monies with a banking institution, making provision also 
for withdrawals. The resolution was unanimously carried.
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R.G. Baloyi , a businessman from Alexandra and the A.N.C. Treasurer- 
General , spoke and expressed his sympathy with the people of Sofasonke 
Village, He said that he had heard that the President of the African 
National Congress, Dr. A.B. Xuma, had given some money towards the fund. 
He would also make a personal contribution of 5 Pounds 5 Shillings. He 
wished them every success in their present plight.
Delegates from a meeting in Alexandra Township brought greetings and a(44)donation of 2 Pounds 3s. 6d. from Alexandra residents. v
On the following day, now Monday the 3rd April, the assembling of the
machines and material for making the breeze blocks began. The breeze
blocks were to be made from ash, sand and cement. Each machine would
have a productive capacity of 1 200 bricks per day, but as each house
(45)would require 3 000 blocks , a number of machines would be needed.
Work was also begun on a road leading from railway lines serving Orlando 
West, to Shantytown.
Shacks were still going up on the hillside as the Council began replacing 
the simple sanitary facilities set up by the committee.
Apart from those excluded by the agreement who were threatening to
(47)organise a 'protest march' v ' the camp was settling down to a quieter 
and more stable pace.
Over the ten days of its existence the squatter camp had mushroomed 
outwards. From a start of 500 families and 250 shacks, it had shown an 
average daily growth of 300 families per day since then. It had 4 000 
registered families at its peak, i.e. 4 000 shacks.
The first houses were very densely packed and the later ones were also 
very close. This was done to provide protection and made accessibility 
by unwanted outsiders very difficult,
"The houses of hessian are arrayed side by side with 
nc lines of demarcation. It is one big family united 
by a strong will, to see their struggle through to the 
bitter end. Here, on this patch of ground, near the 
richest city in the country, in the midst of the noise
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of grinding wheels of trains carrying thousands of 
African workers into the city a few miles away , is a 
village where life is different. Water is drawn from 
a nearby stream; the sanitary arrangements are quite 
primitivef there is no individuality, all is
communal. Below the dwellings, where the stream is 
wider, is the communal washing place. On either side 
of the stream, on the clean green grass are spread 
yards and yards of white linen and other articles of 
clothing. The women folk are determined that there 
shall be no dislocation of their industry. Their
employers must have their clean linen just as if there 
were no Shantytown and they themselves will keep their 
family linen clean even though the sky be the only 
roof over their heads.
In the centre of the settlement is the communal fuel 
depot. Yes I There is enough coal and wood for 
everybody. Shantytown is properly administered. It 
has its Headquarters in the ten over which James 
'Sofasonke' Mpanza presides.
James Mpanza is an elderly man, with an oval, 
emaciated face. He speaks with a chronic hoarse
voice. There is a perpetual glimmer of light in his 
eyes. Around him centres the whole business
concerning Shantytown. It is to him that more than 
10 000'look for leadership; it is to him that they owe 
their newly found freedom, for these houses of hessian 
have given to the occupants a sense of proud 
ownership. As one resident said: 'I'd sooner have my
own place here , than be crowded in one room over 
there indicating the place, where he was living
before coming to Shantytown."
Mpanza was maintaining order in the camp through his guards and would 
hear cases in the office.
The fuel depot was being run as a co-operative store by this stage 
selling coal and wood at less than 20% of Orlando prices.
It had been hoped that work could have begun immediately on the building
of permanent houses, but a week after agreement the Government had still
(45)not released building material. v ' However, the Council by then had
two health inspectors on duty, water in seven standpipes, pail closets 
had been constructed and a daily pail and rubbish removal service had 
been instituted. To maintain control and check influx, a white inspector
and thirteen blac!
(50)
’special constables' were appointed for duty in
Shantytown.
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Shantytown continuedd to grow but with most of the subtenants already in 
and some attempt to stop further mass influx, there was only a trickle of 
newcomers. The ..gamp was now about a mile long by 500 yards wide.
With the threat of cold weather to come the squatters had begun trying' to 
protect their homes with mud. They were digging clods from the ground on 
the fringe of the township to pack against the hessian or mealie stalks.
The roads from Orlando and from the railway had been completed and the 
preparation of breeze-blocks was under way. There were seven moulds , 
each making blocks using clinker ash from the Orlando power station, at 
the rate of more than one a minute. Thousands were standing in the sun 
drying. It was estimated that 30 000 would be needed to build the 
shelters. People gathered to watch the bricks being made.
This evidence of the Council taking steps to fulfil the housing part of 
the agreement, added to the relaxed atmosphere in the camp. The police 
on duty at the camp reported tha there had been no crime or 
trouble. .
The only dissatisfaction expressed was with the Council's decision to 
build only 2 800 temporary houses. It was felt that 4 000 were needed. 
There was also fear that given the discrepancy , not enough permanent 
houses would be built either.
Embarrased by their failure to support the squatter movement and still 
reluctant to entirely concede the ground to Mpanza the Communist Party 
was forced to respond to the situation in some way.
They argued that they had supported housing demands through the Orlando 
Advisory Board for years and that even though Mpanza had not consulted 
the rest of the Board before starting the movement , despite his mistakes , 
they still supported the people in their sturggle. They had vigorously 
opposed a proposal by the City Council that the squatters be evicted and 
insisted that the Council should negotiate with them.
On stronger ground they responded to criticism emerging within the camp 
about the undemocratic nature of Mpanza*s administration. They argued
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that the Committee was not elected by the residents to run the affairs of 
the township. The whereabouts of the money collected by Mpanza was 
questioned. The_ also objected about reports that people were being 
evicted for not paying the weekly fee.
The objection by the Communist Party members of the Advisory Board about 
not being consulted was a technical and face-saving point with little 
validity. While they were perhaps not formally approached as an Advisory 
Board , they had obviously been approached as the Communist Party. The 
Communists were forced to give Mpanza some credit. Said the Guardian,
"Whatever might be said about Mr. Mpanza's conduct of 
his campaign, the outstanding fact is that through 
this bold and imaginative action, Shantytown has 
forced the Council at last to make a move. It is true 
that Mpanza should have consulted and sought 
assistance from his fellow members on the Advisory 
Board so that a democratic working committee of 
Shantytown's dwellers should be elected and a proper 
statement of income and expenditure should be issued."
The Communist Party turned to criticise the Council's response as 
inadequate and to use the issue as election propaganda for the 
Johannesburg Council elections.
"Severe criticism must be expressed about the City 
Council procedure in this matter. Their measures may 
relieve a small proportion of the homeless now camping 
at Orlando, but they are completely inadequate to deal 
with the housing question as a whole. Shortage of 
materials is no excuse. In the wealthy suburbs, 
expensive houses and blocks of flats are being 
erected. Materials must be provided for the desperate 
poor at Orlando.
"The Communist Party demands the immediate start of 
bold extensive sub-economic housing schemes. It calls 
upon the voters Johannesburg to reject in the October 
elections, ratepayers' candidates who through a year's 
callous neglect have created the present crisis and to 
return a workers' majority to the Council," (55)
Some of the breeze-block shelters were nearing completion by the end of 
the third week of April. They were 13 feet square with no fireplaces, 
chimneys or windows. A census was being undertaking so as to control the 
move to the shelters.
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Mpanza was beginning to express disagreement with the move to the 
shelters. He argued that the people felt they should be allowed to build 
their own housea instead of moving to temporary shelters. He did not 
think that the people would suffer when the cold weather arrived as they 
had plenty of stoves and fuel.
He objected to the camp being called Shantytown. It was called Sofasonke 
Township and had a banking account and its own police force registered in 
that name. He said that township policemen were properly registered with 
the Native Affairs Department and employed by the township. They were 
paid a minimum wage of 6 Pounds per month plus allowances. There was now 
500 Pounds in the bank.
He said that discipline was much better than in Orlando. Since the 
township was started there had been no cases of drunkenness and no 
fights. The blacks were all law-abiding people and the township was an 
example of what they could do on their own initiative.
Although Mpanza and his supporter wanted the camp to be called Sofasonke 
Township or Sofasonke Village , it was also to be called Masakeng 
(Sacfctown) and to stick with the name Shantytown.
Dissatisfaction with the shelters was not just from Mpanza. As they took 
shape there were growing complaints about the lack of windows and refusal 
on the part of some to occupy them. The Sofasonke Party undertook to 
hire private doctors from the party's funds to inspect the houses and 
give their opinion as to their habitability. When it was pointed out by 
a Council official that the shelters were only temporary, one of the 
squatters replied, "Yes sir, but how long is 'temporary'?"
The Communist Party continued to provide public support for the 
squatters. Occasionally there was also support from other parties. In 
the House of Assembly a United Party Representative with Shantytown in 
mind pcsed the question of when Blacks would be allowed to run their own 
townships in their own way. The Minister of Native Affairs , Major Piet 
Van der Byl replied in a manner that belied the degree of organisation 
shown by the Sofasonke Party in Shantytown.
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“As a whole, Natives have not reached the stage where 
they are capable of administering a large township 
under modern conditions. Wherever Natives have been 
allowed to develop a township without being under 
municipal control , the result has been 
disasterous." (57)
The first 100 temporary shelters were complete in the second week of May 
and almost ready for occupation. The Council was to continue 
constructing the shelters at a rate of three blocks of ten every two days 
till the demand was fully met.
There was still dissension in the camp between those who wanted to occupy 
the skaters as soon as possible and those who wanted to build their own 
homes.
Council officials argued that in spite of no windows there was adequate 
ventilation in the openings between the top of the walls and the asbestos 
roofing. There would thus be no danger of carbon monoxide poisoning from 
the use of braziers in the rooms.
There were already many applications for rooms at the municipal offices 
in Orlando. A fee of 5 shillings per month was to be charged to the 
inhabitants for santitation, water and rubbish removal services but there 
was no rent.
A meeting was to be held on the evening of the 9th May, to thrash out the 
general attitude of the squatters to the shelters as divergent viewpoints 
continued to emerge.
The split over occupation of the shelters led to the formation of a 
Vigilance Committee inside Shantytown in opposition to the Sofasonke 
Party. v It was also to contribute to more active conflict.
The Committee wanted to know if the squatters were to be paid 
compensation for the material and labour that had gone into making their 
shacks. They estimated that at 4 Pounds per shack they were due about 
12 000 Pounds for the township.
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The success of the Shantytown squatters gave a new sense of pride and 
self respect to Johannesburg blacks. This in turn created a tension in 
the relationship between the local advisory boards and the Council. A 
meeting called~~by the NEAC to discuss the sensitive issue of black 
housing with advisory board members from Orlando, Pimville , Eastern and 
Western Native Townships and Shantytown representatives was adjourned 
when a board member immediately requested an apology from the Council 
Committee for wasting their time by coming late. Order broke down as the 
Township representatives continually interrupted the chairman to cheers 
from the others. The chairman then adjourned the meeting.
By now the shelters were almost ready in sufficient numbers for the 
squatters to start moving in. They were to be required to demolish their 
shacks when they moved , to prevent another family from taking their 
place. The removal of Shantytown was also intended to leave a space on 
which to build permanent housing.
Food continued to be provided to what had become an established market by 
traders and vendors. Some shops were run from shacks and sold groceries, 
inealie meal, meat, fruit or tomatoes.- Bread delivery vans arz’ived on a 
daily basis from Johannesburg and left empty. All traders, whether from 
inside or outside the camp were charged a levy.
An attempt by the Committee to build a large central market place with
(62)split poles was stopped by the Native Affairs Department.
Displeased by the defiant mood Shantytown was giving rise to, and with 
the shelters almost ready, the Council was keen to break the control of 
the township's leaders and to ensure that the movement be brought back 
under its control in the registered temporary housing.
As part of its offensive it started an official investigation into 
conditions in Shantytown, fed by the emerging disunity appearing from 
within the movement. The investigation was reporting that there was a 
great deal of dissatisfaction, that many were keen to move to the 
temporary housing but were afraid to move out of fear of reprisals. The 
Council was ensuring protection for those -who chose to move.
95
There were also said to be complaints that the Shantytown Committee was 
charging too much for administration fees and that those who refused to 
pay were beaten with sticks. It was also alleged that some who had not 
complied with camp rules had been taken to an unoffical prison, had theii^  
wrists bound with rope and had been severely beaten.
Mpanza, answering to the mounting criticism, argued that the election of 
the committee had been confirmed at one of the earliest general meetings 
of residents. This meeting decided on the 2s.6d administrative fee and 
agreed that those who could not pay this much should pay according to 
their means. He said this was not a compulsory levy. He argued that the 
money was used for the emergency needs of the residents in cases of 
sickness and death. It was also to - pay the camp 'officials' of whom 
there were now 28.
His administration also served the community through the central supply 
depot which provided goods at cost. All these traders, he assured, were 
in the employ of the Committee.
There was now between 900 Pounds and 1 000 Pounds in the Sofasonke 
Village bank account,
Mpanza's claims were contradicted by an independent deputation claiming 
to represent a large body of residents in the camp who visited the 
Johannesburg Star offices to air their complaints.
They said that the fee for administration was compulsory and that some 
who failed to pay had had their shacks pulled down. There were also 
collections of money made for various other items such as uniforms for 
women and to buy a car. There was also the trading licence levy.
"They said that though residents in general
appreciated what the officially elected committee was 
doing for thetownship, they would like to have some 
independent inspection of accounts to comply with the 
normal machinery for administering income and
expenditure in such a big community.
Many residents were ignorant and did not understand 
how or why the money raised by the committee was being 
spent in their interests. An independent inspection 
of accounts, of course , implied no reflection on the 
committee, but was a routine safeguard, essential in 
the interests of the committee and of the
residents.” (63)
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Allegations that the Shantytown Committee was not democratic in structure 
were clearly true. But criticisms that it had not been elected by the 
residents (denied by Mpanza and endorsed by the deputation above) did not 
accurately reflect the strong support it obviously had as seen in mass 
meetings. Many of its resolutions were endorsed in this form of direct 
democracy.
However, it seems likely that Mpanza's bullying tactics, intrinsic to his 
personality since childhood and practised since before the start of the 
squatter movement , were continued as he reached new heights of power and 
influence. Nor were these methods to end here as will be seen.
With regards to the disagreement among the squatters over moving to the 
shelters, it is clear that there were dissenting views as the meeting 
called to discuss the issue and the formation of the Vigilance Committee 
evidences. It is also likely that there were threats against those who 
refused to tow the line.
But in spite of the internal dissension and the grievances expressed, 
there was overall support for Mpanza and his Committee which, although 
may have wavered at times , was to remain and grow.
The Council of course had other interests and through its investigation 
it sought to gather the necessary information to discredit the squatter 
leadership thus detracting from public sympathy when it came to 
re-imposing the Council's control of the squatters.
Mpanza responded to the investigation by saying that he would have 
welcomed an opportunity of being consulted and of being able to rebut 
evidence detrimental to the committee. He denied the allegations against 
him. He said , for instance , the money for uniforms had not been 
collected by his committee but had been decided among the women 
themselves and that some of the uniforms were ready and would be 
distributed shortly. He said that private trading had been stopped at 
the camp and those selling goods were the employees of the committee.
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He also said that the Township Committee was entirely separate from the 
Sofasonke Party Committee which kept separate books and these were open 
to anybody's inspection.
The Council nevertheless continued to sabotage the squatter leadership.
A cheque sent to help the squatters buy blankets and coal , addressed to 
the "native chief of Shantytown" was forwarded by the Rand Daily Mail to 
the Manager of NEAD to be passed on. The Manager returned it to the 
donor saying that the squatters did not need it as they had a bank 
balance of more than 1 000 Pounds.
By the 26th May, the first 200 breeze block shelters were ready for 
occupation and 201 families were moved from the eastern portion of 
Shantytown into the shelters. They were allocated according to numbers 
drawn from a tin. The families were shown to their rooms by municipal 
police and were assisted with trucks in moving their belongings to their 
new homes. As agreed, their 201 shacks were demolished as they left.
Twisting the' blade, the NEAC held its enquiry in Shantytown that
morning. The Chief Magistrate and the Director of Native Labour were to 
meet with Mpanza and his Committee. The Council had already prepared
itself by consulting the Chief Native Commissioner and the Deputy 
Commissioner of Police.
Mpanza did not appear at the meeting as he was 'indisposed'. With strong 
backing , alternative Council-provided housing becoming available and its 
'investigation' underway, the Council had defined its strategy and was
ready to act.
The Shantytoim Committee was informed by NEAC that Shantytown,
"Is to come under the strict control of the 
Johannesburg City Council , which will not tolerate any 
usurping of its powers by any body of natives.”
Referring to the Shantytown Committee as 'self-elected', as though the
NEAC in relation to the townships was not, they were,
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"bluntly told that the Council was going to enforce 
its authority in future as far as the township was 
concerned. The present committee in the township 
would not be recognised officially and had no 
adminis-ferative powers. Any grievances that the 
committee might wish to bring to the attention of the 
authorities could be done through the 
Superintendent." (66)
By moving people into the shelters and charging the fee of 5 shillings 
per month which was half of Mpanza's fee, the Council was whittling away 
his social and economic base and at the same time , the autonomy of the 
squatter movement. By discrediting Mpanza's committee the Council was 
also lending weight to the argument that blacks were incapable of running 
their own affairs as asserted by the Minister of Native Affairs in the 
House of Assembly.
Mpanza continued to operate as before but as the building of shelters 
continued a number of rival committees were formed , all planning to 
represent the residents of Shantytown.. There were eventually six of
these, including the Sofasonke Party. Most were not recognised by the 
Council.
The ^difference In the objectives and policies of the A.D.P. and the 
Sofasonke Party became evident at this time. Members of the A.D.P. on 
the Shantytown Committee welcomed the Council's statement that it was to 
take control of Shantytown. They had even expressed regret that the 
Council had not assumed control of the administration at the time of the 
first negotiations. As said by Mampuru, they now felt that the 
Council's intention was
"in harmony with the terms of the agreement entered 
into with the Council at the time of recognition and 
settlement." (68)
Mpanza on the other hand, opposed the Council's interference along the 
lines of a very practical and unsophisticated kind of Africanism which of 
course , also coincided with his self-interest. Shantytown was for Mpanza 
an example of black self-government.
But in spite of the A.D.P.'s collusion and the Council's propaganda 
against Mpanza's committee, in an indirect admission of Mpanza's
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strength, the authorities were unable to take full control immediately 
and were unable to fully disregard the committee which would still 
present grievances to the Superintendent.
By mid-June with 200 rooms occupied and 100 more needing only roofing , 
the shortage of cement was seriously hampering building. At the same 
time cold and rain were causing terrible hardship in Shantytown.
The 4 000 shacks were soaked through.
"For two nights the rain has been dripping through the 
sack-cloth roofs and down the hessian walls of most of 
the shacks. The floors are churnea-up mud and were 
from one to three inches under water all night.
Mattrasses were wet through; there was not a dry spot 
to lie on; so the 4 000 families spent the night 
crounching over scanty fires in braziers or dozing 
fitfully in chairs in the wet. After the second 
sleepless night the men left for work from 5 o'clock 
this morning in the rain."
Those with umbrellas put them up inside their shacks as protection.
"In shacks selected at random, the floors were deep in 
mud. In one typical hut a woman was trying to clear 
up the mess caused by the rain overnight. All the 
scanty household furniture was wet through. Food 
basins were full of water that had leaked through the 
roof. The solitary mattress had been folded up and 
wrapped in sheepskins to keep it dry. The woman said 
she, her husband and two children had sat up in the 
rain all night trying to cover up the furniture. Her 
husband wrapped his old overcoat over her and the 
children and left for work this morning in damp 
clothes."
Their groceries were soaked through.
By contrast those in the shelter, apart from some rain that leaked in 
through the joints in the asbestos roofing or through the chinks in the 
breeze-block walls, were dry and could sleep comfortably.
This was the moment the Council was waiting for. Without any 
consultation with the Shantytown Committee , the NEAD announced on the 
15th its intention to open soup kitchens for the Shantytown children
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that morning. The City Engineer agreed to make available corrugated iron 
huts for accommodation and Ballenden had appealed to all missionary 
bodies who had school buildings and churches under their control in 
Orlando Township-'to make these available to women and young children as 
shelter against cold and wet.
Tenants in Orlando with spare room were also asked to help. They were 
encouraged to do so by the City Council considering a rebate in their 
rent. <7l>
Taking advantage of the vastly greater resources available to them, the 
NEAC in addition sent 1 000 bags of coal to Shantytown to be distributed 
free to the most needy cases. Meat and vegetables were also bought and 
delivered to make the soup.
The soup kitchen, consisting of three big boilers, was set up that 
morning at the entrance to Shantytown, with a view to providing soup as 
long as the bad weather lasted.
By noon black staff of the NEAB were preparing beef and vegetables for 
the soup.
The Department also sent forty black employees to report on the condition 
of each shack and to draw up a list of those most in need who would have 
first claim on the Council’s aid.
Several loads of old sacks were also dumped at the township entrance the 
previous night to reinforce the shacks.
There was not much rain on the night before and some sun shining as the 
relief work got underway. A van from the Public Health Department was 
drawn up at the entrance of the township and officials began vaccinating 
women and children against smallpox.
They also began building a market in the neighbourhood with twenty four 
stalls arranged around a courtyard. This would enable the Council to 
regain control over trading and prevent Mpanza from collecting revenue 
either from levies on private traders or through profit on a committee 
run store,
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The public at large also made many offers of help with gifts of clothing, 
blankets and money. The Johannesburg Star was collecting much of this 
and handing it over the NEAB so circumventing the Township Committee in 
their bid to 'help'.
Alarmed by the overwhelming scale of the Council's 'aid' which threatened 
his control and the squatters autonomy, Mpanza addressed a large crowd 
from the top of one of the lorries used to carry the coal to Shantytown. 
He told his followers not to give any of the coal to those who accepted 
soup from the municipality. He said he would kill the white man in
charge of the distribution of the soup and then the people would took the
( 73)'pig soup'. The people wanted houses ,‘not soup, he asserted. v
He said that the municipality was trying to smash up the organisation for 
which he had worked hard and that was why his followers would stop and 
punish anyone who takes soup. He again objected to the building of 
temporary houses.
Mpanza's overzealousnous and lack of caution played into the Council's 
hands. There was a mixed response to his exhortations. Some agreed but 
others did not. Someone shouted ,
”'fe were brought here to Shantytown to die of cold , 
and our children need the soup to keep warn." (75)
On the morning of Friday the 16th June, Julia Mpanza addressed a meeting 
at the Mpanza's house in Orlando and again in Shantytown.
"'None of you must have that soup. We don't want
soup. We have not come here for soup. We want housesi
• e •
'Ewel Ewel' shouted those in the audience.
' What must happen to those who do not honour their 
word?' she asked and there was silence. 'Well, I’ll 
tell youl Such people will. stand condemned as 
traitors ...'
'Yebol Yebo'.' the response was deafening. ' Vie pledge 
our support to the cause,' said another woman. 'For 
my part I shall have none of that mess. Curse 
it."" (77)
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While preparations were being made to distribute the soup , Mpanza passed 
by and said that the people did not want soup from the municipality, they 
wanted houses. He added that if the people took the soup, they would be 
killed. It was pig's food and the people did not want it. He then spoke 
to the black municipal staff who were cooking;  ^ '
Soon after midday about 150 people started lining up for the soup. As 
they did so a large crowd of women and men, waving sticks and holding 
stones came dancing and shouting towards the three boilers. Those
queuing for soup moved away. The white officials and the black staff
continued their work and told the people who did not want soup to go
away. The dancing and shouting attracted a lot of attention and people 
came pouring out of the shacks to see. They gathered around the soup
kitchen.
"Chanting and prancing to the rythm, a big crowd 
advanced towards the soup bins, a woman and a man at 
the head. Some brandished knobkerries and sjamboks, 
making threatening gestures ... 'Upset the pots I' 
someone shouted. ’That’ll be the day' , a woman 
whispered. She scooped up the soup and tasted it. As 
she did, so another woman lunged forward towards her 
and attempted to upset the pot but a municipal 
policeman caught hold of her. It was enough! Stone , 
sticks and knobkerries flew overhead and the mob went 
wild." (80)
The white officials tried to calm the crowd arid sent word to the Orlando 
office of what was happening. A call was sent through to Marshall Sqaure 
in Johannesburg and police x?ere sent at once. But most of the crowd had 
got out of hand. A huge man armed with an axe was prevented from 
striking another by the white works foreman who caught his raised arm in 
mid-air and wrenched the axe away.
The foreman then organised a column of 175 people to stand between the 
people round the soup kitchen and the attacking party. While the 
fighting continued nearby, hundreds stood in the queue to get soup.
A man guarding a coal dump provided by Mpanza was surrounded by part of 
the crowd defending the soup and struck to the ground with blood pouring 
from his head. One of the white officials rushed up, carried him into an 
iron hut, and called for an ambulance, which took him to the Orlando
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Clinic. Before he arrived there he was dead. His skull had been cracked 
by many blows. Stones were found in his pockets.
By then those in favour of soup greatly outnumbered those against and 
when 80 white and many more black policemen arrived, the latter scattered 
in all directions.
"Soon the hillside near the town was black with flying 
and pursuing figures."
Part of the crowd then went and destroyed Mpanza's 'office*.
"The cry was then raised that they should get Mpanza's 
regalia as chief of the township and burn that up , 
too. On Sundays Mpanza used to ride through the town 
on a spirited horse and wearing riding boots , pink 
riding breeches, a leopard skin coat, and a helmet 
with a long scarlet plume." - echoes of his childhood 
hero , Napoleon.
But they were pursuaded by Council officials not to go near Mpanza's 
house in Orlando.
The soup was distributed with the crowd affirming that they would not 
allow anyone to keep them from the Council's free coal and soup.
When the fighting was over, apart from one dead man, another had his ear 
slashed off , a woman had been stabbed and hundreds were bruised by 
blows. Between 3 000 and 4 000 had been involved in the fight.
By sunset everything was quiet in the township. (82)
Orders were issued for the arrest of Mpanza and his wife and they were
(83)arrested at Mpanza's house in Orlando 
township the following day to prevent a recurrence
Police remained in the 
(84)
On the Monday Mpanza appeared in Court at a preparatory examination on 
the allegation of incitement to public violence and Julia and Zacharia 
Ngomezulu, Julia's father and one of the camp officials, on charges of 
public violence. Mpanza's 
two to June 27th.
case was remanded to June 28th and the other
104
Showing weakness in the Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. alliance, Mampuru took the 
opportunity at this time to begin to voice condemnation of Mpanza. He 
also condemned him for imposing the weekly levy of 2/6 without consulting 
the committee. He maintained that Mpanza's hostility to the Council 
administration of the camp was because he would lose an easy source of 
incotse. <86)
On the 22nd June Mpanza's receipt books and papers were seized for audit 
by the Union Department of Native Affairs. The books were found to be in 
such a state of disarray that no definite irregularities could be 
established. Mpanza was to claim that he was not charged because his 
books had been in order. v '
By the next day the Council had completed another 100 shelters and was 
hearing tenders for the planned 2 600 permanent houses. Building was 
still being hampered by the cement and materials shortage.
With the cold weather, the Council's relative massive 'aid' programme 
underway, open conflict in the camp, and another 100 families siphoned 
off, the rout of the Shantytown Committee and the Sofasonke Party had 
begun«
With the co-operation of the authorities and missionary bodies a relief 
centre was established in Shantytown distributing gifts and 
donations. k ' In view of the NEAD returning donations before because 
the squatters had 1 000 Pounds in the bank, this about turn in policy 
indicates that the change in the squatters charity status had more to do 
witIt the fact that now it was being conducted under Council supervision 
and not the Committee's rather than any material change in the squatter's 
conditions.
A midwifery clinic , accommodating 8 women set up by the City Health 
Department was added to the Council's programme.
Whan Mpanza, Julia and Ngcraezulu appeared in court again, there were two 
more camp guards charged with them. Sofasonke Party men and women filled 
the court wearing Sofasonke sashes.
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Basner, as lawyer for the defence, aware of the Council's interests in 
destroying the autonomy of the squatter movement, argued that the fight 
was a put-up job by the municipality and that the last thing the 
municipal officials wanted was that the police should arrive. This was 
denied.
Cross-examined by Basner the foreman said he was not instructed to 
interview the Shantytown Committee but only to distribute soup. Basner 
was pointing to the Council's intention to subvert the camp's committee..
Evidence was given as the trial progressed recounting the events of the 
day of the riot.
There was singing and shouting by the Sofasonke Party supporters outside
(92)the Court during lunch. v 1
Shortly after this the squatters who had started a Shantytown at 
Sharpeville Location outside Vereeniging , were also coming under attack 
from the Vereeniging City Council. They were ordered to move from the 
site they had occupied for the last two years. Not having done so. many 
were arrested and sentenced to two months imprisonment suspended on 
condition they move within forty eight hours. The A.D.P. intervened and 
advised the squatters to move but gather at the Native Commissioner's
Office and ask for help. They were then allowed to resettle on land in
(93)the municipal location. v '
Clinching their successes so far, the Johannesburg City Council assumed
full control of Shantytown on the 28th August. They withdrew official
recognition of the Shantytown Committee and would only receive complaints
(94)from the residents through the Superintendent. v '
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With the Management Committee now iiot recognised, the Sofasonke Party 
still went on to combine with the Shantytown Vigilance Committee to form 
the independent committee which was recognised by the Council for some 
time. (Footnote).
By now Shantytown had attracted sufficient attention to require a
response from the central Government. Major Van der Byl , the Minister of
Native Affairs, paid a visit to Shantytown and he and his entourage
threaded in single file through the labyrinth of narrow passages between
the sackcloth hovels. v After the visit he called a meeting with
the Minister of Labour and all Government Departments which might be
helpful in hastening the City Council's efforts to provide housing and
remove Shantytown. The Council was pleased with the results of this 
(98)meeting.
Meanwhile, under its new constitution the A.N.C. was attempting to build 
up its membership and branches. It had convened an anti-pass conference 
in Johannesburg in May, 1944. This had been followed by a demonstration 
of about 20 000 people in the city centre.
The Orlando branch was little in evidence. Meetings were occasionally 
held in Orlando. The Transvaal A.N.C. held a meeting there on 
the 9th September. When the railways placed a 10% war sur-charge on rail 
fares in October, the A.N.C. called meetings in Kliptown, Pimvilie and
An argument about the nature and limitations of 'poor people's movements' 
by Piven, F. and Clowered, R. is presented by A. Stadler in Politics of 
Subsistance: Community Struggles in Wartime Johannesburg. I do not wish 
to include theoretical generalisations in the body of the text. In 
particular I have problems with the 'theory' as it suffers from a number 
of methodological as well as theoretical deficiencies. Firstly, it 
appears to be impirically induced generalisations drawn from liberal 
democratic examples. Thus it does not fulfill such criterion for theory 
as logically internal consistency, as well as consistency to an adequate 
methodology. Secondly, it fails to understand the fundamental 
contradictions in society which are class contradictions. It therefore 
fails to have a conception of political movements as movements in 
struggle more or less directly related to basic class contradictions and 
therefore makes unqualified generalisations about vacuous concepts like 
'poor people'. It has no materialist concept of power nor a theoretical 
commitment to historical specificity. In this work I have tried to show 
in a more integrated way the actual playing out of the specific 
historical forces in a specific historical context. (96)
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Orlando to protest against this. Again the A.N.C. (Transvaal)
convened a meeting of 'all progressive organisations' to protest against 
the ban on 'open-air meetings' on proclaimed land in the Witwatersrand 
area. There were arrests and meetings cancelled as a result of the ban. 
They argued that the ban was interfering with legitimate democratic and 
trade union activities.
On the 19th of October, Mpanza was discharged on the charge of public 
violence. His wife Julia and three others were still on trial.
This was another triumph for Mpanza. He returned strengthened, to 
Shantytown using his victory to rebuild his party.
The Council, meanwhile, continued with its programme in Shantytown. The 
acting manager of NEAD held a mass meeting on Sunday the 22nd October, at 
.which he said the residents of Pimville were entitled to a high priority 
in the allocation of new houses being built at Orlando West. He told the 
people of the Council's plans to combat the danger of an interitis 
epidemic. In particular he informed them of their proposal to cut two 
lines through Shantytown to serve as a firebreak and to give access to 
the interior and remote parts of the township for rubbish removal. After 
the acting manager's speech Mpanza also addressed the crowd. More 
confident at his legal success his attitude toward the Council was 
derogatory and he belittled the Council's efforts to help the people. He 
compared the Counil's administration of Shantytown to his more desirable 
administration. The Council was alarmed by his affrontary.
Julia and Ngomezulu were then acquitted on the 26th of the same charge, 
while the remaining two were found guilty of culpable homicide arising 
from the death of the stabbed and battered man. They were each fined 10 
Pounds or two months hard labour.
Mpanza called a mass meeting on the next Sunday the 29th October at which 
he attached the Acting Manager's statement at the previous meeting , that 
priority would be given to Pimville for the housing being built. He 
undertook to see that the residents of Shantytown received first 
preference in the allocation of all new houses erected by the Council. 
He advised people affected by the Council's proposal to cut two roads
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through Shantytown to refuse to vacate the shacks if so required by 
Council officials.
He said he was introducing a new system of membership cards for the 
Sofasonke Party and urged everyone to join him. He told the people 
assembled that the money he had previously collected was intended to 
purchase a farm beyond Pretoria for their joint benefit and informed them 
that for this purpose he needed more money. He also called for voluntary 
subscriptions which would also be used for 'cleansing' him so that he 
could again assume charge as Shantytown. He said he knew that people did 
not want whites among them.
In October it was announced that Graham Ballenden, who had founded HEAD 
in 1928 and been Manager ever since, was about to retire. The Council 
put a request to the Communist dominated Orlando Advisory Board to 
sponsor a farewell reception for Ballenden. The elected members of the 
board , Mpanza and three Communists , decided against this. It was a rare 
occasion where for once the Council was looking for their co-operation 
instead of the ether way around , an opportunity not to be missed. Their 
carefully worded reply shows years of frustration.
"The farewell to Mr. G. Ballenden has been the subject 
of a lengthy discussion in the official meetings of 
the Orlando Advisory Board and was finally rejected 
for the following reasons:
a. That in his whole carreer as Manager, Mr. G.
Ballenden had very little respect for the views 
and recommendations of the Advisory Board Members 
who are the only legal , though powerless, 
representatives of the Africans in the township.
b. That in spite of the fact that his
recommendations went a long way with the City 
Council , who have always regarded him as an
authority on 'Native Affairs' , he was always 
ready to reject any recommendations made to him.
Whilst he has been an 'efficient office' as far 
as the City Council is concerned, the Africans 
have very little to thank him for.
c. From time to time the Advisory Board has made
representations to Mr. Ballenden that
Superintendents should not be changed without 
consulting the Board. The Board should be
consulted and farewells arranged for them. But
Superintendents are still changed without the
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Board being Informed, and Mr. Ballenden has not 
even had the courtesy to reply to the Board's 
demands. For this reason, the Board feels 
justified in rejecting his own farewell.
There is also the welcome to Mr. L.I. Venables, who 
is appointed as new manager. He is already named 
'Nkoma ya Hlaba' by the Africans. Whilst the Board
has not discussed him, the welcome has been rejected 
because it is deliberately linked with the farewell.
We learn that the invitation is extended to the 
teachers , children and Ministers of Religion. We say 
nothing to the teachers. We want them to be their own 
judges. To the children and the parents we say that 
there are no playgrounds and parks for the children, 
because the man you intend giving a farewell , did not 
agree with the Board.
To the Ministers of religion we say that only a few of 
the fortunate or European churches can thank Mr. 
Ballenden for the church sites he has given them but 
the rest of the unfortunate African churches have 
nothing to thank Mr. Eallenden for.
Yes , you will have plenty of meat to eat in these 
meatless days and you will have plenty of beer to 
drink - beer that Mr. Ballenden refuses to recommend 
that you make at your own house , beer that according 
to the new Government laws you have the right to make , 
if only the Council agrees.
There is no politically conscious African who can be 
happy to eat and drink under such circumstances. The 
unfortunate unconscious African will eat meat and 
drink beer, but the hardships of the Africans remain. 
No self-respecting African can go to this combined 
farewell and reception ceremony and be happy. We know 
that some Africans will go and bluff Mr. Ballenden, 
when he knows they are not sincere." (10?)
With elections coming round again and with widespread popularity of the 
Sofasonke Party and A.D.P. in the Shantytown Committee, the Communist 
Party began its campaign at an early stage.
They argued that all members of the Advisory Board should be elected as 
the nominated members had voted against their motion of rejection of 
their farewell reception and had , in fact , published a leaflet against 
it. The Communist Party saw this as a lack of integrity and a dishonesty 
on the part of the nominees ~to their own people. The opposed anybody 
accepting nomination as the interests of the residents ware diametrically 
opposed to those of the Council. They proposed that a strong militant
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board could bring problems to the attention of the Council while at the 
same time expose the ineffectiveness of the boards. As this was what 
they proposed to do , they called on people to vote for the Communist 
Party in the next election.
On the 17th November, new legislation was brought into effect to prevent 
squatting. It enabled a magistrate to take steps to effect the immediate 
removal of persons who unlawfully occupy land or' buildings.
Within days this law was exercised when 100 military troop carriers and a 
large force of white and black police moved the 1 000 inhabitants form a 
shantytown in Alberton and all their property to Hammanskraal 45 
kilometers north of Pretoria. All their goods were marked and moved, and 
at Hammanskraal they were immediately housed in tents, and were provided 
with cooked food.
The Council was now feeling legally more secure and the effectiveness of 
the new legislation had been amply demonstrated. It had often been 
argued by Council members that the way to deal with the squatters was to 
nip any new developments in - the bud with firm and swift action. This 
point of view seems to have been invalidated at Alberton. But what this 
point of view did.not take into account was that most of the squatters at 
Alberton were unemployed. The state gave as its reasons for acting here 
and not in the Orlando case as being that because they were unemployed 
'their removal therefore caused no economic dislocation'. These
economic factors which underlie legal ones were again to be demonstrated 
before too long.
By mid-November only 850 breeze block shelters had been constructed in 
Orlando. The cement shortage was preventing further building and the 
Council was looking for alternatives. There was still over 3 0G0 
families in Shantytown waiting for accommodation.
The Council had gone ahead with its proposal to cut two roads through 
Shantytown and the occupants of the shacks which had to be demolished to 
make the first road, were moved into breezeblcck rooms. Another main 
road was still to be made which would intersect with the first, so 
cutting Shantytown into four parts, giving the authorities easy access.
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The Council decided to build log cabins as a substitute to the breeze 
block shelters to avoid reliance on cement.
Perturbed by widespread growing unrest the state passed anew emergency 
regulation prohibiting meetings of more than 15 people, whether indoors 
or out of doors , in all locations. The Orlando Advisory Board was 
refused permission to hold a public meeting.
Under this regulation Paul Mosaka and M.R. Kumalo were charged for 
addressing a demonstrating crowd outside a courtroom. It was alleged 
that as members of the Workers Transport Action Committee they had been 
planning a procession into town.
In an act of solidarity Dr. A.B. Xuma sent a message to the Worker's 
Transport Action Committee saying that the arrests were a national 
matter, and he, in his personal capacity and as president of the A.N.C., 
was prepared to give the committee every assistance in any action they 
take. <113>
But the events which followed served to widen the rift between the A.N.C, 
and Communist Party on the one hand and the A.D.P. on the other.
The A.D.P. planned a march of workers from Orlando to town to protest 
increased rail fares. The march was a dismal failure, with only twenty 
people taking part. Apart from their more general critisms of the A.N.C. 
and the Communist Party, the A.D.P. criticised the latter for opposing 
the march. This drew scathing attacks from Mofutsanyana, Saying that 
the march was put forward in a sectarian way, Mofutsanyana criticised the 
Workers' Transport Action Committee, which organised the march, for 
appearing to think that it was sufficient to
"run around with motor cars and loudspeakers shouting 
at the people to march,"
"If you add to their wrong and ill-considered 
approach the fact they continuously occupied 
themselves making public attacks on the Communist 
Party and the A.N.C., it will not be difficult to see 
why they have antagonised th people of Orlando to such 
an extent in this township with a population of over 
70 000, only 20 people marched to town for one day
-tonly.
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Although the Communist Party did not agree with the march, it had not 
opposed it and in fact some of the leading Communists even joined in ’the 
march of the 20.'
He criticised the policies of Basner and Koza as the top leadership of 
the Sfcrkers* Transport Action Committee and advocated support for the 
A.N.C., the Council of Non-European Trade Unions, and the Communist 
Party. <114>
This was not the end of it. With the A.N.C. beginning to pick up again, 
a strong annual conference was held in Kimberley in December, claiming 
organisational progress in the Transvaal.
Reporting on this, a newspaper very sympathetic to the A.N.C. Youth 
League, Inkundla ya Bantu, broadened the attack on the A.D.P. to extend 
to their role in Shantytown.
"The'A.D.P. , of course, could not give a fair account 
of its failure. They did not tell the country that 
the cause of their failure to organise Orlando lay in 
the fact that they had messed things at Sofasonke 
Township at the time when they had the upper hand in 
the Sofasonke movement. Thus, at Orlando, few people 
nowr take them seriously."
Attacking their performance at Alexandra too , the article continues to 
point out their ineffectiveness.
"Tite trouble with the A.D.P. was that when it came to 
words , it was very powerful - particularly with 
borrowed loudspeakers - whereas in action it could 
kick as effectively as a day-old chiclcenl" (H5)
With 1944 drawing to a close and the Orlando elections due to take place 
on the 17th December the political pace was intensifying.
The contest was essentially between the Communist Party and the A.D.P. 
and Sofasonke Party alliance.
Still fairly arrogant about their politics the Communist Party published 
the following statement.
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"We must go on with the struggle for a better Orlando, 
but the time for for cheap electioneering promises has 
passed. We leave these to amateur political 
candidates who labour under the illusion that, if they 
get into the Advisory Board , they only have to speak 
and mountains will move. All support must be given to 
the Communist Party candidates - it is a labour 
victory.' We have no separate interest from yours. We 
ask everyone to vote for E.T. Mofutsanyana , J.J.
Masupha, S.M. Moema and E. Mavimbela."
The political arrogance of some Communist Party members was aimed at the 
A. DTP. which the Communist Party maintained sufffered 'from all the 
faults of sectarianism, political inexperience and stupidity'. Against 
this it was held that the Communist Party candidates for the Advisory 
Board elections were 'infinitely more advanced politically.1
Mampuru threw the obvious weaknesses in their position back at them in a 
way that applied to the A.D.P. members but much more so to James 
Sofasonke Mpanza.
"Can it be said that a man who interprets the feeling 
of the people correctly to the extent of asking 20 000 
to defy.the authorities and establish a Shantytown in 
" municipal land without permission, is less politically 
advanced than one who regards such a move as mere 
election propaganda?" (117)
Mpanza meanwhile was busy organising among 'the people'. He called a 
meeting on the evening of Friday the 15th December at about 7.30 p.m. 
between the shelters and Shantytown.
Mpanza addressed the meeting in Zulu. It was also translated into 
Seso tho.
"People , I have called you here to tell you what I 
have heard. As you know, we were promised that houses 
would be built for us. I am sorry to tell you that it 
is no longer so, These houses which are being built, 
which we thought were for us, are going to be given to 
Pimville , Orlando and Western Native Township. They 
are getting these houses through us and now you will 
grow old here in 'Shantytown' because you don't listen 
to me. I want you to listen to me , and let us do the 
same thing that we did when we came here to 
'Shantytown'.
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As soon as these houses have been roofed, we must take 
our things and go into them. I want each family to 
contribute one pound so that when we have entered 
those houses as I have told , we shall take steps to 
appeal to Bloemfontein."
Those who were present all agreed to contribute one 
pound.
"As you know before I came here I had endeavoured to 
speak to my fellow members of the Advisory Board in 
connection with making means for the people to get 
houses. They agreed with me, but when the time for 
the Exodus came they left me as they were afraid, but 
I was not arrested. You must not be afraid. The 
position of Chieftainship is given to me like Jesus.
Many people thought that I was arrested and yet I was 
not. The same as with Jesus 1 Many people thought he 
was dead and yet he was not.
I speak this knowing that there are detectives about 
and that before the day breaks the white man will know 
everything. You must not be afraid. You must do the 
same thing tha you did when we came here. One who 
asks is never satisfied but the one who takes for 
himself is satisfied."
There was great laughter and clapping of hands. Some 
people said ’Let us give the pound'. The meeting then 
closed. (H8)
Alarmed at Mpanza's continued activism the Council passed a resolution 
stating its intention to deport Mpanza. In so doing they intended to 
violate one of the conditions of the agreement made on Saturday April 
1st, which was that "no prosecutions would be instituted against the 
leaders or any members of the community with regards to the migration."
Support came for Mpanza from the Africanist Youth League which appears to 
have admired him, probably as an independant black leader and more 
specifically, they possibly saw him as an Africanist.
"Mr. Mpanza's conduct throughout has beer, exemplary 
and responsible, in spite of the exeedingly difficult 
position in which he and his people found 
themselves." (H9)
On election day then the Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. alliance was under 
considerable pressure - the A.D.P. from the Communist Party and the 
A.N.C. , and Mpanza under threat of deportation. There was a much greater
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interest in the election than was usual and a. higher percentage 
poll. <120>
In what must have been a shock fo the Communist Party and for the Council 
authorities, the Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. alliance soundly defeated the 
Commuaists. They contested on a joint slate of two Sofasonke - Mpanza
and Lucas P. Kumalo , and two African Democrats ~ G.G. Xolile and J.P. 
Mophiring. (^1)
This showed very definite and strong support for the Sofasonke Party and 
A.D.P. and the actions they had taken. It was support in spite of 
negative propoganda against them from the Council, the hardship and the 
conflicts inside the camp. In particular, it was a personal triumph for 
Mpaitsa himself.
"To those who know, there can be no doubt that but for
M s  popularity the Democratic Party candidates would
have been defeated." (122)
But although significant it was only half a victory. For the support it 
represented was that of registered tenants in the permanent houses of 
Orlando and Orlando Rfest only. Because thousands of families were still 
living in Shantytown they were not registered voters as voting rights 
were restricted to those who could produce Council rent receipts paid up 
to the end of the month preceding elections. They paid no rent. To make 
matters worse, those who had moved into the shelters, although paying 5 
shillings per month also could not vote as this also was not for rent but 
rather for sanitary and water services. The Returning Officer thus 
refused permission for the shelter dwellers to vote. v ' The test of 
the Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. support in Advisory Board elections was to 
come a year later. The Council could console itself for the meantime 
with the belief that Mpanza was perhaps seen by the squatters at least as 
a brutal despot, if not by the residents in the permanent houses. After 
all , it was the squatters who had had first hand experience of his regime.
The Communist Party were now faced with clear evidence of the 
significance of their failure to actively support the Shantytown 
movement. Khile the board was of course not the sole target of their 
political organisation as they had consistently proclaimed, it was,
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however , a useful platform and a reasonable indicator of broader 
political shocks. They had begun to pay the price for their mistake , but 
like the Council could also wait to see which way the Shantytown 
squatters would go when they could vote. With Communist presence in 
Shantytown at a minimum their stakes did not look promising.
The A.D.P.'s flagging credibility was further deflated when Mosaka and 
Kumalo of the Orlando Workers' Transport Action Committee appeared in 
court in January , 1945 on charges of organising the flopped march to town 
in contravention of the proclamation banning gatherings. They were 
acquitted on the grounds
"That there was no evidence 'to show that a procession 
to town was being planned.”! (124)
Meanwhile the Council's attempts to provide temporary shelter for the 
squatters was running into further difficulties. The log cabins erected 
as a cement-free substitute to the breeze-block shelters, proved to be a 
failure when they were flooded out by a heavy downpour on then ight of 
the 18th January. Only 44 had been erected so far and only 17 of these 
occupied.
"The rain poured through as if there was no house here 
at all said one of the women.
The breeze-blocks on the other hand stood up well to the rain. The 
inhabitants had made them more comfortable with soil and manure plaster 
and women were building verandahs outside their front doors. Some had 
decorated the walls.
An attempt was made to waterproof the log cabins while trying to get 
further supplies of cement.
Mth the leaks and the cost of 400% more for log cabins than breeze-block 
shelters, the Council decided on 27th February to continue building with 
breeze blocks.
In Shantytown,
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"some of the sacking and corrugated huts improvised by 
the Shantytown dwellers are so congested that it is 
impossible to wheel even a small barrow between them 
to clear away debris. In some places up to a dozen 
huts are almost pasted together in an unhealthy mass.
By demolishing huts the authorities have now cleared 
four roads through the close-packed encampment."
In spite of congestion Shantytown was kept clean by a constant day and 
night service by four whites and 100 blacks. Thirty trucks removed 
rubbish every day and night-soil removal was carried out twice every 24 
hours.
At Orlando West progress was being made with the permanent houses but
/I O Q \
there was still a labour shortage. v '
This shortage was in part due to white building unions preventing blacks
(129)-from being employed as arti
To make matters worse a dispute between the contractors and about 50 
bricklayers over the men's daily output has resulted in the bricklayers 
stopping work. They were then sacked. The other aritsans, carpenters 
and plasterers, continued to work.
There were more heavy rains on the 2nd of February which even penetrated 
the breeze-block shelters.
In spite of considerable pressure on the Council and its
defuse the situation by showing some progress in providing
(132)houses had been built in Orlando in 1943 and 1944. 
able to exploit the housing shortage.
"On Sunday the 18th day of February, 1945 , at about 
8.30 a.m. Mr. James Mpanza held a meeting of more than 
two thousand men, women and children at 'Shantytown’
Square , where he addressed them. He said that he was 
sent by God to take the Bantu x^eople to ' Shantytown' , 
and he wanted to know from them whether these people 
are still following this messenger of God , if not he 
will leave the place in peace, but if they still wish 
to complete the duty that he is sent to do he would 
like them to take cards from him and pay their money 
to his Office in Shanty, for if they do this he was 
going to give them new houses , and do the job that God 
has sent him to do." (133)
By March 1945 , almost a year later, Shantytown was down to about 2 000 
families , half the original number.
attempts to 
housing , no 
Mpanza was
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The major problem had shifted from materials which were gradually 
becoming available, to the labour shortage. There was only about l/10th 
of the skilled labour required at Orlando West. Building was also going 
on at JPimville where 100 houses were being built.
There were further problems at the Shelters when a new block of twenty 
four rooms which had reached roof height , collapsed in the heavy 
rains. <135>
The labour shortage was being made worse at Orlando West as the joint 
executive of the building trade unions were maintaining a boycott against 
any of their members working there. This was because the 34 bricklayers 
had not been reimbursed for the working time they had lost during their 
dispute with the contractor.
Defeated in the Advisory Board elections the Communist Party remained 
active. A. Msitshana , Mofutsanyana , Moema and Masupha were arrested in 
Orlando when they organised a meeting to discuss the employment of blacks 
in skilled trades. At the meeting they said that building was going too 
slowly while 'the people' suffered.
Mpanza too found himself in court again when 6 people were charged wi th 
trading illegally in Shantytown. The Council had erected a temporary 
market building on the outskirts of Shantytown and given licences to 
non-residents. This was intended to cut away some of Mpanza's revenue 
and prestige. However, as stalls inside the camp were more conveniently 
accessible and because the Council's market did not carry a wide range of 
items, the squatters continued to buy from their fellow squatters. The 
Council's response was to try to break their hold by prosecuting these 
traders.
Mpanza gave evidence that the traders were employed by the central depot 
run on a non-profit basis by the Shantytown Committee and that they were 
paid 2 Pounds per week. They only sold to Shantytown dwellers who were 
required to produce their 2s6d receipt before being allowed to buy. They 
were found guilty but discharged by a sympathetic magistrate as they were 
clearly managers and because he felt that the system did more good than 
harm. Mpanza's intelligent petition on behalf of the traders and
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his familiarity with the law must have counted in their favour. Once 
again he had proved his ability to protect his followers from the law.
Back at Orlando West there were a few more bricklayers at work and the 
situation was marginally improved. About 60 rooms were being completed 
per week at the shelters and this was being helped along with the use of 
M a c k  semi-skilled labour. 876 rooms had been completed by mid-April. 
This continued , with families being transferred from Shantytown -as they 
built, and Shantytown shrinking as vacated shacks were demolished.
Towards the end of May the cold weather began again. In what was a very 
rare occasion for the area, snow fell on the Rand covering the landscape 
in stark black and white and plunging the still 10 000 inhabitants of 
Shantytown back into a state of crisis again. The relief depot organised 
by four missions the previous winter was re-opened.
"Last week melting snow penetrated the sackcloth 
'roofs’ of many huts , and the people had to sleep in 
damp beds or under damp blankets on the mud floors.
Many -families huddled over braziers , the women holding 
their babies in an all-night vigil to keep them 
warm." (139)
Relief measures were again instituted and with the experience of the 
previous year and at least half the squatters in the shelters , the 
situation was easier to control.
At Pimville too there were developments. By June, 28 of the 100 houses 
ordered had been completed and the first 15 families had been transferred 
from the tanks. These had been lived in as ’ temporary' since the 
removals from 'Coolie Town’ in 1904 and were only being replaced and 
demolished after 41 years. It was the Shantytown squatter movement that 
the Pimville tank dwellers could thank.
At Orlando West 76 houses had now been completed and 1 468 rooms at the 
shelters. An equal number of families had moved into them. ^
With some of the promised housing beginning to materialise although very 
slowly, the start of the first phase in the struggle of the people of 
Orlando for better conditions had given a moral victory to them. While
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of course adequate housing and the rate at which it was built were still 
issues of the forties to be fought out, gains had been made and the 
format of struggle had been established. This struggle was part and 
parcel of the process of urbanisation and more specificially of 
proletarianisation as the foundations of the industrial proletariat were 
being laid. This was their first major community based struggle, i.e. 
for houses. With a foot in the door, within the heart of the first 
successes of this phase, already the seeds of the next and higher phase 
of struggle were being sown.
The Council announced in June , 1945 that the rents for the new Orlando 
West houses were to be much higher. These were to be 3 Pounds per month 
for a 4-roomed house where the rents for similar older houses were 
1 Pound 8s.6d.
The Communist Party immediately protested that in view of the low wages 
and the high cost of food , clothing , transport and other necessities , the 
new houses would be barred to the majority of black workers while housing 
needs were more acute than ever. Said Mofutsanyana , 'the new rents are a 
scandal. '
There were some, however, who could afford the new rent. The war had 
hastened the rise of a black middle class of traders and professional men 
in the black townships and in Johannesburg itself. Their number was 
growing rapidly with already 500 black storekeepers on the Rand.
In Orlando in the Council's market close to Shantytown were the small but 
successful grocers and butcher shops , 'cash bazaars' and general 
dealers. There were also two bigger stores in Orlando. ^ ^
But although growing the interests of this group were not significant 
enough to meaningfully alter the fact of the inaccessability of these 
rents to the majority of blacks who ware working class. Even the Council 
had to admit the facts. At a Council meeting the Chairman of the NEAC, 
James Gray , said that 32 out of 50 black families who had recently been
moved into the new houses could not. afford these 'sub-economic' 
(143)rents.
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The Independent Committee took the opportunity to raise complaints about 
the rents being charged for the shelters, and about the allocation of new 
shelters. The superintendent responded by withdrawing his recognition of 
the Independent Committee , saying that he would only deal with the 
Advisory Board , on which the squatters were not directly represented as 
they had been excluded from voting. In so doing he simply returned to 
dealing with the parties which had constituted the original Management 
Committee, as it was the Sofasonke Party and A.D.P. who controlled the 
Board. <l44>
The Council continued to build, completing another 200 shelters and 50 
houses. ^ 4^  When these families had been moved there were only 1 000 
of the original inhabitants left in Shantytown.
On the 15th July the Orlando Branch of the A.N.C. held its annual 
meeting. It was addressed by the Transvaal President, C.S. Ramohanoe , 
who said that,
"Congress was doing its best to re-organise and the 
branches must take the day-to-day issues to the 
people. Committees must meet regularly and report to 
the Provincial Committee." _
It was reported that a new A.N.C. branch had been started in Pretoria. 
While a step in the right direction, in focussing on day-to-day issues, 
Ramohanoe's speech still showed something of the elitist attitude of the 
A.N.C. Despite the fact that the collective action in the early 1940's 
owed little to the established political organisations, he still felt 
that the A.N.C. had 'to take these issues to the people' rather than 
learn from the lessons provided by popular protest.
Orlando A.N.C. Branch officials elected were D.Tloome , chairman; S. 
Ksitshana , vice-chairman (also a member of the Communist Party);
F.3. Moloi , secretary; Ngidi , assistant secretary; J. Majoro , organising 
secretary; and B.B. Ngculo , treasurer. ^ 4<^
Up to the elections the meeting went well. What followed was a 
micro-cosm of the poltical forces at the time and an indicator of what
was to come.
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"As the conference was scheduled for 10 o'clock in the 
morning and did not begin until 1 p.m. , nobody thought 
that any delegates could still be coming in the 
afternoon. But at 3 p.m. a group of African men, 
women and children were seen approaching the hall , 
with Mr. J.S. Mpanza , galloping in front on a white 
horse. As usual, he did not come in. He passed as 
his procession entered the hall.
What happened then made one think that there are some 
Nazis amongst our people.
Mr. L.P. Kumalo, the leader of the group, who is only 
equal to Dr. Malan and Dr. van Rensburg in his hatred 
of the Communist Party and the Jews , immediately 
demanded from the Chairman that the elections be 
re-opened.
Mr. A.M. Lembede , who throughout the earlier part of 
the conference was lying low, now went over to the 
offensive. Mr. A. Msitshana became his target. He . 
moved that the election of Vice-Chairman be reopened 
and contested again. The supporters of Mr. Kumalo 
were shouting 'Communist JewsI' until they were 
hoarse."
Mr. Kumalo, who was one of the candiates for the position of Treasurer, 
was five hours late, as he was still collecting his supporters, and 
organising them to come and join the Congress for the purpose of voting 
for him. Mien the Chairman announced that the election was over, the' 
candidate became very unruly.
The Chairman, however, stuck to his guns. He had been trying very hard 
to be as democratic as it was possible with these unruly gentlemen. 
Their demand for the elections to be re-opened was out of order since 
some people had been waiting for the conference since 10 o'clock. The 
Chairman eventually ruled that the people who had been elected earlier in 
the conference were properly constituted office-bearers.
This made the opposition very wild. They demanded back the money they 
had contributed in membership dues.”
While there was some overlap between the Communist Party and A.N.C. , 
apart from the absurdity of calling them Jews, the A.N.C. could hardly be 
called Communist. The alliance between the A.N.C. and Communists was, 
however, in an embryonic state but was only to mature in the early 
fifties. For the Sofasonke Party, the antagonism shown for the Communist
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Party was nothing new but its condemnation of the A.N.C. was the
forewarning of a more conscious divergence that was to follow.
The conference also revealed the latent tensions emerging from one of the 
fathers of Africanism in the actions of Lembede. This was the second 
instance where support had come for Mpanza from the Africanist Youth
League which had been under Lembede's presidency since September
1944. <148)
"In a very practical sense, Mpanza typified the 
'Africanism' which Lembede was trying to express in 
his writings. Lembede tried to make this philosophy 
political - Mpanza acted it out in the streets, and on 
the veld." (149)
Lembesde obviously saw the arrival of the Sofasonke Party at the meeting 
.as support for his stand and given some of the crudities of the Sofasonke 
politics it points to some of the pitfalls to which Africanism as an
ideology lends itself.
In Parliament the draft of the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act was being 
read which was proposing to officially allow balacks to help in . the 
building of black housing only. The state was desperately
looking for a way to reduce housing costs and make available skilled 
labour.
It was anxiety over the rising cost of housing that was compelling the 
Council to try to recoup some of the cost from rents. In the face of the 
protest, obviously low wages and the Council's desire to bring the 
squatting problem under control , when the new rents were finally 
announced in August they were lower than was first stated. Rent for a 
4-roomed house was 2 Pounds 10s. Furthermore , these rentals were 'only 
provisional5 and the Manager of NEAD said it was hoped that reductions 
would be possible later.
As these rents were still high, the Council attempted to get around the 
problem, and that of sub-letting which was difficult to control. They 
would carefully select tenants for the new houses from among those of 
existing houses who required more space and were in a position to pay 
high rentals.
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The Council also corrected the regulation which had excluded shelter 
dwellers from voting in the Advisory Board elections by defining the 5 
shillings paid for sanitary and water services, as rent.
Pressing ahead along established elitist paths of 'economic freedom' the 
A.N.C. conferred a meeting of black businessmen. The meeting was very 
much concerned with trading rights in the townships. The meeting agreed 
tha t
"the All African Business Association be formed under 
Congress as a Department of Commerce of that 
organisation."
They sought to create a 'big , strong African National Chamber of 
Commerce. '
At the A.N.C. (Transvaal) Annual Provincial Conference held on 29th 
September it was reported that there had been an increase in membership 
though not of branches for the year. This meant that established
branches were swelling. However, Orlando was not amongst these. With 
branches divided between
"(a) those which 'are active and on the way to 
progress and also taking the initiative in the 
struggle against oppression' ,
(b) those 'which are not active' and
(c) those which are 'very inactive'"
Orlando was among the last. The A.N.C. was still overly
concerned with policies which could not take it through to a mass base , 
although there had been some involvement in supporting or advising 
squatters at Alberton, Zuurbekom and Koroatipoort , and some
interest in the anti-pass movement.
By October the last of the families had been moved out of the shacks and 
into the shelters and Shantytown was no more.
In Orlando election time was coming round again. Keen to get an early 
start, the Communist Party held its second meeting to announce its 
candidates for the Advisory Board elections at the Shelters where 
residents could now vote on Sunday, 7th October. The Sofasonke Party set 
about actively sabotaging their meeting.
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”As the leaflets calling the meeting were distributed 
on Saturday, the 6th, a group of mischief makers 
styling themselves the Sofasonke Party , got to know 
about the meeting. They went round telling the people 
that they must come and sign for the new houses on 
Sunday at the same place where the Communist Party was 
holding the meeting.
Early in the morning the people who were hoodwinked 
into the belief that they were signing for houses 
started queuing up in order to get the first chance.
The leaders knew there were no houses, but that they 
were calling the people to come and interfere - with the 
election campaign of the Communist Party. In oder to 
avoid trouble the Party speakers went to a different 
place, where they opened the meeting. The crowd 
rapidly grew, and this was too much for these would-be 
politicians. They attempted to incite the people
against the speakers to break up the meeting , but 
failed. They started their own platform with one or 
two speakers but they soon got tired. At 2.30 p.m. 
the Communist Party speakers led a procession through 
‘the streets which terminated with cheers for the 
Communist Party." (3-56)
The Communist Party felt that it was receiving a favourable response from 
residents to Its house to house canvassers. They were discovering many 
who had lived in Orlando for years and never voted. But the Party was 
having problems motivating its members.
“Many comrades are not taking the election seriously, 
they do not go out canvassing at all. To expect 7 or 
1 0 comrades to canvass over 1 0 000 voters is out of 
the question."
The Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. alliance appeared to be undergoing a 
re-evaluation which Communist Party propoganda -interpreted as 
weakness.
The Communist Party also sought to propagate their policies with 
discussions and speeches in the s treets. Their activities invoked a 
vitriolic attack from the newspaper Umteteli wa Bantu , sponsored by the 
Chamber of Mines, which favoured the outgoing Sofasonke/A.D.P. Board.
“fFor the past three weeks members of the Communist 
Party have been showing their loyalty by going from 
house to house cavassing for votes. In doing so, they 
have not been slow to draw their visibljT scarlet party 
line across the locations.
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Processions are the order of the day. Men and women 
may be seen on Sundays moving up and down the streets 
in an attempt to convert people to their particular 
creed. *~~~ Talking about women, the article continues,
'It is a great pity that these noble creatures have 
allowed themselves to be used by the menfolk in these 
political games which are so much Greek to them [the 
women]I In the processions I have mentioned,' the 
writer goes on, 'the women provide the 'hear, hears' 
as the men make speeches. Some of these poor women 
don't quite know what this is all about. They have a 
hazy idea that their menfolk are seeking election to 
some parliament whose main purpose is to bring to them 
the free unrestricted brewing and consumption of 
Kaffir Beer.
The retiring members of the Board have really done a 
magnificent piece of work.'" "(158)
The Communist Party was quick to defend its Orlando Advisory
candidates through its organ, Inkululeko.
"Regarding the noble creatures who do not understand 
anything about elections, we consider this an insult 
to the African women. If African women were allowed 
to represent the residents of Orlando , they would do 
better than the out-going members of the board ...
The outgoing members of the board who have now finally 
decided to stick together and go down as a blcok, are 
now nervous about the elections. The Orlando Branch 
of the Communist Party has gone all out, and the 
campaign has been intensified. The old song about the 
Communist Party being a Jewish party is so stale that 
nobody worries about it among the voters. Even the 
Shantytown recitation which was used last year to 
cover up the terrible political deficiencies, has now 
been wiped out but the. endless taxations that even the 
Government has never asked for so frequently, the poor 
people at the breeze-block shleters have been paying 
more than any other people have ever paid for proper 
houses. The outgoing board knows better about it if 
not behind it."
The article accuses the old board of deliberately changing
"the day on which the monthly meetings of the Board 
were taking place, and which was more amitable (sic) 
for the residents to come and listen to the debates of 
the board members , these meetings have once more been 
made private to the credit of the Boards.” (159)
Board
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The Communist Party raised the question of the undemocratic way in which 
votes were cast. Apart from voting being restricted to tenants who could 
produce rent receipts for the current year and women being excluded , they 
questioned the actual voting procedure. This was done by voters calling 
out the names of the candidates they favoured to an election officer, who 
recorded their votes. The voters had no way of checking whether their 
votes had been correctly recorded and the . township superintendent and 
police had tended to be present in the past.
This intimidated voters and deterred many from voting Communist for fear 
of the repercussions. There was also no check on the counting of votes. 
The Communist Party candidates were Mofutsanayana , Msitshana , Moema and 
Masupha. They reflected the growing overlap between Communist 
Party and A.N.C. with both the first two being prominent A.N.C. men as 
well.
So strong was their campaign that before the elections people in Orlando 
were wondering whether they had any effective opposition. The opposition 
had not been canvassing, they held very few meetings, and published 
virtually no manifestos. The only candidate who published a 'small and 
unreadable Zulu manifesto' was Ilpanza , asking the residents to vote for 
him and his 'boys'.
The Sofasonke Party had decided to remain with the A.D.P. for the 
election. They fielded the same candidates as the previous year , namely 
Mpanza , Kumalo , Mophiring and Xorile.
"Their election manifesto stressed two points: the
possible extension of the passes to women- when the 
control of these documents was transferred to the City 
Council , and the need to make the Council provide 
housing for a further 30 000 Africans. The manifesto 
also warned that the Council planned to 'solve the 
problem (of those without houses) by expelling them 
from Johannesburg.'" (162)
There was tremendous enthusiasm at the election on the 23rd December. 
There was a clear victory for the Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. alliance. This 
was a significant indication to both the Council and the Communist Party 
of the strength of the alliance’s support. It was also an indication of 
the strength of the Sofasonke Party's base when it wavered before
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deciding to stay with the A.D.P. Although they decided that there was 
still an advantage to be gained in keeping the alliance, the A.D.P. were 
rapidly becoming more of a liability than an asset.
The position of the Communist Party was clearer and the lesson of 
Shantytown had been unequivocally taught. Although remaining active the 
Communist Party were unable to recapture what popular support they had 
enjoyed in the thirties and early forties.
The Council for its part had made marginal gains during 1945 having 
constructed 198 houses in Orlando and having completed 4 042 shelters and 
73 blocks of communal latrines. Shantytown had been removed and the 
original population of 20 000 brought under Council control as registered 
tenants of the Orlando shelters. (-*-63). aqso had plans for the
removal of the man who it saw as the instigator behind the squatter 
movement as it feared what he might be planning next. This fear was made 
more pressing because of the Council's difficulties in finding companies 
to build for it and supply materials. With competition and still the 
shortage of materials , these tended to go to other long-standing and 
commercial interests. This was slowing down the Coucil's ability
to deliver the goods and increasing the possibility of further action on 
the part of the masses.
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CHAPTER 4 : MORE SQUATTERS, MPANZA FIGHTS DEPORTATION, THE A.N.C.
REVIVING, AND THE SOFASONKE PARTY SUPREME IN ORLANDO, 
1946 - 1949
Before the dust had settled after the elections for 1946, the 
Johannesburg City Council through its informers, alleged that Mpanza had 
already begun to organise a new squatter movement. N.E.A.D. claimed to 
have received numerous reports that Mpanza and other Board members were 
involved. ^^
An observer claimed that at a meeting on 17th January, 1946 they were 
told by Xorile to unite as one body.
He said , 'you must understand there is no Communist 
Party, or Sofasonke Party: we must just all of us be
one to fight against the Council.' Mpanza said, 'Now 
you tenants of this township must take out all your 
sub-tenants; kick them out; put them in front of your 
doors in the street. I, Mpanza, will go and fetch the 
Superintendent and authorities to come and see all the 
people outside in the street. You people must not say 
that it-was we, the board, who are telling you to get 
out.' We went from there believing we were all
one." (2 )
Aaother affidavit claims Mpanza said further,
"'If you hide the sub-tenants in your house, the
authorities will not see them: get them out and the
authorities will know they are there and the day all
the sub-tenants are thrown out the Advisory Board will 
go and call the Superintendent and Council and say,
'look at your people outside in the streets.'
There was a message sent round the whole township that 
all the sub-tenants must be thrown out. There were 
runners in the trains advising the people to throw out 
all the sub-tenants." (3)
On the 23rd January, Mpanza, Lucas Kumalo and G.G. Xorile called on the 
Manager of N.E.A.D. and informed him that they had been instructed by the 
tenants of Orlando that it was their desire - 1
1. (a) That the Council endeavour to obtain sufficient tents from the 
Defence Department for the housing of Orlando sub-tenants; or
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(b) failing the provision of the tents, that the Council make land 
available in Orlando where sub-tenants could lease stands and 
build their own dwellings.
2. To present an ultimatum to the Council that unless a
satisfactory answer to these proposals was received by not later 
than the 28th January, the tenants would sumarily eject all 
sub-tenants.
The Advisory Board members claimed to be merely carrying out a mandate , 
although the Council was suspicious of them.
Meanwhile , say the Council reports, Mpanza continued to organise.
"Yesterday, Friday, the 25th January, 1946, I went to 
Mpanza’s house in Orlando at 4 o'clock in the 
afternoon. With me were five other women who also 
were anxious to find houses. When we arrived Mpanza 
asked me what I wanted and I said 'I want a house.' 
Mpanza replied 'I have no house.' Another woman 
stated, 'I have come to join.’ Mpanza replied, 
'Right , if you join give me some money. ' The women 
paid 10/-. Other women followed suit and said they 
wanted to 'join' and also paid whatever they could 
afford. Two women paid 10/-, one paid 7/6, one paid 
9/-, one paid 2/6 and I paid 5/-. - After we had paid 
our 'tax' Mpanza gave us receipts. He then said to us 
'I want you to understand that I do not promise to 
give you houses , but I need money to go to Pretoria 
and fight the authorities in order to get a house. To 
go to Pretoria I need money for my fare , and while I 
am away my children will starve unless I have money to 
buy them food in my absence. The money you paid me 
today is very little indeed , and will never be 
sufficient to cover all my .expenses. You must
understand that if you want me to fight for you, you 
must come prepared to pay me more money, but even if
you should pay me 2 Pounds as some people do , I still
cannot promise to give you houses , but all I can say 
to you is that if I win, you win with me, and if I
fail, you fail with me, and you cannot ask me to
return your money. 1
After this Mpanza said 'Y'ou are now soldiers. You 
have joined forces with me and you will die where I 
die.’ We then repeated, 'Yes, Chief, we are your 
soldiers. We have joined with you - we shall die 
where you die.'”
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Mpanza urged them to attend the public meeting on the 27th with the 
Council officials.
A meeting was first called by the Council for the 26th to discuss black 
housing. This was chaired by the Mayor of Johannesburg and attended by 
three Council Committees, thirty six members of the Advisory Boards, the 
Chief Magistrate, the Director of Labour, the Native Commissioner, the 
Deputy Commissioner of Police, representatives of the Residents' 
Committee, the Progressive Association, the Communist Party, the 
Independent Party, the Vigilance Association, the Teachers Association, 
and others.
Discussion lasted for three hours during which Advisory Board members 
also raised various social, economic and political injustices.
The CSiairman summarised the outcome of the meeting by saying that there
was a need for land so that blacks could build for themselves. Re and
other Councillors undertook to attend a mass meeting the following day, 
and that the problem would receive urgent attention.
The mass meeting of 10 000 people took place on Sunday the 27th as 
planned at which the Council representatives explained that the3? were 
havirig difficulties in providing solutions tc the housing problems but 
asked that the people suspend any action for thirty days while the 
Council gave the matter urgent attention. The black chairman of the 
meeting told the Council representatives that this had been agreed to and
they then left. Mpanza who was at the meeting, however, had expressed
dissent. The Chairman, as was the practice at such meetings, summarised 
the outcome as an overall agreement and wrote to the Council indicating 
so. This left an air of ambiguity as to what was actually resolved at 
the meeting. ^  ^
Another report by a Communist Party member says that on the same day 
Mpanza held another meeting , chaired probably by his ally Xorile , so as 
to retain control of the meeting. Mpanza said that "Although the 
Communist Party was a large body it had been divided in South Africa.' 
He told the people of the Council's 'false promises'. If they failed to 
get the sub-tenants out, the matter was in their own hands.
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"What happened on the 28th January, 1946, is something 
that had been decided upon a long time before ... The 
people already knew that they had to go out on the 
28th January, 1946. The meeting was merely a 
camouflage ... What is hurting me, is how long shall 
Mpanza go on riding the Communist Party and riding the 
Council, We, the Communist Party are still trying to 
stop him doing so , and today we have followers.
Mpanza is afraid of nobody and certainly not the 
Communist Party. He knows that when he is in Orlando 
he is chief and says 'I am God.'" (®)
After an easy win at the elections and now more sure than ever, after this 
public demonstration of support for him from Orlando East, Pfest and the 
Shelters, Mpanza was beginning to take advantage of his position in order 
to continue undermining the Communist Party. The other smaller groupings 
in Shantytown which he had to contend with but which were now falling 
behind were the Basuto Advisory and Protective Committee, the Shantytown 
Vigilance Committee, the Shantytown Residents Committee, The Shantytown
(  Q)Independent Committee and the Shantytown Progressive Association.
To this day there is uncertainty as to what exactly Mpanza's role in what 
followed was. Although the A.D.P. was still in alliance with the 
Sofasonke Party , Mpanza did not always inform his allies of his next 
move. Nor did he~ always stick with what was arranged. Says Xorile , 
talking of this incident.
"it was difficult to work with Mpanza. After an 
agreement he would surprise you." (1 0 )
Xorile did not know what Mpanza was up to on the eve of January 27th, 
1946.
The Reverend O.S.D. Mooki who joined the Sofasonke Party at about this 
time , says Mpanza ,
"appointed one of his lieutenants , Chief Edward 
Kumalo , as leader of a second exodus." (H)
Whatever the truth is, on the night of the 28th January, in darkness and 
pelting rain, 2 000 to 3 000 people occupied by force forty or more 
half-completed arid fifteen completed municipal houses at Orlando West.
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Thirty to fifty people huddled together in a single house. Most of them 
were sub-tenants from Orlando who had been evicted. Members of the 
Orlando Advisory Board were at the scene that night and tried to dissuade 
them from occupying the buildings. In a change of heart Mofutsanyana was 
on the scene all night offering support.
The next morning they were warned by municipal officials that they would 
have to move, but they refused to do so. The squatters emphasised that 
they had been evicted.
"Is it likely that we would walk out into the rain and 
the night without furniture , beds , cooking utensils or 
even something to make a fire?”
asked a woman with a baby strapped to her back.
A spokesman for the squatters added;
"we cannot get back into the houses in Orlando because 
the occupiers will not let us. There are not enough 
houses here with roofs to accommodate us. The only 
way to shelter these poor people is to get tents at 
once , to have more breeze block rooms built and then 
to get on much more quickly with the building of the 
houses."
He and others said there had been up to sixteen people living in the
Orlando houses and eight to ten in the breeze block rooms. As
(12)sub-tenants they paid 1 0/- or slightly more per month. v '
Vendor’s carts soon arrived to sell food and women began cooking over
fires in front of the houses.
The Council was dismayed that in spite of the agreed thirty days grace, 
the sub-tenants had been ejected only twenty four hours afterwards. One 
explanation suggested that the confusion about how the mass meeting had 
ended and the widespread publication of the resolution of the 23rd , led 
tenants to believe that this resolution was being put into effect so that 
evictions rapidly spread.
The result of this was that a crowd gathered in front of the
Superintendent's office, numbering eventually 4 000 to 5 000. When
(14)weather threatened , they occupied the houses. v '
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Fed information by their informers and already suspicious of Mpanza , the 
Council felt that the exodus was a concerted move aimed at forcing it 
into an impossible situation.
This appeared to be confirmed by a Star reporter who found that the 
squatters could not give the address of the house from which they had 
been ejected. None had complained to the Superintendent as was usual in 
the case of evictions.
The Council was adamant instead that it was a concerted arrangement
"in which either or both landlords and sub-tenants 
figured , or were inspired to move out by some 
influence behind the scenes It is alleged that one 
influence behind the scenes is a native who according 
to evidence accumulating in the files of the 
authorities, exploits simple minded natives in 
Orlando. The law-abiding natives consider his 
influence dangerous."
Unable to believe the degree of overcrowding , the Council was also 
convinced that .at least half the squatters were not from Orlando houses , 
but rather from other areas.
Closer investigation showed that many of the squatters did not sleep out 
around the houses every night, but would go away after dark to spend the 
night at friends’ houses, and then return shortly after dawn.
The occupation of the houses had wider ramifications as it led to fears 
among sub-tenants in surrounding townships that it would upset the quota 
system and Orlando residents would get more of the completed houses than 
was agreed they would be allocated.
The Council hurriedly went into conference on the 30th January. It was 
hoped that quick action would contain the situation. But the Chief 
Magistrate opposed ejectment as the police did not have sufficient means 
to be able to clear the houses and then prevent re-occupation. This 
would only further weaken authority. There was also no alternative 
accommodation. The Magistrate advocated instead that action be taken 
against Mpanza , Xorile and Lucas Kumalo. The Manger of NEAD , Venables, 
and the Director of Native Labour agreed to go immediately to Pretoria to 
obtain a deportation order against Mpanza. They also wanted to warn the
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other two. This course of action was endorsed at a Council meeting on 
the same day.
Meeting with Government officials in Pretoria, the Johannesburg Council 
delegates argued emphatically that if the squatters were ejected from the 
houses and prevented from re-occupying them , the whole movement would 
collapse of its own accord and the squatters would return to the houses 
they came from. This would particularly be successful if timed to 
coincide with the removal of Mpanza. The Council members saw the action 
as a trial of strength rather than emanating from legitimate grievances. 
Hence the call for force.
The Government would not agree to ejectment unless some alternative were 
offered, but it was unanimously agreed that with Mpanza's history and the 
warning given to him the previous year, that he should be removed.
Back at Orlando West the ranks of the squatters were swelling as more
(IT)sub-tenants joined them. v ~
On Friday, 1st February, Mosaka was invited to address a conference 
called by the Council to discuss the situation. He stated that from his 
investigations he was satisfied that allegations appearing in the press 
about subversive influences working behind the scenes encouraging the 
squatters, were correct. He agreed that the squatters had not been
ejected by the Orlando tenants but had moved voluntarily. He said he was 
prepared to try to mobilize 'decent public opinion' to counteract these 
'evil influences' which were exploiting the situation for private 
gain.
Desperate for solutions, the NEAC decided to set aside 100 plots near 
Orlando on which blacks could build houses for themselves. They would be 
helped with materials but would not be allowed to build for other 
blacks. It was hoped that if this experiment was successful, more would 
be allowed.
Mosaka, who as a native representative, had become the go-between for the 
Council and the squatters, also met with the Johannesburg Joint Advisory 
Boards and the special emergency committee of the Council. At this
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meeting it was decided to let black representatives offer formulae for 
solving the Orlando problem.
At Orlando West on the 3rd February, with an already delicate situation
with the builders, the influx of squatters was threatening building even
further. The builders were threatening to .'down tools' by the next day
because of the 'unhygienic conditions' on the site caused by the 
f21)squatters. v
On the same day the Superintendent read the Emergency Regulations to the
( 22)squatters and warned them to vacate the houses.
Repercussions in surrounding townships were beginning to surface. In 
Pimviile a demonstration by women in front of the Superintendent's office 
complained that they feared losing their allocation of housing to the 
Orlando squatters. The Superintendent assured them that they would get 
their total allocation.
On the 4th February, the squatters left the incomplete houses in Orlando
West and about 1 000 congregated in and around the Orlando East Communal
Hall. There they had access to water and sanitation. The move averted
(24)the threatened strike of the builders.
Meeting with the Council's emergency committee on the 6th, Mosaka 
presented his formula to solve the recent squatter deadlock. This 
formula and the Council's reply were to be read to the squatters at the 
Communal Hall at 5 p.m. that day. They were also given an ultimatum to 
leave the. area by 6 p.m. the following day.
Of Mosaka's formula the Council agreed that Pimviile tenants would get
their agreed upon allocation of houses and that they would discuss the
allocation of houses with the Joint Advisory Boards. They disagreed with
the suggestion that they provide temporary shelters as they did with
Shantytown for reasons of 'public health, sanitation and priority on the
waiting list. 5 They were instead determined to press ahead with the
provision of permanent housing. Finally they agreed to add the names of
(25)the Communal nail squatters to the waiting list.
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On the same day, however, an order for Mpanza's removal to the farm 
"Coldplace" , in the District of Ixopo , Natal, was issued. Xorile
and Lucas Kumalo were also given a warning.
That evening the meeting was held at the Hall , attended by 4 000 to 5 000
squatters. * They listened quietly and patiently as they were given the
(27)ultimatum to leave by 6 p.m. the next day.
The Council was on edge. They were told that the squatters would refuse
to leave. To make matters worse, in a statement of solidarity,
sub-tenants from Pimville and Eastern and Western Native Townships ,
threatened to come out and squat in sympathy with the Orlando 
(28)squatters. v '
With a tone of desperation the chairman of N.E.A.C. said,
"The Council will not be intimidated by these people.
We cannot tolerate this situation any longer. In my 
opinion if the police remove the root of the evil, 
which' is the agitators behind this movement, the whole 
matter will simmer down." (29)
As the day wore on and the tension mounted, so did the militancy of 
sympathetic sub-tenants from the surrounding township. They changed
their statement to say that
"if there was any fighting at Orlando they would come 
to Orlando and help."
As 6 p.m. approached there was great tension among the squatters and the 
crowd that came to see what would happen,
"Just before 6 p.m. yesterday, the squatters, called 
together by a peremptory whistle , gathered round a 
choirmaster armed with a shield and a pick-axe as a 
baton, and sang their nightly chant ... 'We, Xhosas , 
Zulus, Sesutos , want a place to live.1"
Zero-hour passed without sign of the police and tension eased.
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It was found out that Mosaka had called a meeting of about 600 tenants 
that day, at which they denied having ejected their sub-tenants. They 
agreed to take them back on condition that the Council give a written 
assurance that they would be allowed to extend their own houses at their 
own expense and to give the squatters space in their yards to erect 
temporary shacks. They also declared their support for the squatters. 
On the basis of this , Mosaka persuaded the Council to extend the 
ultimatum to Sunday, the 12th June while considering the tenant's 
offer. (30)
However, many of the squatters disagreed with Mosaka's proposal that they 
return to sub-tenancy and preferred to remain at the Communal Hall site.
Their objection was that sub-tenants were in a semi-illegal position in 
the township and had no vote in Advisory Board elections, such as is 
accorded to registered tenants. They disapproved of Mosaka negotiating
f 3 1 ’\on their behalf without being appointed by them. v '
The next day the squatters continued to sit around the Communal Hall in
damp drizzle. They were well disciplined and already had their own
'police boys' who_ wore red armbands with the sign 'S^V.' and controlled
r 37 )access to the fenced-off hall grounds. v '
That night as they slept around the hall in the open, they were drenched 
in a heavy downpour. It rained again the next day, Sunday.
"First one man put up a rough shelter along the fence , 
and then everyone started doing it."
They built about 150 shelters on the first day. These were made of
sacking slung over poles. Meanwhile no action was taken on the extended
deadline of Sunday, 6 p.m, , as the Council was still considering the
(33)tenant's proposals. v '
Meanwhile, unperturbed by his deportation order, Mpanza who was now the 
owner of some fine race horses, was participating in race meetings 
nearby. These were organised by the Orlando Horse Owner's Association of 
which he was an important member. The races were watched by many.
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By Monday the 11th, another 100 shelters had been added and people had 
dug furrows around their shelters to lead the water off.
The Council also rejected the tenants' proposals and a suggestion that 
the sqautters be moved into empty houses at Noordgesig. They argued that 
the houses were not empty but for 'coloureds' who also had a waiting 
list. <35>
On the 12th the Council succeeded by urgent representations and the 
lodging of further affidavits in persuading the Chief Magistrate to issue 
an Ejectment Order under the Emergency Regulations of 1944 passed 
especially to deal with cases of forcible trespass. The Superintendent 
of Orlando was authorised to remove' the squatters from the hall, if 
necessary by force. There were by now 800 hessian shelters with more 
going up.
"This morning , after gathering for the usual 
song-making which precedes each meeting , the squatters 
were addressed by one of their leaders. He told them 
that "the white people might be coming out to evict 
them, and advised them to pull down the shelters and 
just sit about.
A few minutes later he changed his mind and told the 
squatters to leave the shelters as they were, and to 
sit quietly and not to create any disturbance no 
matter what happens.
Leaving an open circle immediately surrounding the 
hall, the natives have erected their shelters round 
the four sides of the fencing in rows two and three 
deep , in some instances leaving not even breathing 
space between each."
All arrangements to execute the order of removal were made but it was 
suspended at the last minute. No official explanation was given for the 
suspension.
Mofutsanyana who was present suggested that they stage a march to town of 
all residents to see the Mayor and demand decent housing for all. This 
was greeted with great enthusiasm. He said that if the Orlando 
Communists and the present Board can get together on such an undertaking, 
they would rally the great majority of the people behind them.
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"We Orlando Communists will fight 'all out' against 
Mpanza's deportation. We do not agree with his 
methods and many of his policies.- But he has been 
elected by the Orlando people. The principle of 
deportation is completely undemocratic." (37)
Mosaka was there with a member of the Orlando Advisory Board. He said 
that if the Government's Native ' Affairs Department had assumed 
responsibility in the matter of deporting Mpanza it should also assume 
responsibility for providing the squatters with homes.
A meeting of sympathisers was held at Mpanza's home that night to raise 
money to provide for his defence against the deportation order.
He had until the next afternoon to leave Johannesburg to go back to 
Natal , where he had come from.
The order was served on Mpanza by a Marshall Square detective under 
Section 5 of the Native Administration Act by which the Governor General 
might, whenever he deemed it expedient in the public interest, order the 
removal of any tribe , or portion thereof , or any black to any province or 
district within the Union upon such conditions as he might determine.
Mpanza had been given a rail warrant to Natal and he had been told that 
rail warrants would be issued to his family if he wished to take them 
with him. (38)
A letter from the Secretary of Native Affairs, enclosing a rail warrant 
told him he was being deported because he incited people to occupy land 
which was not their property. He could take clothes and property to the 
value of seventy five Pounds with him.
It was feared that the deportation of thousands more could follow. (33)
Representatives of various organisations met in the. Communal Hall that 
night to protest against the deportation order and to demand immediate 
accommodation for the squatters. Never before or probably since has such 
a large and representative grouping from Orlando shoxred such unity on a 
single issue. A committee representing the A.N.C. (Transvaal), the
A.D.P. Partj  j the A.N.C. Youth League, the Africanthe Communist
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Minister's Association, the Sofasonke Party, the African Trade Unions and 
the Orlando Advisory Board, afterwards issued a statement describing the 
deportion order against Mpanza as
"undemocratic , high-handed and tactless , especially 
after the World War in which Africans participated and 
laid down their lives for the fundamental human rights 
which are now denied to Africans in the land of their 
birth."
The statement also expressed the opinion that the negotiations between 
the City Council and Mr. Mosaka revealed a keen desire on the part of 
blacks to arrive at a satisfactory settlement.
The Council on the other hand had rejected their proposals.
Said Inkundla Ya Bantu ,
"Dr. Xuma has sent a wire to protest to General Smuts 
and so are other organisations preparing for 
co-ordinated action against this piece of tyranny 
borrowed from the Nazis.” (41)
The Johannesburg District Committee of the Communist Party of South 
Africa sent a telegram to General Smuts and the Minister of Native 
Affairs , Major Piet van der Byl , protesting against the deportation of 
Mpanza as an
"outrageous and undemocratic action against an elected 
representative of the largest native township in the 
Union."
They demanded the immediate withdrawal of the deportation order.
With the Council failing to have taken action at Orlando, a new influx of 
people to join the squatters began on the morning of the 14 th. The 
Council claimed to have found people from Withank, Standerton, Kroonstad 
and Alexandra among the squatters,
"If we go on like this the Johannesburg City Council 
will soon have to house the whole of the Native 
population of South Africa ,”
said the Chairman of N.E.A.C, in panic. (^)
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The Council feared the perceived conspiracy to be growing.
"The organisers of the squatters appeared to have 
excellent lines of communication, both in the city and 
along the Reef, and little negotiation takes place, 
however sub judice, said an official, of which the 
squatters of their leaders are aware."'(44)
Between 3 and 4 o’clock that afternoon Mpanza's attorney called on the 
Chief Native Commissioner for the Witwatersrand and told him that Mpanza 
was not prepared to leave and would test the validity of the order.
The emergency committee of the Council was sent to Cape Town to see the 
Minister of Native Affairs. They were frustrated at the indefinite 
postponement of the ejectment order.
On the night of the 13th a large group of between three to five hundred 
people went in procession through Orlando Township waking up the 
residents with their singing and calling everyone to come and see Mpanza 
being taken away unjustly. The procession wound up at Mpanza’s house 
where there was an ’indaba' with him and dancing.
The next morning there was again a demonstration of sympathy by a small
. (46) group. v '
The squatters around the hall continued to increase in number. The area 
within the Hall’s grounds had become so conjested that people were lying 
outside the fence during the daytime. At night they all returned to the 
inside of the fence and mothers and babies were able to take shelter in 
the Hall'.
The Council had appointed an employee to be responsible for the 
cleanliness of the camp. He estimated that it had grown by 250 shelters 
in the previous two days to 1 000.
Mpanza, who was supposed to have left Orlando by 5 a.m. that morning 
handed himself over to the police at Marshall Square at 9 a.m. He was 
accompanied by his lawyer and about fifty friends.
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A collection of money from the squatters was made for Mpanza's defence. 
Each shelter was requested to provide 5 shillings, and 18 Pounds was 
collected on the first day.
Mpanza appeared in the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court on the 15th, 
charged with failing to comply with the order. The case was remanded to 
the 18th February. Bail was fixed at 10 Pounds.
The response of the squatters to the failed ultimatum of ejectment was to 
see it as an attempt to trick them to leave the Hall. It hardened their 
resistence. With numbers continuing to swell, the encampment had now 
acquired the name of Hessian Town.
The Communist Party was now openly supporting the squatters. This was 
some distance since its first rejection of the Shantytown movement. The 
Communist Party slogans were, 'Houses for Everybody'; 'Accommodation for 
the Homeless5; and the 'Defence of Mpanza.'
They took the Sofasonke Party to task for its approach to this matter. 
As usual the Sofasonke Party was cutting its own path.
"Unfortunately some of Mr. Mpanza's supporters are 
devoting themselves exclusively to collecting money 
for a legal defence fund. They fail to realise that 
this is a political matter, not merely a legal one.
If Mpanza is deported even the small democratic 
freedoms now enjoyed by Non-Europeans are in grave 
peril ...
Not the lawers , but the people's unity can prevent 
this action of the Government and thus defend African 
freedom." (^8)
The Executive Committee of the A.N.C. Youth League added their voice to 
the protests against the deportation by sending a telegram to the Prime 
Minister on the 16th.
“The A.N.C. Youth League protests against the 
deportation of Mpanza and demands the immediate 
withdrawal of the deportation order. The action is 
unwarranted and constitutes a violation of the 
principles of democracy for which thousands 
died."
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Back at the Hall the name of Edward Kumalo was beginning to emerge as one 
of the leaders of this movement. While it is clear that he was one of 
the leaders a question mark again remains on his relationship to Mpanza. 
He had been a Sofasonke supporter and was to receive support from Mpanza 
again at a later stage. He also gave evidence to a Government commission 
that he was merely a front man for the elected Orlando Advisory Board 
members and that they were behind the squatter movement. He said that 
their attempts to persuade the squatters to leave the houses at the.start 
of the movement , and return to sub-tenancy were prearranged to disguise 
their involvement. Later he broke down and retracted this statement. 
The truth remains hidden.
Fearing that congestion would lead to complaints , Kumalo appointed a 
group of women armed with kieries and assegais to stop new squatters from 
entering the Hall grounds. They attempted to prevent any further 
shelters being erected.
On the steps of the Communal Hall was the headquarters of the ’Mpanza 
Defence Fund’. With the levy of 5 shillings on each shelter, 35 Pounds 
had been collected in the morning of the second day of the Fund. Some 
families preferred to leave rather than pay the 5 shillings. Those who 
had paid were given pink heart-shaped badges with a smaller heart in blue 
in the middle.
Mpanza's trial began on the 18th. The Court was flooded with Sofasonke 
and other supporters and had to be moved to a larger room.
He was handed a letter from a woman sympathiser which read;
"I wish you all the best today and remember that luck 
favours the brave."
Mpanza denied that it had been his intention to occupy the Orlando West 
houses. He said that on the contrary, he had warned Orlando residents at 
a normal weekly Advisory Board meeting that the Emergency Regulations of 
1944 would enable the government to act against the squatters and that 
this would cause trouble.
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Ke said that as an Advisory Board member he had delivered the ultimatum 
of the 23rd January to the Council as it was his. duty to be 'the 
mouthpiece of the people.'
He claimed that rather than being the force behind the occupation of the 
houses, the people actually resented his attempts to pacify them and 
point out the Council's difficulties.
On the same day as the start of the trial the Council received
confirmation of their order to eject the Hessian Town squatters. This
had been decided upon during the Emergency Committee's talks with the
f 52)Minister of Native Affairs but was not disclosed until confirmed.
The Council was now in a position to implement its long awaited for 
strategy in what it perceived as a trial of strength between subversive 
elements and itself. This strategy was to remove the 'agitators' and 
eject the squatters and keep them out long enough so that they would all 
go back to where they came from. This was supposed to solve the squatter 
problem. The ' Council seemed unable to see the cause of the problem as 
being genuine grass-roots grievances , a problem of basic necessities for 
the masses. ,
The order of ejectment was read to the squatters at 11 a.m. while 
Mpanza's court-case took place in town and many had gone to town to see 
the trial. Four hundred white policemen were watching from outside the 
grounds and two hundred black municipal police and labourers stood inside 
the grounds as the squatters were told they had fifteen minutes to leave 
the grounds with their household goods.
The Native Commissioner told the squatters that the Government had asked 
him to advise them to:
"Obey the order. Leave the grounds quietly and of 
your own accord. Then go quietly back to where you 
came from,"
Against such odds, and with probablj' most of the leadership away, the 
squatters capitulated. A woman jumped up and shouted;
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"Let there be no fighting. Let us get out goods and 
move out.”
They got up quietly , gathered up all they could carry of their 
possessions and hessian houses, and left in a solemn procession by the 
main gate.
Within half an house Hessian Town was no more. Thousands of people from 
the Orlando houses watched in silence as municipal workers demolished the 
remaining shacks.
Many of the squatters crossed the road and dumped their belongings under 
bluegma trees on a common opposite the Communal Hall. They sat there 
waiting for further instructions from their leaders.
Some went off to see if they could return to the houses where they had 
lived as sub-tenants before. Others from outside Orlando took their 
possessions and went back to where they had come from.
But most remained on the common.
With tension in the air, armed white police were kept on standby at 
various points in Orlando.
At 1.45 p.m. Edward Kumalo addressed the squatters on the common saying 
that if necessary they would stay there for three weeks or more if they 
could get no other place to go to. There was no attempt to build
shelters.
The Council threatened to charge them under common law if they did
The Council's only response by way of a solution was to reiterate its 
intention to set aside leasehold for blacks to build their own houses. 
Instead of 100 such lots they were now considering 250 for a site called 
Dube.
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With Mpanza's case continuing, he. maintained in court that as he held a 
letter of exemption issued to him in 1908 , the deportion order did not 
apply to him as he was not subject to Native Law. The case hinged on 
this and the fact that Mpanza was not given an opportunity to answer to 
the charges against him. The trial continued.
By the 20th only about half of the Hessian Town squatters were left under 
the bluegum trees. They sat around their bundles of belongings , some 
using black umbrellas for shade against the hot sun.
Unable to understand the grass roots defiance and determination, the 
Council maintained that the squatters leaders were preventing them from 
leaving. The municipality continued to keep the area clean and prevent 
the squatters from erecting any shelters or comforts.
By the next day the squatters had begun to regroup. Their numbers began 
to increase and they spread further out under the trees. The leaders had 
begun a census. At a table in the centre of the encampment, badges were 
feverishly being made. The badges were to indicate who had paid their 
membership fee of 5 shillings. There were still no shelters.
There were reports that there were moves in Sophiatown and Martindale to
set up similar squatter organisations. A meeting had been arranged in
( 58)Sophia town for the afternoon of the 23rd February. ' - I t  was 
postponed on that day.
kith his court case continuing Mpanza maintained an interest in what was
happening in Orlando. He even found time to enter three of his horses in
C59)a gymkhana in the township. v
Many of the squatters were leaving the common at night to sleep in houses 
in the township , then returning in the morning to swell the numbers 
during the day. Basner addressed a crowd of about 1 000 on the
24th.
"I am going to advise not only the people of Orlando , 
but the people of all the other townships to do the 
same as you have done. I ask you not to give in, and 
not to do anything which might lead to a disturbance.”
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He told the crowd that the Council had stipulated that those who would be 
allowed to build at Dube had to earn between 16 Pounds and 26 Pounds a 
month. The Dube scheme was mean to provide homes for the squatters. 
When he asked for anyone in the crowd in earned 16 Pounds a month to 
raise their hands, there were no hands shown.
On the 25th February, in a crowded courtroom, Mpanza was found guilty of 
failing to obey an order issued by the Governor General. He was fined 2 
Pounds with the alternative of seven days in prison. Bail of 2 Pounds 
was allowed pending appeal which was to be noted within 24 hours. The 
Magistrate claimed that the exemption only referred to ’Native tribal 
laws' and not to laws especially affecting natives, therefore he was not 
exempt. He added that it was difficult to believe that Mpanza was not 
behind the recent squatter actions and that there was provision in the 
law to compel Mpanza to comply with the order for removal. The defence 
argued that this should not be done pending appeal.  ^ '
At 5.30 a.m. on the morning of the 28th February, Mpanza awoke to the 
sound cf policemen knocking on his front door. He was placed under 
arrest and taken to Marshall Square. From there he was taken 
under escort to the station.
Maintaing the offensive, Venables, the Manager of N.E.A.D. addressed the 
people encamped under the bluegums and told them officially that Mpanza 
had left, explained to them that they would gain nothing by remaining 
where they were, and advised them to return to the places they had come 
from.
The Transvaal A.N.C. issued a statement on the same day calling for land 
and the right of black artisans to build houses for blacks. The 
statement shows that the Transvaal A.N.C. had by this stage realised the 
importance of this grass roots initiative. It also shows how widespread 
squatter action had become.
"Congress regards the exodus at Orlando and the Shanty 
Towns at Vereeniging , Bloemhof , Pietersburg and Benoni 
as a prelude for a mass movement for decent 
accommodation. " (65)
That afternoon. Mpanza was escorted to the station and sent off on the 
3,40 p.m. train for Ixopo in Natal. v '
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Desperately his lawyers applied for an interim interdict calling on the 
Minister of Native Affairs and others to show why they should not be 
restrained from putting the removal order into force. It was obtained 
too late to stop Mpanza leaving.
.  ' • *  *
In his petition Mpanza argued that he had made no preparations for 
immediate or sudden compliance with the o'der , pending his appeal.
An urgent order was issued for Mpanza's return. Mpanza was taken off the 
train at Standerton that night and headed back to Johannesburg.
The next afternoon application was made in the Witwatersrand Division of 
the Supreme Court for an order for Mpanza’s immediate release. Pending 
the decision of the proceedings, an undertaking was tendered that he 
would take no steps, directly or indirectly, to create or further any 
public disturbance or to absent himself , or evade the ultimate 
enforcement of the order of removal , if found valid. The court was again 
crowded with supporters.
The Council's strategy was going horribly wrong. As desired the 
squatters had been evicted and action taken against 'their leaders'. The 
squatters although evicted had not 'gone back to where they had come 
from' as was expected and the main 'agitator' in their eyes had escaped 
deportation. Although Mpanza was kept in prison, it was still a powerful 
moral victory in the eyes of the community. He had defied the 
authorities once more and escaped unharmed. Almost as if an unseen hand 
had intervened , he had been brought back in the last hour.
Under the blue gums in Orlando tension was mounting. The squatters had 
been camping in the open for over two weeks while Municipal police kept 
their strict and watchful eye on any attempts to build shelters.
"The workers would go to town, and their womenfolk 
mostly stayed behind awaiting the Council's word under 
the trees, and at night they slept in trenches dug in 
the ground , with blankets on top. This went on for 
some time. Women lived there under those trees with a 
few of their pots , etc. , waiting to such an extent 
that none of them had a lighter complexion , bearing 
all weather changes. Heat, wind, and what have you.
All of them dark. The Salvation Army Church was open 
to those with children." (70)
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During the later afternoon of the 8th March a storm broke over Orlando.
Determimed to stick to their strategy the N.E.A.D. responded when they 
saw threatening weather, by preparing for repressive measures to enforce 
the law. They arranged for 250 sanitary and other labourers to meet at a 
road camp in Orlando , and for 120 black municipal police to gather at the 
municipal offices in the township. When the rain began to fall the two 
parties converged on the squatter's camp and the Superintendent of 
Orlando , Col. T.W. Armitage , went by car to warn the leaders to advise 
the squatters not to put up any shelters but to 'go back to where they 
came from’ should rain fall.
An argument between the leaders and officials ensured, which was cut 
short when the command came for the municipal force to break down any 
shelters in the camp. By this time about 100 shelters had been erected , 
and other were going up.
The municipal force made two sweeps through the camp, pulling down the 
shelters.
Some scuffles ensued , but there was no real trouble, and at the end of 
the second sweep all the shelters had been pulled down and the municipal 
force prepared to depart.
The labourers left for the road camp and the black municipal policemen 
marched down, the road between the Communal Hall and the camp.
“As they reached the gate of the Communal Hall a woman 
shouted out something in Sesotho and rushed at the 
police. In a moment hundreds of native men and women 
joined in. Using knives , sticks , stones and irons 
heated in the braziers , they attacked the police from 
every quarter. The police were forced back gradually 
defending themselves with their sticks. The squatters 
state that some police were also armed with pieces of 
iron, which, they alleged, were used on the squatters.
The police, with their staggering wounded, retreated 
into the hall , and barricaded all entrances. One 
policeman was left behind lying on the ground with his 
head battered in and his throat cut ...” (1
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One policeman was killed and fifteen injured. The squatters kept watch 
on the building all night to see that no police could escape. Mosaka had 
persuaded them to release the injured and at about 10 p.m. they 'granted 
permission' to the" authorities to do so. This was done by 1 a.m. The 
squatters were jubilant and spent most of the night 'war dancing'. 
Fourteen squatters were taken to hospital. The sixty policemen wht> 
remained trapped in the hall were 'liberated' the next morning by more 
than 200 S.A.P. They advanced in three columns and met with no 
opposition.
Senator Basner, Councillor Mosaka and the elected members of the Orlando
Advisory Board sent a telegram to the Prime Minister protesting against
(73)the Municipality's actions and requesting an enquiry.  ^ 1
Meanwhile , Mpanza was granted an interdict in the Witwatersrand Supreme 
Court preventing his removal from Orlando pending the decision of an 
appeal. He was therefore released. ^ ^
"His release on bail on the 11th March, 1946 was made 
the occasion for a huge demonstration of rejoicing , 
thousands of Natives marching in procession through 
the location and filing past him while he sat in 
state.” (75)
No doubt their victory over the Municipality also contributed to their 
rejoicing. Mpanza kept away from the squatter camp after his 
release.
Mpanza was drawing increasing interest and recognition from many people 
at this time.
"He has a family of three , a small shrill voice and is 
five foot six inches high. At first sight he looks a 
very fired man, and unimpressive figure , but on closer 
acquaintance one cannot but be impressed with the 
man’s resourcefulness and profound knowledge of human 
nature.” (77)
Not all reports were favourable. A statement by a woman missionary 
worker on the 15th March who was both hostile to and threatened by 
Mpanza.„ reveals also something of his image and ways of operating in 
■Orlando at the time.
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"Mpanza now claims Divine origin and Divine authority 
and purports freely to give dispensation from the 
conventions of Christian or native tribal morality , 
and to dissolve customary unions at the wish of either 
party* He has recently had photographs of himself 
made available for sale to members of his party at 
10/- each, which party members are expected to put up •
in their rooms if they have houses, or if not, in some 
position in the vicinity where they are squatting and 
to which they are expected to pray. Mpanza does not 
hesitate to make capital out of every possible 
incident in support of his claim to have supernatural 
powers. He frankly boasts that he was sentenced to 
death for murder but claims that his sentence was 
commuted to penal servitude for life , and he was 
subsequently released because of his medicine. He 
also claims that he was discharged from the 
prosecution last year arising from the riots at 
Shantytown for the same reason. He made use of the 
coincidental breakdown on the night the movement 
started , the 28th January last , of my motor car and 
that of the Superintendent of Orlando locatoin and 
flooding of the motor car of Manager of the N.E.A.D. 
in a river, as a further proof of his supernatural 
powers, claiming that it was he who had brought this 
about and thereby prevented interference with the 
movement.
Mpanza's claims are implicity believed by the natives 
who can only see that so far as he has been able to do 
with complete impunity what none of them has ever 
believed possible and this belief has been enormously 
strengthened by his recent release by the Supreme 
Court pending the hearing of his appeal against his 
conviction for failing to obey the Governor General's 
order of deportation. He has stated to his people, 
not that he is released pending the hearing of the 
appeal , but that once again his magic powers have 
procured his complete acquittal. On his return after 
being released on Monday 11 March, 1946 , Mpanza was 
given an enormous reception and processions were 
organised through the location during the whole 
afternoon and part of the evening. In the course of 
the celebration Mpanza was openly hailed as 'King' and 
it was freely stated that the Council is now finished 
in Orlando. Afterwards Mpanza sat in state in front 
of his house and allowed an enormous crowd of his 
followers to file past and gaze upon him, for which 
they were afforded the privilege of paying him sums 
that they could spare not being less than half-crown."
She estimated that Mpanza had collected 5 000 Pounds since the Shantytown
movement and about 2 000 Pounds from the present movement.
Consolidating their position the squatters , reportedly now numbering 
3 000 families, defied the municipal authorities and erected between 400 
and 500 shacks, and six bell tents. Two men were reported to have died 
as a result of the fight with the police and many were suffering from
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conjunctivitis as a result of the use of teargas by the police.
'Sofasonke guards' were reported to have collected money for the funeral 
of one of the men. Rains on the 21st had prompted this wave of building , 
and anger and triumph had encouraged the growth of the camp. New 
families were ariving daily.
The Council was losing control of the Orlando area. In a tone of
mounting hysteria, the chairman of the N.E.A.C. said;
"The composition of the squatters has changed since 
the movement started. What was originally a 
superficially peaceable demonstration (however illegal 
and however organised for private ends) has now
attracted to itself a large percentage of lawless
elements of the native population. Intimidation is 
being practised to such an extent that it is bearly 
possible even for those who wish to leave the movement 
to do so. The situation, in fact, has all the 
elements of terrorism and mob rule." (SO)
These accusations were to be made again in Council evidence to the Moroka 
Commission where it was alleged that in 'acts akin to terrorism’ people 
were forced to participate in the squatter movement, especially women in 
the last stages of pregnancy and with newly born children, to,enlist 
public sympathy. The Council raised many objections to the camp 
administrators such as punishment for not obeying camp regulations, 
expelling non-members, etc. Says Stadler,
"If such acts were 'akin to terrorism' they were 
remarkably similar to the methods employed by the 
Government and the Municipality in controlling 
blacks." (31)
Of course the attacks were extended to include the inevitable 'Communist 
threat'. It was true that Communists were involved at this stage. Said 
Mofutsonyana ,
"The Squatter movement came to the Communal Hall of 
Orlando. Mpanza was already with his movement over 
there. We immediately captured those people and 
started to help them. Our people ware very busy in 
town helping the squatters. They were collecting 
clothing and so on because they were sleeping on the 
open veld." (32)
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The Communist Party's approach to the squatting movements was different 
to that of the leaders. They tended to introduce broader demands. This 
was noticed by the Council.
"At this time, the emphasis of the negotiations with 
the self appointed squatter leaders as well as with 
other native leaders changed from complaints about 
inadequate housing to claims for freehold ownership of 
land, better political representation and so on. In 
short, the native leaders merged the city's housing 
deficiency with the general political and economic 
difficulties of the Natives." (83)
However, an investigation by the S.A.P. found no information to support 
the allegation that the camp was organised as a 'demonstration of 
lawlessness' or that it was organised by the Communist Party, although 
the Communist Party got involved immediately the movement was 
started.
Also contradicting the Council's view was a survey by a group called the 
Orlando Relief Fund who found that the squatters were previously 
sub-tenants in Orlando and that they vrere forced to relinquish their 
rooms because of unbearable overcrowding with twenty to thirty people 
living in a three roomed house.
Countering the Council's irrational attacks the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party issued the following statement.
"Vfe view the actions of the Labour Party , which 
controls the Johannesburg Municipality, as a betrayal 
of the working class principles which it avows. We 
demand the cessation of terrorism and violence against 
the inhabitants of Orlando and the immediate provision 
of shelters and housing for them.” (86)
The Communist Party had been deeply embarrassed at this time by the 
actions of one of its members who had been rapidly rising to the top 
echelons of the party. Boshoff had accepted a brief from the state to 
appear on behalf of the Native Affairs Department in its attempt to have 
Mpanza deported. This, plus their defeat in the Orlando Advisory Board 
elections, badly damaged the party in the black areas. It highlighted 
the gap between black and white members. The Communist Party had to
suspend Boshoff and demand the withdrawal of the deportation order. (87)
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Desperate, the Council was again forced to negotiate to try to bring the 
situation under control. They reached an agreement on the 24th of March 
with the Orlando Advisory Board, again Mpanza , to set aside land on which 
only those who lived and worked in Johannesburg might build their own
houses.
As they went to the negotiating table , the first signs of the follow-up 
to the Orlando squatters' successes appeared on the scene. On the same 
day of the agreement about 200 people marched out of Pimville to Orlando 
under the leadership of Abel Ntoi and camped near the uncompleted houses 
in Orlando West. They demanded housing. They claimed also to have been 
evicted by landlords and to be the Pimville Sub-tenants Association. 
They were worried about the allocation of the new houses.
Mpanza's appeal came before the Supreme Court on the 26th March. 
Judgement was reserved.
There were, now over 6 000 squatters in Orlando. The Communist Party were 
involved in relief work in the camps and in making deputations to the 
authorities.
The A.N.C. 
meetings at
Youth League, becoming 
this stage.
more active , were holding monthly
On the 2nd April, Mpanza's appeal was dismissed in Pretoria. His defence 
asked for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division. The case was stood 
over to the next day.
In terms of the agreement with the Council , on the night of the 2nd
April , the Orlando squatter camp opposite the Communal Hall was
surrounded by 400 policemen, forming a cordon so that a census could be
taken of all those in the camp. This would enable the. Council to
register those working in Johannesburg. It was also agreed to legalise
sub-tenancy so that if vacancies occurred in Orlando , the squatters could
(94)take up sub-tenancy there. v '
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On the 3rd, Mpanza was granted leave to appeal to the Appellate Division 
subject to the following two conditions,
.(1) That Mpanza undertook to leave Orlando by April 9th and did not
return, pending the decision of the Appelate Division; and
(2) That the records be filed with the registrar of the Appelate Division 
by May 1st. ^
The removal of people to the new emergency camp called Jabavu began
almost immediately. Military trucks were used to transport the squatters 
to Jabavu. Those without work were separated out to be sent back to 
their places of origin by the government. They were kept in transit in 
the Communal Hall grounds.
The Communist Party were active among the squatters and pointed to 
dissatisfaction with the temporary arrangements made. There was
antagonism toward Mosaka who was seen as partly responsbile for this. 
There was tension betxvreen the Council and the Communist Party. The 
Council claimed that the Communist Party was hampering their efforts.
The -Communist Party claimed that the census had already shown that the 
Council's allegations about the squatters coming from other areas had 
been 'won't works' were disproved by the fact that the vast majority of
squatters were moved to Jabavu. There had been a notable absence of this
(97)kind of statement since the census, they argued. v
Meanwhile, the Council's housing was proceeding at a slow pace. Only 198 
of the 2 350 contracted for houses had been completed with only ten a 
month being built. They attempted to speed up the surveying of 
Dube. (98)
At Orlando West the new squat was growing steadily, now numbering about 
2 000 people.
According to the conditions of his right to appeal, Mpanza left Orlando 
on April 9th for an unknown destination. He left a message to say he was
dropping out of politics. Julia who stayed behind at their house would
„ , , . , _ ( 100)not say where he had gone to.
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With Mpanza gone the Orlando Advisory Board lost some of its coherence 
and there was a fall-off in their attendance at board meetings. The 
Communist Party, dissatisfied with the Board, repeatedly demanded a 
statement from them to be presented to the public accounting for money 
collected from the squatters. The Communist Party was quick to point to 
dissatisfaction with the Board's performance.
It was also known that the Orlando Advisory Board had agreed to the 
census of the squatters and Orlando residents at a secret meeting between 
it and the Municipal author-ities.
The A.N.C. (Transvaal) Marking Committee came out in support of Mpanza on 
6th May , 1946. It was decided to take a stand on the issue of the 
deportation law, to contribute 50 Pounds to Mpanza's defence and to make 
an appeal for more money.
More support came for Mpanza when a pamphlet was published primarily 
under the initiative of the A.D.P. , signed by Basner, Mosaka and the full 
Advisory Boards of Eastern Native Township, Orlando, Pimville and Western 
Native Township. It was called 'To the Citizens of Johannesburg - The 
Truth about Shantytown.'
In it they criticised the labour-dominated Council for deporting Mpanza 
and the destruction of Hessian Town by force. They pointed to the harsh 
conditions and lack of housing in Orlando and attacked the Council's 
attempts to blacken Mpanza's character and other leaders of the 
'Shantytown movement'.
"The truth is that Mpanza has the loyalty and support 
of more Africans in Orlando that any other member of 
the Advisory Board and that his deportation has caused 
great resentment throughout the African community."
By May there was more coherence in the authorities' strategy. A warning- 
was issued by both the Government and the City Council to the Orlando 
West squatters to leave the houses within one week.
The Pimville Sub-tenants Association responded with a letter to the
authorities saying that they wanted to leave but didn't know where to 
(103)go-
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After deciding at a meeting on the night of the 20th May to resist their 
removal , the squatters were taken by surprise the next morning by an 
early' morning raid. 400 police stood by while the removal of 3 000 
people in 100 3-ton troop carriers was begun.. It was found that
very few were n'ot employed in Johannesburg.
On the 11th June, Mpanza's appeal against the charge of failing to comply 
with the order of removal was allowed In the Appeal Court in 
Bloemfontein. The Magistrate's fine of 2 Pounds or seven days with hard 
labour was set aside. Mpanza was again free to live where he 
wished. (106)
On the 23rd a feast was held by Mpanza for all those who supported him 
during his trials.
"As early as 10 a.m. a crowd had already gathered at 
Mpanza!s house for this memorable occasion which was 
marked by the slaughtering of an ox. Men and women 
with the Sofasonke Party's badges were singing 
throughout the morning and afternoon until 3 p.ra. when 
the actual celebrations began.
Later in the day, the crowd had a little rest during 
■ which roasted meat was.given■to them as other food was 
. not yet ready.
It was after this that men and women rose and sang 
with great pride their song, 'Sill Wini.le Icala 
eBloemf ontein - We have won the case at
Bloemfontein. 1 Those who did not take part in the 
singing and dancing joined in the shouts and cheering 
of the Sofasonke women as they sang this song.
At this moment a man eloquent in praises , praised Mr.
Mpanza in Sesotho. In his praises, he made references 
to Mr, Mpanza's heroism. .Mr. Mpanza, this man said,
'is a man who has dona a lot for his people - a kind
of man of the Aba the thwa tribe, a man who has nothing
to do with other people (sic). He is a kind man to
his people irrespective of race.'
Wien this man was praising , the women were cheering 
him with the usual 'moliliecsane'.
Late in' the afternoon, Sofasonke Mpanza returned home 
from training his horses as he is an owner of valuable 
race-horses. Wien he came, the crowd gave him a great 
cheer.
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At this juncture the long awaited moment of feasting 
came. As in the country, meat was served in big
dishes to all who were present. This was done by
giving — a dish to each group representing various 
locations in and outside the Reef. People enjoyed 
themselves with this meat and other foods prepared for 
the day as it was Mpanza's desire that everyone from 
child to father should have the best of the day. 
After the feasting, more people came from the location 
dressed in African fashion as in the old days.
Carrying sticks and singing folk songs , these men kept 
everybody amused. On the other side, women of all
tribes were dancing and singing songs in praise of
Mpanza.
Towards sunset Mr. Mpanza addressed the gathering. 
Everybody stood quietly as 'Magebhula' spoke to the
people.
'If I was wrong to secure for you rooms when some were 
sleeping outside as a result of having no 
accommodation, then God must be my judge. When I
suffered, I was not doing so for my family, but I was 
doing so for all the people in general,' said Mpanza 
amidst loud cheers. He was here referring to the
Shantytown exodus.
He went on to say that many were pleased the day he 
was asked to go out of Orlando. 'Ha e ee tau,' said 
some of them. He told the gathering that throughout 
his long trial up to his success he relied on God. He 
knew that if God did not wish him success, all the 
money collected in his aid would avail nothing. At 
this moment he asked the people to sing 'Uyesu 
unamandla'. He himself joined in the singing of this 
song.
Most of his speech he based on quotations from the 
scriptures. He quoted stories from Daniel and the
other men of old. After this speech the day's 
rejoicing came to an end, although some people still 
remained, long after dark." (107)
Sounding a warning note , the Youth League sympathetic Inkunala Ya Bantu 
showing an astute understanding of the issues, commented on the outcome 
of the trials.
"From this fact we should learn the lesson that united 
action will always triumph. If the community had not 
backed Mr. Mpanza solidly he would not have probably 
been in a position to meet the heavy expenses entailed 
in a case of this type. Mr. Mpanza's victory is a 
signal triumph for the whole African community. The 
more we fight together , the more we shall win. We won 
at Alexandra Township because we fought together. We
166
have won in the Mpanza case because we fought 
together. Even bigger issues should be faced by the 
community acting in unison." (108)
There was further evidence of the Youth League's activism when Nelson 
Mandela gave a talk in the Leake Hall in Orlando on June 28th on 'Native 
policy' in the Union tracing it back to the Northern provinces before 
Union. (109)
Continuing with his horse racing , Mpanza was involved in an altercation 
with a railway policeman over a delay in transporting some of his 
horses. He was acquitted on charges of using obscene language on railway 
premises , resisting arrest and contravening railway regulations by- 
trespassing. There were at this time signs of growing political
activism in Orlando.
On the 21st July the National Anti-pass Council held an anti-pass rally 
in Orlando. August 4th was set as a preliminary demonstration day and 
within three months from the next conference, there was planned to be a 
mass struggle r culminating in a national stoppage of work and in the 
burning of passes. This was unanimously accepted at the Orlando meeting.
Speakers were Thloome (Transvaal A.N.C.), Lethata representing the 
Orlando Anti-pass Council, Walter Sisulu representing the A.N.C. Youth
League and S, Konoeny and S. Moema of the Communist Party.
Orlando Residents' Association, 
the Orlando Anglican Church
Not only was the activism in the townships, but also at work. On 4th
August, a meeting attended by well over 1 000 delegates of raineworkers 
decided unanimously to embark on a general strike of all blacks employed 
in the gold mines. The strikes began on the 12th August with over 70 000 
mineworkers going on strike. The A.N.C. was involved in organising the 
African Mineworkers Union.
Frustrated by the Government's attitude towards them in the wake of the 
strike, the Natives' Representative Council voluntarily adjourned in 
protest on the 15th August.
Representatives also came from the 
Shantytown Independent Party , and 
clergy.
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Meanwhile, another squatter movement sprang up adjacent to Jabavu on a 
private farm called Volkshaven consisting of about fifty four families. 
Hessian shelters—were erected. On the 23rd August they were forced to 
move to the adjoining farm called Albertyn. Edward Kumalo , who had been 
the leader of the second Orlando squat and who had been excluded from 
Jabavu, emerged as the leader.
Yet another squat was started early in September at Newclare. They were 
few in number and were quickly stopped with pass arrests by the
police.
Pimville added another movement on the 7th September, when about 800 
families led by Oriel Monongoaha began squatting on the site where the 
old tanks had been.
By the 12th there were about 10 000 squatters in the two camps at 
Pimville and Albertynsville , about half in each. The former was very
well organised, but they both followed the basic pattern of the first
squat at Orlando.
The sudden growth of the squatters’ movements prompted the council to 
lower the standard of the houses being built at Orlando and to decide to 
build semi-detatched houses instead.
The Council obtained an interdict ordering the squatters out of Pimville 
but had difficulty implementing it. They moved under pressure fifty
yards away across the Potchefstroom road which was outside Pimville. 
This created uncertainty in the authorities about the interdict.
On the 19th September Mpanza's case was upheld and the judgement given 
that his certificate of exemption made the order of removal not 
applicable to him.
"Mr. Mpanza , being no other than a poor man, travelled 
to Bloemfontein on horseback; I don't know how long it 
took him to reach that place. He won the case there 
and came back home on ‘horseback, to settle a little 
peacefully." (120)
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On the 22nd September the Pimville squatters moved across to Orlando.
The camped on a hill near the Orlando West houses, around a white
flag, Many were ex-soldiers and one of the leaders, S.S. Komo
was chairman of a branch of the Springbok legion, a non-racial
(122)ex-serviceman's organisation with strong Communist links. v '
The Council now decided to make it clear to the Government that the 
squatting problem was beyond their control and that they should 
intervene. ^123^
The Orlando West squatters grew to about 3 000 families living in hessian
(124)houses or bell tents. v '
At a meeting of the Orlando squatters, one of the leaders, Moseli , was 
alleged to have said that,
"the Government is beaten, because even the Government 
of England could not stop people from squatting.”
"He" likened the Government to a man who has a 
cornfield which is invaded by birds and who 'chases 
the birds from one part of the cornfield to another 
part of the cornfield.' Ke was also alleged to have 
said: 'We squatters are the birds. The Government 
sends it policemen to chase us away and we move off 
and occupy another spot. We shall see whether it is 
the farmer or the birds that get tired first.' He 
also said , 'The Communist Party would assist in 
recovering damages from the City Council for the poles 
and hessian which had been burned.'" (125)
At a meeting at Bloemfontein in October called by Xuma , the President of 
the A.N.C. the adjournment of the N.R.C. was discussed and a resolution 
was passed calling upon blacks to boycott any elections conducted under 
the Natives' Representation Act of 1936.
Meanwhile the Council was attempting to get an order to eject the Orlando 
West squatters.
In response to this about 1 000 of the squatters paraded through the city 
on the morning of the 15th October with banners bearing the slogan, 'we 
want houses'.
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They formed up outside the New Law Courts in orderly fashion and
delegates went in to attend the proceedings. (127)
On the 23rd October, the camp at Orlando West split when a group under 
Romo broke away from the larger group under Monongoaha , to set up a camp 
called Tobruk. (128)
Evidence was given by a N.E.A.D. constable that there were widespread
rumours that the Johannesburg municipality was providing land where'
blacks could build their own houses. Many were leaving the rural areas
to take up this opportunity. The rumour had been heard as widely as
(129)Dundee in Natal and Memel in the Orange Free State. v
The N.E.A.D. made frantic efforts to deny the rumour but the influx from 
all over the Union and even the Protectorates gained momentum. Said the
N.E.A.D.,
"Johannesburg is threatened with an invasion of 
natives on a scale which may well reduce the native 
problem in the city to chaos." (1-30)
On the 4th November a group of 27 families tried to settle on the farm 
Zuurbekom but were stopped by the police. ^ 33"\
On about 1st December, Schreiner Boduza led 600 
Alexandra to camp near Monongoaha's and Komo's camps.
800 families 
(132)
from
The annual Advisory Board elections were now due and attention was being 
turned to them. There was tremendous excitement. The two main parties 
were the Communist Party and the Sofasonke Party. The Communist Party 
candidates were A. Msitshana, Mofutsanyana , S. Lesolang and Moema , and 
the Sofasonke Party candidates were Mpanza , L. Kumalo , J.J. Masupha and 
the Rev. O.S.D. Mooki. (133)
The Sofasonke Party had finally broken its alliance with the A.D.P. 
There had been growing dissatisfaction with Mosaka during the year and 
the Jk.D.F. was generally proving incapable of sustaining its position.
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"The colourful dress of Mpanza , despite all the 
ridicule It evoked, was nearer to the people than the 
staid respectibility of the A.D.P. leaders^ Mpanza 
offered the dignity of 'going it alone' - Mosaka and 
Marapuru^ by contrast, belonged to the white man's 
world." (134)
Also, with the A.N.C. beginning to gain momentum, the gap that the A.D.P. 
had temporarily filled was fast disappearing. The A.D.P. had failed to 
link the local campaigns it had been involved in with larger political 
problems. Locally it had lost control of the squatter movements to the 
Sofasonke Party and other local leaders and nationally there was the 
A.N.C. The A.D.P. declined over the next two years then ceased to 
be. <135>
The election was held on 22nd December. There was great interest in the 
election and,
"huge crowds, in the grips of the elections fever 
surged to the polling booths."
People arrived'at the booths in packed lorries.
"Followers of both parties wore contrasting uniforms 
in order to avoid confusion. Mpanza in an animal skin 
hat , led the Sofasonke Party in the procession around 
the location. Fading on his charger, and followed by 
several supporters also mounted, he and his followers 
presented a spectacle which drew the attention of 
crowds of people.
Polling this year was done at booths placed at Orlando 
East and Orlando tfest. Long before the results were 
announced, crowds thronged before the communal hall 
where the returning officer was to make the 
announcement.
The Communist Party suffered heavy defeat, the results 
being J.S. Mpanza, (S.P. .1422 votes) , L.P. Kumalo
(S.P. , 1223 votes); J.J. Masupha (S.P. , 1154); Rev.
O.S.D. Mooki (S.P. , 1148)." (136)
This was the Communist Party's third defeat at the hands of the Sofasonke 
Party and cause for a reappraisal of their position on the squatters.
By January 1947 the total squatter population numbered 70 000, one fifth 
of the total black population of Johannesburg. The Council had failed to 
build any more houses in the previous twelve months.
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The Council's only solution was to take the offensive by creating another 
emergency camp next to Jabavu for 'controlled squatting' , to break the 
power of the leaders. This was called Moroka and was to be the home of 
26 000 families.
On the morning of 3rd January at 3.30p.m. 200 policementdescended on the
Orlando West squatters and moved the more than 2 000 people under Baduza
(139)back to Alexandra in 200 military vehicles.
In spite of this , 28 families attempted to establish another squat on the 
farm Zuurbekom on the 14th January but this was broken up by the S.A.P. 
and the City Council.
The Council believed that two more large scale squatting movements were 
being actively organised in Johannesburg including people from 
Martindale , Newclare and Sophiatown. The Council was close to despair. 
Said the Manager of N.E.A.D. ,
"The situation is quite beyond any power of any local 
authority. There are already 25 000 squatters in 
Orlando, 5 000 on the farm Albertyn on the Council's 
boundaries, 6 000 in Alexandra, 6 C00 ex-squatters in 
Jabavu still under hessian and 21 000 ex-squatters 
from the original 1544 movement still housed in breeze 
blocks in Orlando. The further threatened movements 
would have the gravest consequences."
The Council called on the Government to introduce emergency 
legislation.
Willing to try anything, the Native Commissioner addressed the squatters 
who had been returned to Alexandra and offered free passage to anyone 
going home to the reserves. One squatter replied,
"They only want to send us to the territories to force 
us to become cheap labour for the. mines." (1^2)
The Council felt that the issues at stake in the squatter movement had
(143)now become much larger and that the Government should be involved.
Meeting in January, the Communist Party was coming to a similar 
conclusion.
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"Originally the Party opposed the formation of 
Shantytowns. However, underestimating the growing 
political significance of the movement - the District 
Committee has erred by continuing to discourage the 
formation of Shantytowns.
Paying tribute to the militancy and solidarity of the 
squatters , the Committee now recognises that their 
action and initiative in challenging the African's 
Ghetto's Laws - the Native Land Acts and the Urban 
Areas Act - constitutes an important contribution to 
the struggle for the national liberation of the
African people.”
The Party attempted to act on its new resolution and organised an
umbrella body for the squatters.
“New threats are being made to deport squatters to 
Basutoland and Swaziland. This led to squatters 
uniting in the Joint Shantytown's Co-ordinating 
Committee (JSTCC) which has leading representatives 
from Orlando West, Tobruk Township - the
ex-servicemen's camp - from Albertynsville , Alexandra 
and Jabavu."
The chairman of the Committee was S. Bhoduza , Secretary was E.T.
Mofutsonyana and treasurer, 0. Monongoaha,
Mpanza had very little to do with it.
The Communist Party pledged its support for the new body.
"The Committee heartily welcomes the action of the 
leaders of the various Shantytowns in uniting in the 
Johannesburg Joint Shantytowns Co-ordinating 
Committee , to demand land where they can build their 
own homes. It expresses its wholehearted sxipport for 
this demand , and pledges all possible assistance. It 
demands that the National and Local authorities accept 
responsibility for the squatters; that they subsidise 
and assist them in erecting homes; that civic , 
educational and other amenities , transport and health 
services be provided."
On 25th January a large demonstration was held. It had been called by 
the Joint Shantytowns Co-ordinating Committee. After a meeting in a 
Newtown Market Square, 7 000 squatters, mostly women and many with babies 
on their backs, marched down Jeppe , Eloff and Commissioner Streets 
carrying scores of banners reading 'give us land to build our homes!‘ and 
singing. They assembled in front of the City Hall where they were 
o«<inicouii W  Hi* _ Y.K. Dad oo and an natter leaders.
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The meeting passed a resolution declaring that the
"tragic and acute overcrowding and housing shortage 
and the pressure which led to the erection of the 
'Shantytowns' was due to the criminal rweglect of the 
City Council and the Union Gov-errihient to provide 
housing and their segregation and cheap labour 
policies."
Apart from this , there is little evidence that the Co-ordinating 
Committee undertook any further joint action and the movement 
praiseworthy as it was, was a bit late in the day to be effective.
"The Committee represented the Party's attempt to 
enter a movement which they belatedly saw to have 
social significance, but the problems of which could 
not be known to them from personal experience. In any 
case it was too late: Within six months all the
squatters (except those from Albertynville) , would be 
moved to Moroka and would lose their group 
identity." (146)
Attempting to stabilize the Jabavu camp and to formalise relations with 
it through accepted channels , the Council hurried to .introduce an 
advisory board. Elections were to be on 2nd March. The Communist Party 
responded by announcing its intention to boycott the elections as the 
start of the implementation of the A.N.C.'s 1946 boycott resolution in 
Bloemfontein.
As part of its intensified assault on the squatter leaders, Mpanza's 
certificate of exemption from Native Law was removed in late February. 
He had already been notified on the 9th September, 1946 of the 
Government's intention to cancel it. The reason stated was that he took 
a leading part in organising the possession of the vacant Orlando West 
houses.
"In his reply to the Native Commissioner , Mr. Mpanza 
points out that it is not true that his Sofasonke 
Party took possession of the Orlando houses; that as a 
member of the Orlando Advisory Board he is an elected 
representative of the people of Orlando and has always 
acted on their behalf and that if he is accused of 
lawlessness he invites the Commissioner to appoint a 
commission to investigate whether this is really so.
Reference is also made to his conviction as a
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murderer. But Mpanza says that if the 
Governor-General did not think fit to withdraw his 
exemption certificate in 1915 when the murder was 
committed, so thirty two years after the event it is 
doubtful: whether this can be a true reason for the 
present action" (1^8)
With Mpanza beleagured by the mounting hostility of the authorities, 
Julia Mpanza continued to be active.
On the 8th March, hundreds of women from all race groups marched through
the streets of Johannesburg under demands of freedom and equality.
Prominent in the procession were Julia Mpanza and a number of women from
the Shantytowns. The Sofasonke women had always played a very important
part in the party's actions and were in many ways the backbone of the
(149)movement. Now they were making demands of their own.
Shortly after the 'doctor’s pact' involving the Indian Congress and the 
A.N.C. , a large demonstration took place in Newtown Market Square on the 
9th March. Of most immediate concern to this gathering was the desperate 
situation in the squatters' camps.
This showed the increasing concern amongst the larger political parties 
over the squatter movement. There had been some frustration over the 
A.N.C.'s slowness to respond, particularly from the Youth League.
"Congress has shilly-shallied and missed a golden 
opportunity to crystallise the shanty town movement 
into the spearhead of the African's fight against 
oppression and the discriminatory land policy. Shanty 
towns grew every month around Johannesburg and to this 
day Congress has no plan of how to deal with 
them."
Congress was at last beginning to look more directly at the plight and 
potential of the masses.
On the 6th June 1947 new regulations were gazetted amending the 144 act , 
empowering local authorities to establish emergency camps for homeless 
persons, with heavier penalties for squatters, and for confiscation of 
money, collected from them by unauthorised persons.
The Council was starting to have the power it needed to finally bring 
squatting under control.
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Speaking in the House of Assembly, the Minister of Health said that the 
underlying principle of the plan was that henceforth the squatter 
movement should be controlled by the authorities instead of being left to 
spontaneous, sporadic eruptions, or worse still, to organisation and 
control by unlawful elements.
This was the authorities' policy in a nutshell. The main concern was one 
of control. The actual responsibility of providing housing was secondary.
News of the agreement between the Council and the Government to establish 
the camps led to an influx of blacks hoping to be included in the 
schemes.
The Council now concentrated on bringing all the squatters into the 
controlled camps.
A struggle began in Alexandra where those squatters were boycotting 
applications for sites at Moroka. They wanted everyone to go as a group 
regardless of whether they employed or not.
On the 29th April the S.A.P. took control of Tobruk. More than 300 
people were arrested as unemployed. 16 appeared in court charged 
with arson, assault and common assault. Police kept a patrol at both the 
Alexandra and Tobruk camps, 'to maintain order.'
The removal of the Tobruk squatters began on the 5 th May with mixed 
response from the squatters. Monongoaha's camp (Oriel) were reluctant to 
be screened and attempted to maintain the boycott on an all or nothing 
basis in uniformity with the Alexandra squatters' stand.
A heroic struggle on the prat of the Oriel squatters during which 
Monongoaha was arrested followed. The Shantytown Co-ordinating Committee 
submitted a memorandum to the Johannesburg City Council opposing the 
smallness of the stands at the emergency camps and the high rent, and 
protesting against the screening.
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"We African people are regarded as ’work cattle' who 
are to be housed only as long as we are serving some 
useful purpose to the employers. Restrictions on 
residents are unheard of in any democratic country or 
with respect to any other section of the 
people." (159)
Repressive steps were also taken against the Communist Party. Since the 
African Mineworkers' Strike they had been subject to considerable 
harrassment. This had not improved their performance at the December 
elections in Orlando. There had been raids on the party offices, a trial 
of 52 members of the Communist Party and A.N.C. (in which all were 
discharged), more raids on the party offices and the trade union, 
Guardian and Springbok Legion offices. This was followed by charges 
against Central Executive Committee members.
Although Mpanza had triumphed in the face of the charges against him and 
had risen even further in popularity, it had still become difficult for 
him to directly intervene in grass roots militancy. The withdrawal of 
his certificate excluded him even further. The new regulations made it 
difficult for the party as a whole to make any extra-constitutional 
interventions. Within the orbit of advisory board politics, however, 
they were safe.
The Sofasonke Party was very low key in the first half of 1947. They 
sought to fulfil their role through the Advisory Board through accepted 
channels. For example they took up the issue of congestion in the trains 
through an interview with the Railways Systems Manager and were rewarded 
with four additional trains. They agreed to have regular raeetins with 
him. <161>
They also took up the question of ownership of houses. The Council had 
agreed to give Orlando houses to the residents after fifteen years.
"This promise was made in 1932 and in 1947 we 
approached them and said their time was up. But we 
were asked if we had any proof of their promise and we 
did not. The authorities said they could not have 
made such a blunder
said the Rev. Mooki.
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On 6th June the Transvaal A.N.C. held an emergency conference in 
Johannesburg in oppostion to the Native Trade Union Bill. At this 
meeting a resolution was passed calling on all black urban and other 
Advisory Boards to adjourn indefinitely in support of the adjournment of 
the N.R.C. as called by the A.N.C. the previous year. There was 
opposition to the decision. Native representatives spoke against it. It 
called for the immediate implementation of the boycott.
In what looks like an unprecedented act of solidarity with the broader 
political movements, on the 11th June , the Orlando Advisory Board voted 
by four elected, i.e. the Sofasonke Party votes, against 2, to adjourn 
indefinitely until the Council defined the functions and duties of the 
board and provided in the Urban Areas ACt. These had not been defined in 
15 years they said.
"The Board has been made a mere toy in the eyes of the 
people they represent and have become a mere sham."
The following day a meeting of over 1 000 Shantytown supporters of the 
Sofasonke Party was held in the Communal Hall, which endorsed the action 
of the board.
As failure to attend three consecutive meetings of the board disqualified 
a member, the residents waited to see whether the Council would try to 
use this provision to get a new board functioning.
Looking more closely at their demands it appeared that their 
dissatisfaction is not with the board per se but rather that it should 
have greater powers.. This differs greatly from the consistently held 
position of the Communist Party that the boards should be used and 
exposed , and can only be platforms for mass mobilization.
Meeting nearly two weeks after calling for the boycott, the Transvaal 
A.N.C. executive committee reversed its decision on the grounds that no 
mandate had been obtained either from chiefs or the electoral committees , 
members of the N.S.C. had not toured their constituencies to organise the 
boycott, and the body representing the advisory boards of all the 
locations {the Locations Advisory Board Congress) had not been consulted.
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Apart from wanting to continue with the efforts to negotiate with the 
Government over the N.R,C., the committee stated that the resolution on 
the boycott of advisory boards would be unworkable. This was because in 
many cases the.local authorities had the power to appoint members to- the 
boards to carry on the place of any members who adjourned 
indefinitely. (-^5)
The A.N.C.'s boycott resolutions were never fully accepted or implemented 
with discipline.
"For all the past talk of boycott and resolutions 
passed in both the A.N.C. and the A.A.C. , there had 
not only been Xuma's personal defiance of a boycott of 
the Roayl Family's visit to Zululand in 1947, but 
Matthews and Moroka had remained members of the 
N.R.C. Furthermore, the Communist Party had broken 
the boycott of elections and put up candidates (in 
1948)." (166)
Looking back at this period Mandela writesj
"The 1947 boycott resolution of the A.N.C. was 
correct, in spite of the fact that no effective 
country-wide campaign was carried out to implement 
this resolution. It will be recalled that at the 
time, in an endeavour to destroy the people's 
political organisations and to divert them from these 
organisations , the United Party Government was
fostering the illusion that the power of the Natives' 
Representative Council , the Bunga , the Advisory 
Boards , and similar institutions would be increased to 
such an extent that the African people would have an 
effective voice in the Government of the country. The 
agitation that followed the adoption of the boycott 
resolution by the A.N.C. , inadequate as it was , helped 
to damage the influence of the sham institutions and 
to discredit those who supported them."
Explaining this further he says ,
"... for the boycott is in no way a matter of 
principle but a tactic weapon whose application 
should, like all other political weapons of the 
struggle , be related to the concrete conditions 
prevailing at the given time." (167)
By the 24th June the removal of squatters from Tobruk and Oriel had been
completed, and a start made on moving the Alexandra squatters to
w , (168)Moroka.
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Steps were taken to remove the squatter leaders from their followers. 
They were not allowed to live in the same place.
For the Orlando Advisory Board the boycott issue was not over. At a four 
hour meeting in Orlando on about the 20th July , which had been addressed 
by the four elected members , they were being criticized for their actions.
"At first it was thought that the Orlando Board's 
decision was in line with the action of the N.R.C. but 
it was later believed that though the board might have 
copied the action of the Council, the reasons for its 
decision were mainly local."
They were severely attacked by W, Pela , a nominated member of the board , 
but whose criticisms were not without some force.
"W.S. Pela said he thought the majority decision by 
the board was unwise. The majority had stated that 
the police had arrested unlicenced hawkers in the 
township and that the N.E.A.D, had allocated certain 
houses to families on its waiting list without 
reference to the board as had been the practice in the 
past. For these reasons it was contended that the 
board should adjourn indefinitely until the council 
defined its powers and functions as provided by the 
law.
Mr. Pela pointed out that the powers and duties of the 
four Advisory Boards falling under the City Council 
had been stated in terms of the Act and were 
circularised to all members of the boards in May, 
1945, for comment.
In September last year a conference was held at which 
the boards , as well as other Native organisations were 
represented. After some debate it was decided that 
the discussion of the draft locations regulations 
should be held over pending the findings of the then 
recently appointed Fagan Native Laws Commission.
Mr. Pela said that the Orlando board's decision was 
unilateral and without reference to the other three 
Advisory Boards - Pimville, Western and Eastern Native 
Townships. It was contrary to the September decision 
to wait until the Government had formulated its policy 
in the light of the Fagan Commission's report, when 
that was promised.” (170)
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Pela's criticisms are important as they show that the Sofasonke Party's 
decision to boycott was for reasons specific to its own conditions , that 
it was not a fundamental dissatisfaction with the board system itself and 
that the Sofasonke Party had no reservations about acting on its own 
without consultation with other relevant bodies and for local interests. 
They were also now less directed toward mass unified action. These 
factors were to continue to be a problem in Orlando's local politics.
But even with these considerations the problem cannot be laid at the feet
of the Sofasonke Party entirely. At least during the forties' the
Sofasonke Party tended to have a much closer relation with the rank and 
file than any other party.
Another meeting was held on 20th July at Orlando West at which the
boycott issue was discussed. This was reported on by G.W. Xala, the
Honourary Secretary of the Orlando West Residents' Association.
"The Orlando residents were unanimous in their support 
of the action taken of the Orlando Advisory Board in 
adjourning sine die, the only dissentient being a 
Council nominee who recieved no support for his 
counter-motivation criticising the Orlando Advisory 
Board's action.
The following resolution was adopted.
'That this meeting of Orlando West residents fully
supports the action by the Orlando Advisory Board in 
adjourning sine die , but would like the board to add 
that it also sympathises with the action taken by the 
A.N.C. and the N.R.C. in boycotting all elections 
under the Native Representation Act of 1936.'” (1^1)
Concerned about the boycott the N.E.A.C. made an effort to improve its
relations with the boards. It held a meeting with them on the night of 
24th July. It was decided that quarterly meetings would be held and that 
any member of the boards would have access to the chairman of the
committee on urgent matters provided that the superintendent and the
manager of N.E.A.D. were first informed of the matter for
.. . (172)discussion. '
The attack on the legitimacy of the boards, while not uniform, had wider 
effects than Orlando. Two out of the three elected members of the
Albarton Advisory Board resigned in September due to the Council's
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refusal to give them copies of the regulations and the repressive 
attitude of the authorities toward them and the people of the location.
"The chairman of the board uses us only to suppress 
our people," they said.
Becoming more active the A.N.C. Youth League was able to call a well 
attended meeting at the Orlando Leake Hall of people from all along the 
Reef. (173)
At an A.N.C. (Transvaal) Annual Provincial Conference for 1947 held on 
the 25th and 26th October, the Secretary was able to report on 
significant steps towards broader involvement of the A.N.C. in popular 
political issues. The Secretary was a member of the Joint Shantytowns
Co-ordinating Committee and President Xuma had claimed to have been 
instrumental in the boycott of Moroka by the Alexandra squatters and the 
subsequent rent boycott there. It was also reported that several 
advisory boards had adjourned completely in response to the call to 
boycott state structures. Included among these were Vereeniging, Bethal 
and Orlando.
In December it was election time again. 1947 had been a significant 
year. The state had finally acted in unison with the Council and 
together they had introduced the necessary legislation and taken the 
necessary action to not only bring the squatter movements under control , 
but also to prevent their reoccurence. Only 582 houses had been built 
that year. Miile a significant increase, it was still only a drop in the 
ocean.
The homeless people had been suppressed but not without a fight. There 
had been the attempt to stop the Council from breaking unity in the camps 
by separating out the unemployed. Shortly after arriving in Moroka a 
protracted rent boycott began with strong mass support. There had also 
been a riot in August during which three white policemen had been killed.
The state had responded as could be expected. A new wing of the police
was established called the "Flying Squad" which was armed with twelve
Sten sub-machine guns and other arms, was motorised, and consisted of
forty trained men. Their purpose was specifically to deal with 
(176)riots.
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The state also responded to the riot with a Commission of enquiry under 
the chairmanship of H.A. Fagan. The commission reviewed the entire 
squatter movement.
Of the bodies involved in the activism of the mid-forties around 
Johannesburg , which included the squatter leaders , the A.D.P. , the 
Sofasonke Party and the Communist Party , most had either disappeared for 
lack of support or had come under a degree of repression, as the state 
struggled to reassert itself to bring the situation under control. Most 
of these bodies had been forced to retreat. The only organisation which 
had escaped relatively unscathed was the A.N.C. which had also had the 
least direct involvement. Its numbers were growing and there were new 
energies coming to the surface through the efforts primarily of the Youth 
League. It was the organisation which showed the most promise.
This was the situation when the Advisory Board elections came round again 
in December. The A.N.C. , which had not looked in any serious way to the 
boards as a site of struggle, was still largely boycotting. The 
Communist Party, the Sofasonke Party's old enemy, licking their wounds in 
the wake of state action, was supporting the boycott and did not contest 
the Orlando elections. The Sofasonke Party candidates of the previous 
year, Mpanza , Masupha , L. Kumalo and the Rev. O.S.D. Mooki were returned 
unopposed.
In January 1948 the Communist Party broke the boycott, as did Xuma and 
fielded Mofutsanyana for the N.R.C. elections. Mpanza was nominated as a 
candidate by his own and one other board.
Mpanza restricted himself to maintaining control of local politics on a 
smaller scale, as usual not always with constitutional means.
He appeared in the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court in February on a 
charge of public violence when it was alleged that a gang under his 
leadership, called the 'skelm gang', intimidated inhabitants of Orlando 
Township who were not members of the gang.
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He was charged with having caused a riot and the break-up of a meeting of 
the White City Residents Association on January the 18th. He conducted 
his own defence.
A witness said that thirty blacks had arrived during the meeting armed 
with kieries and dangerous weapons. Later Mpanza road up on a horse with 
a sjambok in his hand and said he would spoil the meeting if it was not 
stopped. He told his thirty followers to beat the people at the meeting , 
saying ,
"Mio gave you instructions to hold this meeting in 
Orlando? I am the King of this Orlando, and nobody 
else." (179)
With the N.R.C. election campaigns underway , Mosaka and Mofutsanyana were 
competing for the Transvaal and O.F.S. seat. An issue in their 
campaxning had become Mosalca's suggestion to the Council during the 
Shantytown struggle , that Mpanza be deported. This had come to light 
during the Fagan Commission.
The A.N.C. Youth League held its fourth annual conference in Orlando in 
early April. Among the delegates were Tambo, Mandela and Sisulu, a 
strorg grouping emerging , from Orlando.
By May Dube was ready and the Council invited applicatins for 
sites <182>
It was also in May that the Nationalist Party came into power and began 
to Implement its policy of 'Apartheid'.
The Fagan Commission reported in September 1948 and concluded about the 
Moroka disturbances that
"The cause of all the difficulties was the direct or 
indirect result of the housing shortage." (184)
The Commission also concluded that the Council was hopelessly wrong about 
the proportion of squatters who were employed in Johannesburg and at one 
time had wanted the Government to take all the squatters away.
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"The results of the subsequent inumerations showed 
that, had this been done, the effect on the economic 
life in Johannesburg would have been like that of a 
major strike." (183)
Apartheid was seen for what it was by the national political 
organisations and condemned. It was the focus of a great deal of 
discussion at the time, nationally, and in Orlando as well.
At a well-attended meeting in Orlando with Mpanza in the chair, the topic 
of ’apartheid' was discussed. Mpanza outlined to the meeting his 
understanding of ’apartheid'. The meeting agreed to accept this policy,
"provided adequate land for cultivation and grazing 
farms were given to blacks. In addition, tractors and 
boring machines should be supplied.” (185)
This was a time of changes, of new alignments, of taking decisions. The 
Sofasonke Party's response to apartheid was a conditional acceptance.
"Sofasonke believed that the Apartheid was a stupid , 
costly and backward policy. He said - practically 
there was nothing progressive in the theory of 
Separate Development. He said he could only accept 
the separate development theory if the Nationalist 
pursues Apartheid to its logical conclusion. As it 
is , this is a Convenience Theory propounded by the 
white man for the humiliation and inconvenience of the 
black man.” (186)
The advent of the Nationalist Government was to have profound effect on
the politics of resistance , especially in its effects on the Youth
League. It broadened the acceptability and strength of its ideology of
'African Nationalism'. It also forced the Youth League to look to the
masses for the power to challenge the Nationalists. In so doing it
brought themn into closer co-operation with the Communist Party in a
willingness to develop mass action. This in turn created increased
personal contact between members of the Youth League and the Communist
z ^ 8 7 )Party and moderated the anti-Communism of the former. ^
While these new alliances and forces developed Mpanza continued with his 
own personal interests on his home ground. Orlando held the biggest race 
meeting it had ever seen at Orlando on November 6th with entrants from as 
far afield as the Free State, Standerton, Vereeniging and the Reef.
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Mpanza was a leading race horse owner and the Secretary of the 
Club. (188)
But the boards as a whole were not dormant. Responding to the Council 
having taken over the Pass Laws and enforcing the compulsory endorsement 
provisions of the law without consulting the boards, the Western Native 
Township Advisory Board called for a joint meeting of the Orlando, 
Moroka , Pimville and Eastern Native Township Boards to discuss 
this. <189>
In December Mpanza was very confident of his position in the coming 
elections. He had changed the name of the party to 'Magebula Party' , 
although it soon returned to its former name. He explained why he was 
confident.
. "My Party, the 'Magebula Party', recently had an 
interview with the Native Commissioner and 
representatives of the City Council , in connection 
with mass arrests for passes and liquor. We objected 
to indiscriminate employment of African convicts on 
farms ,”
he said.
"Mr. Mpanza said that his party pointed out that 
arrests for beer were wrong in that Africans regarded 
beer as part of their ritual. 'This is in keeping 
with our religion,' he added.
He thought it was useless , therefore , attempting to 
convince a people that beer was bad while they 
attached religious importance to it.
'In any case,' he went on 'European liquor was 
stronger than kaffir beer. I see no reason to arrest 
location brewers of light beer while Europeans may 
have stronger liquor. Mass arrests of our womenfolk 
has acquainted them with gaols and criminals.'
Mpanza asked: 'What does the word 'pass' mean when our 
people in the location are arrested for passes? 
Houses are raided and even people asleep are woken up 
and asked for passes.*
Objecting to police raids for passes in the locations , 
Mr, Mpanza said that these people once convicted, are 
sent to work on farms.
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'I asked the Native Commissioner to give us some trust 
farms together with tractors and necessary implements 
so that those who cared to , could go out and live 
there. __They would then be away from town, free from 
pass raids and be able to till the soil voluntarily 
for a living.'
He said he had seen the Director of Native Labour who 
offered land in Kuruman. He objected to this and 
pointed out land in Pretoria district.
'On being told that the trust farms in the Pretoria 
district were over populated , I sought to know where 
and how Apartheid would be carried out. I have had no 
answer to that question' , he said."
His party candidates were the same as the previous year.
The Communist Party had returned to the fray this year as they had 
abandoned the boycott. There was also an indication that the A.N.C. was 
beginning to take an interest in Advisory Board Elections with a strong 
rumour that they were putting up candidates at Krugersdorp.
A report appearing in Bantu World at the time captures much of the 
excitement of the election and explains much of the dynamics of Orlando 
Advisory Board politics and part of the reason for the success of the 
Sofasonke Party against the Communist Party. - ,
"Sunday, December 19th was Election Day at Orlando, 
and for colourful pageantry, excitement and 
high~pressure-vote-catc.hing-sales talk, the Etonswill 
election of the Picwickian days, by comparison, was a 
very tame affair. Since the beginning of last week 
the parties seeking election - for we have parties too 
at Orlando - were haranguing the residents through
loud-speakers on the relative value of their
respective 'policies'. The people, it seems had been 
sufficiently aroused by these pre-election speeches; 
for as early as 6 a.in. on Sunday columns began to
emerge from the different sections of the locations 
all converging towards one focal-point - the polling 
sta tions.
The election of members to the Native Advisory Board 
in Orlando is not merely a matter for the enfranchised 
alone, whole families declare a national holiday from 
all domestic chores and go abroad gaily clad in the
finery of their respective parties. So election day 
here is a fancy dress parade, a gala occasion. Yes, 
feelings do run high at: times but the worst that ever 
happens is a contest in vective.
In this year’s election there are three parties in the 
field - the Sofasonke Party, the ’Liberals' (a new 
one) and the Communists. Supporters arrived in 
lorries"' and private cars whilst advance columns 
paraded the streets carrying banners and election 
cards. To the accompaniment of popular tribal songs- 
and chants they danced tirelessly from early morning 
to dusk. Men and women and their children wore 
multicoloured blankets and now and again you came 
across a man dressed only in the traditional 'beshu' 
of the Zulu, complete with knob kerrie and shield and 
sporting a large feather headgear.
It became quite clear from the outset in which 
direction the loyalty of the electors lay. The 
majority carried Sofasonke cards and whenever one of 
the candidates of that party visited any one of the 
polling stations , excitement broke loose , but the 
highlight was the arrival of Mr. James Sofasonke 
Mpanza , that colourful leader of the original 
Shantytown movement.
All the votes must go to Mpanza argue the people; for 
is it not to him we owe the impetus that has been 
given to Native housing in recent. years?
Significantly enough at this very same time other 
people further down the road begin to sing the party 
song: 'We shall die together' composed by Mpanza
himself for he is a musician as well as being a party 
leader.
It is thus not the soundness of the 'policy' of one 
party as against another's that matters with the 
people of Orlando, nor can they be divided along 
tribal lines. What do they know of the ward system 
promised them by the Liberal Party? They are just not 
bothered. They never vote on policy. They are a hero 
worshipping crowd with whom the personality of the 
individual weighs a good deal.
Just now, Sofasonke is their hero and anyone who 
embraces civic aspirations must come to terms with 
this astute leader.
As for the Communist opposition, it might never have 
been there at all for all the people of Orlando care. 
Their 'policy' , less still their propaganda makes no 
impression on the voters. So, once mors the Sofasonke 
Party has been returned to power by a majority of 
4 623 over the Liberal Party and 4 023 over the 
Communist Party." (192)
This situation is aptly summed up by Harris.
"A people often deserve better leadership than they 
receive, but the leadership does reflect the state of 
political consciousness at the time,” (19o)
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While there were still some squatters in the original camps , such as the 
844 families at—Albertynsville , and occasional smaller groupings started , 
for example the 150 families who squatted on McDonald's Ground near 
Klipspruit in February 1949 , by May of that year the Council 
regarded the movement as clearly passed. The Chairman of N.E.A.C: 
reviewed their achievements with satisfaction.
"For a long time these people had lived under lawless 
conditions , brooking no interference from the 
authorities. The rule of law was at a discount and 
criminal and illegal practices were the order of the 
day.
In less than two years , the Council has resolved this 
heterogenous collection of people into a law-abiding 
community, house-proud and actively engaged in 
improving their dwellings and living conditions. I 
know of no precedent for such conditions in this 
country, and it is an achievement of which we may be 
proud." (195)
After years of neglect, repression and attempts to make the homeless 
people 'go back to where they came from' rather than accept 
responsibility for their living conditions, the Council now wished to 
claim credit for having established something of what the homeless people 
had been fighting them for, for nearly a decadel
With the Nationalist Party now in Government the repression of the 
Communist Party had been intensified. No doubt in the protection of 
'democracy' , an elected Communist member of Parliament, Sam Khan, was 
prevented from addressing meetings of the residents of Alexandra , 
Nevelare and Moroka, by the banning of the meetings. The response at the 
meetings showed a strong and growing recognition of the Communist Party's 
contribution to the struggles of the black people.
At Alexandra the crowd persisted in spite of being attacked and assaulted 
by the police. As Kahn was leaving without attempting to address the 
crowd, the police charged the crowd again, injuring more people.
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At Newclare there was a similar scene. He left immediately after reading 
the banning order. The crowd refused to leave the area. When the police 
ordered them to disperse they replied that if they had no right to speak, 
then neither did the police and demanded that only God should address 
them. After being forced back by the police , the crowd began stoning 
passing white motorists and a police van.
At Moroka the meeting dispersed when they heard it was banned.
Observing events in the townships the Manager of N.E.A.D. in his annual 
report on 30th June 1949 noted that troubled times were ahead.
He reported that racial tension had increased during the year and that an 
important factor in this was the acute housing shortage which forced the 
majority of blacks to live in grossly overcrowded conditions. 'The 
situation is explosive.' There was the inevitable fear of ’agitators’ 
taking advantage of the situation for their own political ends.
“Natives particularly are developing a feeling of 
nationalism and all Non-European groups are displaying 
increasing intolerance towards the other groups. •,
^ Officers of the Department find their conduct and- 
administration increasingly questioned and criticised 
by Non-Europeans. European officers find that their 
duties demand more than ordinary tolerance and
restraint if they are to preserve harmonious relations 
with the Non-European population." (197)
The Orlando Advisory Board continued to discuss issues like the 
accommodation for teachers at Orlando High School, the extension of 
trading shelters at the Orlando shelters, the rent for the stalls and 
street names for Orlando. They also protested strongly against the
proposal to demolish the breeze-block shelters at Orlando as they became 
vacant because they eased congestion in Orlando to a considerable 
degree.
The Council had begun building houses at Jabavu next to the controlled 
camp and moved the first forty families from the breeze-block shelters to 
these houses on the 16th August. The houses were being built at a rate 
of sixteen a day and about 1 000 of the 5 000 contracted were almost 
completed. There were about 5 000 families living in the breeze-block
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shelters at the time. The Council was anxious to demolish rooms as they 
left ’for health reasons'. They also said with probably more honesty, 
that they were concerned that the shelters would be reoccupied as they 
were vacated. The Department of Native Affairs told the Council not toC199)demolish the breeze-blocks immediately, v ' to which the Council 
later agreed. (200)
Still plagued by raw materials and manpower shortages the Council managed 
to build 5 233 houses between 1947 and 1951. (201)
The growing political tensions were having other effects. Concerned at
the upsurge of crime and the growth of gangs , in particular the mainly
Basutho 'Russians' there was a move toward the establishment of vigilante
patrols called the Civilian Guards. It was felt that there was
(202)insufficient protection from the police.
At the A.N.C. meeting on December 16th and 18th it was announced by the 
Transvaal that the Orlando Branch had been divided into two to form East 
and West Orlando branches. This was to cope with the growth of Orlando 
West. The Eastern Branch was still reported to be inactive, while the 
West had a lively membership of 60. v '
With the Youth League under Oliver Tambo's presidency since 
January (204) ancj w-[th Moroka as President and Walter Sisulu elected to 
the position of Secretary General of the A.N.C. in December, the Youth 
League was able to push through the acceptance of its Programme of Action 
by the parent body.
"The Programme of Action called for civil
disobediance, strikes, boycotts and stay-at-homes and 
thus unequivocally committed the A.N.C. to a new 
strategy based on extra-legal tactics, mass action, 
and the principle of non-collaboration. (205)
The conference embarked on the Programme of Action with a call for a 
one-day strike as a protest against apartheid. (2®^^
The Locations Advisory Boards Congress was simultaneously holding its 
annual conference in Port Elizabeth. The President of the Congress
disallowed a motion calling for support for the A.N.C.'s one-day strike
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as they had not been approached 'through the correct channels'. The 
motion and its rejection on a technicality revealed stirrings in the 
Advisory Board's Congress as well and a tension between old leadership 
and new ideas.
Back in Orlando elections were being held at the same time, on the 18th 
Decemhe r.
The two main contending parties were the Sofasonke Party and the 
Residents Association led by S.M. Moema, who was not standing as a 
Communist this year.
"Early on Sunday morning Orlando was filled with 
people moving to the voting stations at both Orlando 
West and East. The results were announced late in the 
afternoon at the Communal Hall.
During the whole morning and afternoon, voters, some 
in motor cars and lorries and others marching through 
Orlando, worked hard to win the elections for their 
parties.
The Sofasonke Party , in lorries and motor cars with 
their flags , was sure of winning the election and this 
they did by an overwhelming majority. Interviewed 
earlier in the day by the Bantu World reporter, Mr.
Mpanza said he was confident of success.
The Sofasonke Party had organised well for the day.
There were lorries , cars and a loudspeaker band , while 
women and children marched through the streets of 
Orlando singing songs in praise of Magebula who moved 
among his supporters wearing a hat made of feathers as 
on the days of old. His xtdfe also played a leading 
part in the processions. The principal songs of the 
Sofasonke Party supporters were 'Vouteli Sofasonke , 
uvouteli nyaniso.' (a vote for Sofasonke is a vote for 
truth)'.” (208)
The results show the overwhelming support for the Sofasonke Party. They 
also show that some of the other squatter leaders had now been drawn into 
the ambit of Advisory Board politics.
Twelve candidates stood for election and these were the results:
Mpanza, 1 547 votes; L.P. Khumalo , 1 307; O.S.D. Mooki , 1 299; J.
Masupha , 1 263; S.M. Moema, 493; D.J. Malefane , 489; T. Cuku , 430,
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F.F. Ngubane , 424;
S.N. Bhaduza , 62; T.M. Mokete , 56; S.S. Komo and S.D. Masitenyane 55 
each. <209> -
Not everyone was Impressed with the Sofasonke victory.
•
"The Sofasonke Party has again got its men onto the 
Advisory Board. They've sure got what it takes to be 
elected. A few songs to move the gullible crowd; 
they've the finger to point at Shantytown, which is a 
nice, easy cushion of laurels to rest upon when they've 
once got through the election-gates. We only hope
that when these 'die-all' vigilantes promised the 
people their best services they did not do so on 
condition that those who would have to reap the wild 
winds , clear the stones and briars from the path of 
the Board members, or line their pockets." (210)
While the housing struggles had been contained by 1949, they had by no 
means been solved. As the Secretary for the Department of Native Affairs 
said ,
"The" most pressing need of the Native community is 
adequate housing. Only by the provision of adequate 
shelter in properly planned native townships can full 
control over urban natives be regained.” (2 1 1)
At the end of 1949, it was relatively quiet in Orlando, but with new 
forces building up in the wake of the Nationalist Party victory , it was 
the lull before the storm.
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